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ABSTRACT 
The concept of “race” has been the organising feature of South African society for more than 
three centuries. More recent social changes in the United States of America, Europe, Australia, 
and South Africa have lead to more subtle expressions of racism.  The present study aimed to 
explore and describe subtle racism amongst undergraduate psychology learners at a tertiary 
institution in Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality in 2004. The Subtle Racism Scale was 
used to measure anti-Black sentiment among a sample of 286 undergraduate psychology learners, 
obtained through non–probability, convenience sampling.  Multiple regression analysis revealed 
the independent variables of race, age, and the race-age interaction were significantly associated 
with subtle racism of the participants.  Research results demonstrated that participants’ level of 
estimated subtle racism varied according to the age and race of the participants, supporting the 
notion that racism in South Africa did not influence different age and race groups in a uniform 
manner.    
 
Key words:  racism, subtle racism, South Africa, undergraduate psychology learners, multiple 
regression analysis. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION   
Significant changes in the racial climate of countries in North America, Britain, Europe, and 
Australia have been evident in South Africa since the demise of apartheid.  Globally, this change 
was a knee-jerk response to Hitler and Nazi Germany’s racist ideology as it became difficult for 
democratic countries such as the United States of America to claim democracy while actively 
practicing racial discrimination (Leach, 2005).  Since World War II, dramatic and drastic changes 
in policies and legislation in these previously segregated countries led to the entrenchment of 
racial equality through policies and programs to bring about social transformation (McConahay, 
1986; Durheim, 2003; Leach, 2005).   
In line with changing norms and legislative interventions, shifts in race attitudes have been 
observed.  In the United States of America, for example, researchers found increasing evidence of 
the rejection of racial segregation and racial stereotypes based on notions of racial inferiority of 
Black people and support for equal treatment of Black people (Durheim, 2003).  Concurrently, 
however, American researchers found that interracial conflict was still present, while anti-Black 
attitudes only showed a modest decline (McConahay, 1986).   This led to speculations that 
changing social norms have created stronger demands for Whites to disguise their negative racial 
attitudes (Durheim, 2003), resulting in a change in the nature of racism (Dovidio & Gaertner, 
2000).  In the United States of America, it was found that contemporary expressions of racism and 
discrimination were more subtle, less conscious, and expressed more symbolically than traditional 
forms of racism.  These contemporary forms of racism were not acknowledged by Whites as 
racism, as they differed from the overt expressions of traditional racism.  However, for targets of 
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racism, the contemporary forms of racism have been as significant and destructive as the 
traditional, overt form of racism (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000).   
 Recent Changes in South African Society 
As in the United States of America, intergroup issues have also featured prominently in the 
history of South Africa (De la Rey, 1991).  Soon after the first White people established a base at 
the southern tip of Africa in 1652, they conducted their first act of racial segregation by planting a 
hedge of bitter almonds to separate Whites from Blacks (Sparks, 2003).  However, as the global 
trend towards abandoning racial discrimination and segregation increased in momentum (Louw & 
Foster, 1991),  South Africa established the apartheid structure, built on the concept of group 
differences (De la Rey, 1991), prejudice, and the power struggle for the control of South Africa 
(Sparks, 2003).  The basis of apartheid has been the division and classification of all South 
Africans according to race, legalised by laws such as the Population Registration Act, the Group 
Areas Act, and the Immorality Act (Eades, 1999; Sparks, 2003), thereby creating a racist society 
in that country (Foster, 1991b).    
However, between 1990 and 1994, remarkable changes took place in South Africa (Smith & 
Stones, 2001).  In February 1990, apartheid South Africa was transformed by two events.  The 
first was a forty-five minute speech during the opening of Parliament by the President F.W. de 
Klerk that announced the lifting of bans on organisations such as the African National Congress, 
the South African Communist Party, and Pan-Africanist Congress.  The second event, on 11 
February 1990 was the release of Nelson Mandela after twenty-seven years of political 
confinement (Eades, 1999; Sparks, 2003).     
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The fist democratic election in South Africa was held in April 1994, and this constituted the 
first step towards the South Africa that Nelson Mandela and his supporters had aimed at creating 
(Pratt, 1995).   After racial prejudice had saturated South African society for nearly three and a 
half centuries (Sparks, 2003), the aim was then for a continuing pattern of change away from a 
racist system (Eades, 1999).  At the swearing in of the new National Assembly in 1994, President 
Mandela announced:  
We enter into a covenant that we shall build the society in which all South Africans, both 
black and white, will be able to walk tall, without any fear in their hearts, assured of their 
inalienable right to human dignity—a rainbow nation at peace with itself and the world 
(Lewis, 2005, p.166).   
It is interesting to note that due to crucial differences between the features of racism in South 
Africa and in other countries in which social changes have occurred, the content of racism in 
South Africa may be different from that in other contexts.   For example, racial beliefs that are 
understood to be part of the contemporary racism model in the United States, such as “Blacks are 
being pushy and overly demanding” is considered to reflect a traditional racial opinion common 
in apartheid South Africa, especially after the Soweto-riots of 1976 (Durheim, 2003).   
Other contextual differences can be identified.  In the first place, in South Africa, a numerical 
White minority oppressed a Black majority.  While maintaining control of economic institutions, 
South African Whites, as a group, have lost political and social power in the democratic South 
Africa.  Their position is therefore significantly more uncertain than their American counterparts.  
Second, racism under apartheid was particularly harsh, blatant, and oppressive.  In addition, the 
effects of racism in terms of racial disparities in access to resources, such as health and education, 
living conditions and economic welfare were more extreme in South Africa than in the United 
States (Durheim, 2003).   
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It is now more than a decade since apartheid has been dismantled and the years since 1994 
have been characterised by the challenge of working towards an egalitarian society (Smith & 
Stones, 2001).  South Africa adopted a new constitution (Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, Act 108 of 1996) that explicitly forbids any form of direct or indirect discrimination, 
thereby incurring considerable change in South Africa’s social context and organisation (Korf & 
Malan, 2002; Pillay & Collings, 2004).  In accordance with the new Constitution, the new 
democratic government committed itself to addressing imbalances of the apartheid system, in 
particular racial and gender imbalances (Makaula, 2005).  In addition, in an attempt to find the 
truth and reconcile perpetrators and their victims or the families of victims, public hearings 
around gross human rights abuses during the apartheid regime were staged in South Africa 
(Meyer & Finchilescu, 2006).   
Contemporary Racism in the “new” South Africa 
A number of authors have argued that social and political changes in South Africa were likely 
to lead to improved interracial relations (De la Rey, 1991; Duckitt & Mphuthing, 1998; Smith & 
Stones, 1999; Smith, Stones & Naidoo, 2003).  Other commentators, however, have questioned 
whether significant political changes have led to similar changes in racial attitudes between pre-
democratic and post-apartheid South Africa (Foster, 2006). Such commentators have argued that 
deeply entrenched psychological and social divisions of the past, maintained by fears of crime and 
violence, and a deep-seated mistrust of other racial groups, have restricted the transformation of 
racial attitudes (Smith & Boero, 2001).  According to this line of reasoning, entrenched racial 
attitudes could be a reason widespread intergroup conflict, prejudice, ethnocentric pride, and 
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racism have been observed in post-apartheid South Africa (Duckitt, 1994; Hook, 2004; Smith & 
Boero, 2001).   
 It may be true then that “apartheid still casts a shadow over the South African social and 
physical landscape” (Meyer & Finchilescu, 2006, p.82), even though South Africans have been 
exposed to multiple social changes, increasingly liberal racial attitudes, and repeated calls for a 
“rainbow nation” (Smith, et al., 2003).  The continuation of racial tension in post-apartheid South 
Africa has led other researchers to postulate that widespread racism in South Africa has persisted 
in the form of contemporary, more subtle racism (Duckitt, 1994; Foster, 2006; Meyer & 
Finchilescu, 2006; Pillay & Collings, 2004).   
Whereas research into racial attitudes was prominent in previous decades, research on South 
African racial attitudes has been sparse and somewhat ambiguous since the 1980s.  Whereas some 
studies indicated slight improvements in racial attitudes (Smith & Stones, 1999; Smith, et al., 
2003), other studies revealed that racial attitudes have not changed since 1994 (Finchilescu & 
Dawes, 2001), while traditional racism and discrimination were still found to be prevalent at 
South African universities (Finnemore, 1998; Pillay & Collings, 2004).    Most empirical evidence 
regarding contemporary forms of racism has been gathered in North America, Europe and 
Australia.  However, large empirical gaps in the understanding of contemporary racism in the 
post-apartheid South African context exist.  For example, little information has been gathered on 
the racial attitudes of different age groups in post-apartheid South Africa.   
The lack of South African empirical research into racism is not a recent phenomenon.  
MacLeod (2004) and Ratele (2006) have both asserted that South African psychological research 
has largely avoided critical issues facing South Africans.  Even though psychology as a profession 
and science is aimed at promoting human welfare, apartheid as a racially oppressive system and 
declared a crime against humanity by the United Nations, did not enjoy critical attention from 
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scholars (Ratele, 2006).  The low percentage of articles in psychological journals that have 
focused on the issue of race, racism, and interracial relations is an illustration of this inherent 
weakness of South African psychological research (MacLeod, 2004; Ratele, 2006).  This trend 
persists in post-apartheid South Africa, perhaps fuelled by the common, but disturbing public 
discourse that in the “new” South Africa, racism no longer is a serious problem (De la Rey & 
Duncan, 2003).The present chapter contextualises the need to explore the expressions of 
contemporary, subtle racism within the post-apartheid South African context, hence highlighting 
the need for the present study.   
Purpose of the Study 
The primary purpose of the study is to investigate the levels of contemporary, subtle racism in 
a South African university among a sample of undergraduate psychology learners.  To achieve the 
primary purpose, the association between subtle racism and the demographic variables of gender, 
language, age, and race were explored and described.   
 Crucial historical, economic, and social differences exist between South African and other 
contexts in which contemporary forms of racism have been studied.  In addition, Pettigrew (1979) 
asserted that a construct should be studied and conceptualised within the context in which it 
occurs.  Thus, instead of merely adopting or amending constructs and measures conceptualised in 
other contexts, the present study aims to explore and describe contemporary racism as it occurs in 
a South African context.  Increased understanding of contemporary forms of racism in a South 
African situation will have an additional benefit.  Contemporary forms of racism have been 
empirically shown to have continuing effects on the targets of such prejudice. Furthermore, 
Brown (2006) argued that attitude and prejudice research should keep an essential aim in mind, 
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namely consideration of how prejudice could be reduced. Conclusions and recommendations from 
this study will therefore add to empirical evidence about contemporary racism in South Africa 
which could then possibly be applied in developing prejudice reduction programs focused on 
reducing contemporary forms of racism. 
Terminology Used in the Present Study 
In the present study, the term ‘race groups’ has been used to denote the categories reified by 
the apartheid government.  These categories – Black, Asian (or Indian), White, and Coloured, 
although not regarded as meaningful or supporting a belief in essential or biological differences 
between these groups by the current researcher, do nevertheless reflect differences in life 
circumstances of South Africans.  These categories are also maintained by the current government 
as a means of monitoring transformation towards equity.   
In the present study, the term Black is used to refer to the aboriginal people of South Africa; 
the term Coloured refers to people of mixed race or those who were descended from slaves 
brought to South Africa mainly from Malaysia; Asian refers to descendents of immigrants from 
the Indian subcontinent, and White refers to people of European descent.   
Structure of the Study 
Racism is a complex; “hydra-headed” construct (Jones, 1997, p. 373).  Before this 
multifaceted construct can be conceptualised accurately, it is necessary to elucidate on the 
constructs that underlie racism.  Chapter 2 provides a theoretical background to racism by 
explicating attitude as a construct that underlies racism.  Attitude is explored in terms of its 
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definition and structure.  Thereafter, prejudice, stereotypes, discrimination are conceptualised in 
terms of the definitions and theoretical assumptions regarding the origins of these concepts.  
Prejudice reduction and measurement are also described.  After the theoretical underpinnings of 
racism have been explored, racism as a construct is explored and conceptualised in Chapter 3.  
This chapter first examines the changing concept of race before investigating racism as an 
ideology, as articulated by apartheid in South Africa.   As it is postulated that the expressions of 
racism have changed in response to societal changes, both the traditional and contemporary forms 
of racism are investigated and discussed.  National and international empirical research findings 
regarding the relationship between racism and the demographic variables focused on in the 
present study (i.e., gender, language, age, and race) are also provided.   In Chapter 4, the research 
problem is formulated and delineated according to two specific aims.  Furthermore, the 
methodology utilised in investigating these aims is outlined.  Chapter 5 contains the presentation 
of the results of the statistical analyses and a discussion of the findings within the context of 
theories of contemporary racism, whilst positioning the findings within the context of previously 
reported international and national research.  The final chapter, Chapter 6, presents conclusions 
reached by the present study. Limitations of the present study as well as recommendations for 
future research on contemporary racism are also presented in this chapter.  
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CHAPTER 2 
INTRODUCING THE CONCEPTS OF ATTITUDE, PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPE, AND 
DISCRIMINATION 
Racism, the phenomenon investigated in the present study, is a multifaceted construct.  It is 
underpinned by other constructs such as attitude, racial prejudice, and racial discrimination.  In 
fact, an attitudinal definition is given to elements of racism, such as racial prejudice (i.e., a 
negative attitude towards a race group) and racial discrimination (i.e., negative behaviour towards 
a negatively evaluated race group).  Attitudes thus feature prominently when referring to racism, 
signifying the necessity to elucidate the attitude concept.   Thus, the notion that attitudes were 
regarded as a central concept in the study of interracial interaction is explored.  Thereafter, the 
definition and components of attitudes are examined in order to increase understanding of the 
components of prejudice.   
 Attitude as a Central Concept in Social Psychology 
Initially, the attitude concept was regarded as one of the keystone concepts in the field of 
social psychology (Albarracín, Zanna, Johnson, &  Kumkale, 2005, 2005; Allport, 1954a; Bohner, 
2001; Foster, 1991a; Meyers, 2005) as it was postulated that behaviour could be predicted if the 
underlying attitude was known (Eagly & Chaiken, 2005; Myers, 2005).  Allport (1954a) even 
defined social psychology as the scientific study of attitudes.  However, the attitude concept soon 
lost its status as the chief concept in social psychology, due to a review of evidence from research 
studies which demonstrated that self-reported attitudes were poor predictors of behaviour 
(Wicker, 1969).   
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Current research indicates that attitudes are not the powerful key to behaviour prediction as 
previously supposed.  While attitudes sometimes control behaviour, the reverse is often true 
(Eagly & Chaiken, 2005; Taylor, Peplau, & Sears, 2006).  Yet, attitudes are still seen to play a 
key role in the social functioning of all people (Bohner, 2001; Rogers, 2003) and are still the 
focus of much empirical research (Eagly & Chaiken, 2005).  The nature of attitudes was at the 
centre of empirical investigations and theoretical postulations of social psychologists (Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1993).    
The Nature of Attitudes 
Through its use in the field of art and theatre in the 1800s, the meaning of attitude evolved.  
First, attitude was used to describe a physical posture or body position of an actor, a statue, or a 
figure in a painting.  Gradually, attitude not only referred to a body posture, but also to the way a 
person’s physical posture conveyed internal intentions and emotions (Allport, 1954a; Franzoi, 
2003; Lord, 1997).  Thereafter, the use of attitude expanded to refer to the beliefs and feelings 
related to someone or something, and the behaviour or behavioural intentions that result from 
these beliefs and feelings (Brown, 2006; Myers, 2005).The definition of an attitude has also been 
adjusted repeatedly as empirical knowledge about attitudes grew.    
Defining Attitude 
Throughout its history in social psychology, attitudes have been defined in numerous ways 
(Fabrigar, MacDonald & Wegener, 2005).  Initially, attitudes were broadly defined (Krosnick, 
Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2005).  For example, Allport (1935, as cited in Krosnick, et al., 2005) 
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defined an attitude as “a mental and neural state of readiness, organised through experience, 
exerting a distinctive or dynamic influence upon the individual’s response to all objects and 
situations with which it is related” (p. 22).    
The definition of attitudes has since expanded to include evaluative predispositions that 
lead to approach and avoidance behaviours (Foster, 1991a; Krosnick et al., 2005).  Eagly and 
Chaiken’s (1993) definition of attitudes, which is regarded as the most widely accepted 
contemporary definition of the concept (Alabarracín et al., 2005; Lord, 1997),  included the 
evaluative predisposition of the concept by defining attitudes as  “a psychological tendency that is 
expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favour or disfavour” (p. 1).   
Accordingly, an attitude is focussed on a specific element or object, rather than all objects and 
situations to which it is related.  In addition, an attitude is a predisposition to like or dislike that 
element or object, apparently with approach or avoidance consequences (Krosnick et al., 2005).  
Central to these definitions of attitudes are the fact that attitudes are intrapersonal tendencies that 
are evaluative in nature about an attitude object.    
 
An Attitude is a Consequence of the Tendency to Evaluate 
Social psychologists regard evaluation as a fundamental human activity (Albarracín, et al., 
2005; Franzoi, 2003) as the evaluation of persons, events, and objects helps people to understand 
and react to their environment (Briňol & Petty, 2005; Dovidio, Kawakami & Beach, 2003).  This 
tendency to evaluate is thus a critical feature of an attitude (Eagly & Chaiken, 2005; 1993), 
implying that an attitude will always be evaluative (Aronson, et al., 2002). In addition, an 
individual is regarded as having an attitude only after he or she has responded overtly or covertly 
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in an evaluative manner to an entity (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993).  For example, when encountering a 
condescending White person, a Black person may negatively evaluate the White person and 
covertly respond by deciding to avoid Whites in future.  The Black person will thus have a 
negative racial attitude towards individuals belonging to the White race group.   
Empirical studies have demonstrated that humans can develop an attitude with relative 
ease (Franzoi, 2003; Taylor et al., 2005) about nearly anything (Briňol & Petty, 2005).  However, 
it has also been suggested that some individuals have a higher need to evaluate than others (Jarvis 
& Petty, 1996).  These individuals were also shown to be more likely to hold attitudes towards 
previously encountered issues, implying that individuals’ tendency to evaluate originate from 
their experiences (Bohner, 2001).   
Attitude Objects 
Bohner (2001) declared that every attitude has an entity, such as a person, an object, or a 
social issue which is the “something” that the attitude is about.  These evaluated entities are 
known as attitude objects in the vernacular of social psychology.  Virtually anything can be 
evaluated and can function as an attitude object (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993).  Attitude objects can 
be: (a) concrete (a certain type of food), (b) abstract (such as equality), (c) inanimate objects (such 
as personal computers), (d) persons (such as a political figure), or (e) groups (such as race groups) 
(Bohner, 2001). Accordingly some attitudes are grouped according to the attitude object involved:  
(a) negative attitudes towards certain social groups are called prejudice, while (b) self-esteem is 
the label for attitudes towards oneself (Bohner, 2001).   The evaluation of an attitude object may 
also be the result of conscious or unconscious evaluative processes (Dovidio, et al., 2003) and an 
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attitude can thus be explicit or implicit.  A person may also possess contradictory explicit and 
implicit attitudes towards the same attitude object or hold an ambivalent attitude.    
Explicit, Implicit, Dual, and Ambivalent Attitudes 
As previously discussed, evaluation is central to the definition of attitude (Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1993). However, some evaluations are automatically activated in the presence of an 
attitude object, often without conscious recognition from the holder of the attitude (Dovidio, et al., 
2003; Eagly & Chaiken, 2005).  These types of attitudes are called implicit attitudes. Feeling 
uncomfortable around a person of a different race group because he or she unconsciously triggers 
negative evaluations of the race group is an example of an implicit attitude.  By comparison, 
explicit attitudes are consciously held (Franzoi, 2003) and are activated in a more deliberate 
manner that requires cognitive effort (Eagly & Chaiken, 2005). 
 The existence of implicit attitudes has emerged from research about racial attitudes in 
which an apparent discrepancy between low professed prejudice and high levels of discrimination 
was found (Dovidio, et al., 2002; Pillay & Collings, 2004).  Implicit attitudes have a significant 
influence on behaviour.  It is generally assumed that automatically activated implicit attitudes 
guide behaviour by default until they are overridden by controlled processes.  Since prejudicial 
racial attitudes are frowned upon in modern society, implicit attitudes tend to influence 
behaviours that are not consciously monitored or that are difficult to control (e.g., facial 
expressions, eye contact, blushing, and other nonverbal behaviours) as well as behaviours that 
people do not consider to be indicative of prejudice.  In contrast, explicit attitudes predict 
behaviours that are under volitional control and whose implications for prejudice are apparent 
(Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005). 
 14
The idea that people can hold more than one attitude simultaneously has also emerged in 
several guises in attitude research.  One such manifestation of the multiple attitude idea is Wilson, 
Linsey, and Schooler’s (2000, as cited in Eagley & Chaiken, 2005; Franzoi, 2003) concept of dual 
attitudes, whereby people have contradictory explicit and implicit attitudes towards the same 
attitude object.  Dual attitudes can form, for example, when new information changes an attitude, 
creating a new explicit attitude.  Yet the old attitude may continue to be present, but often in an 
implicit and unconscious form (Eagly & Chaiken, 2005; Fabrigar, et al., 2005).  Both the new and 
the old attitude are still linked to the attitude object in memory.  Therefore, either or both attitudes 
can be activated (Fabrigar, et al., 2005).  Research suggests that dual attitudes will most likely 
develop for socially sensitive issues such as attitudes towards pornography and racial or ethnic 
groups (Wilson, et al, as cited in Franzoi, 2003). 
Another demonstration of the idea of multiple attitudes is the concept of attitudinal 
ambivalence.  Instead of conceptualising attitudes to fall on a continuum ranging from extremely 
negative to extremely positive, a person may also be described as holding two attitudes towards 
one attitude object; one positive and one negative (Eagly & Chaiken, 2005; Brown, 2006).  
Ambivalent attitudes therefore consist of coexisting positive and negative tendencies (Eagly & 
Chaiken, 2005).  Lord (1997) attributes ambivalent attitudes to the lack of correspondence 
between a person’s thoughts, feelings, and actions towards an attitude object.  Lord (1997) 
thereby identifies that an attitude consists of different components.    
Components of an Attitude 
The tri-component theory, which is the idea that an attitude has three components, has 
enjoyed a long history (Fabrigar, et al., 2005).  According to this theory, diagrammatically 
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illustrated in Figure 1, an attitude is assumed to be an evaluation based on affective (feelings), 
behavioural (actions), and cognitive (beliefs) processes (Bohner, 2001; Franzoi, 2003; Taylor, et 
al., 2006).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Attitudes and the manifestations of attitudes are therefore considered to comprise of three 
distinct components, namely beliefs, feelings, and behaviours or behavioural intentions (Bohner, 
2001; Brown, 2006; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, 2005; Fabrigar, et al., 2005).  The contributions 
from each component can vary.  For example, some attitudes might express relevant feelings 
more than any specific beliefs and behaviour, such as attitudes towards abstract art.  Other 
attitudes might express all three types of information simultaneously such as attitudes about war 
(Johnson, Maio & McLallen, 2005).  The three components are now addressed individually. 
The cognitive component consists of the facts, knowledge, and beliefs of the person 
towards the attitude object. The affective component consists of the person’s positive and 
negative feelings towards and the emotional reactions towards the attitude object. The behavioural 
component consists of the person’s observable past behaviour and behavioural intentions to 
approach or avoid an attitude object (Aronson, Wilson, & Akert, 2002; Bohner; 2001; Fabrigar, et 
al, 2005; Rogers, 2003; Taylor, et al., 2006). 
Cognitive processes 
Affective processes 
Behavioural processes 
Attitude 
Cognitive responses 
Affective responses 
Behavioural responses 
Figure 1.  The tri-component theory of attitude.  An attitude is the result of cognitive, affective, 
and behavioural processes and manifests in cognitive, affective, and behavioural responses.  
Source:  Bohner, 2001, p. 242    
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 Brown (2006) postulated that the three components operate in unison as the result of an 
innate human drive that strives to maintain consistency among the cognitive, affective, and 
behavioural components of an attitude.  Inconsistencies between the cognitive, affective, and 
behavioural components of an attitude create psychological tension which people are driven to 
avoid and reduce (Brown, 2006).  For example, a person who believes he or she is unprejudiced 
against Black people, and interacts regularly with Black people, but feels uncomfortable when 
around Black people is experiencing inconsistencies between the cognitive, affective, and 
behavioural components of an attitude.  
More recently, the tri-component attitude theory has been modified (Eagly and Chaiken, 
1993; 2005; Fabrigar, et al., 2005; Franzoi, 2003).  The contemporary view holds that an attitude 
does not consist of all three components, but instead is a general evaluative summary of the 
information derived from cognitions, affects, and behaviour (Fabrigar, et al., 2005; Franzoi, 
2003).  However, a factor analytical study conducted by Breckler (1984) found that the tri-
component theory of attitude predicted overall attitudes more effectively than any single factor 
alone.    
It has now also been established that any attitude is the result of cognitive, affective, and 
behavioural processes that manifest in cognitions, affects, and behaviours or behavioural 
intentions.  It was also established that an attitude is the results of an evaluation of an attitude 
object.  When an attitude consists mainly of negative evaluations of the attitude object, this 
attitude is referred to as prejudice.  Prejudice can thus be conceptualised as an attitude that 
consists of affective, cognitive, and behavioural components, called (a) stereotypes, (b) prejudice, 
and (c) discrimination respectively (Aronson, et al., 2002; Brown, 2006; Dovidio & Gaertner, 
1986; Franzoi, 2003; Jones, 1997; Lord, 1997; Taylor, et al., 2006).  When the negative attitudes 
in question refer to racial attitudes, it is referred to as racial prejudice or racism.  It is apparent, 
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therefore, that prejudice also underlies the construct of racism.  The complexity of the construct of 
racism can thus not be appreciated without first conceptualising prejudice.  To avoid confusion, is 
important to note that prejudice can be used as an umbrella term to refer to negative attitudes 
towards individuals due to their membership to a particular group, but may also be used to 
specifically refer to the affective component of the intergroup attitude (Aronson, et al., 2002).   
Prejudice  
Social psychologists have found few topics to be as controversial and vital to understand as 
prejudice (Sampson, 1999) because of its significant influence on intergroup relations (Jones, 
1997).   Intergroup prejudice is based on the dynamics created by the innate human tendency to 
divide the world into us and them, or in-groups and out-groups (Baron & Byrne, 2003).    
The Dynamics of In-Groups and Out-Groups 
In general, individuals tend to have more positive attitudes towards members of their own 
group, while they tend to have more negative attitudes towards other groups (Nelson, 2006).   
This dynamic forms the basis of prejudice: the feelings toward, thoughts and beliefs about, and 
behaviour toward fellow members of in-groups and members of out-groups (Nelson, 2006) are the 
source of stereotypes (beliefs), prejudice (feelings), and discrimination (behaviours or behavioural 
intentions) (Allport, 1954b; Jones, 1997; Myers, 2005; Nelson, 2006).  
Dividing people into in-groups or out-groups has a number of consequences for members 
of both categories (Nelson, 2006).  Members of out-groups are regarded in terms of a 
phenomenon termed out-group homogeneity (Aronson, et al, 2002; Baron & Byrne, 2003; Nelson, 
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2006; Taylor, et al., 2006) whereby individuals of out-groups are perceived to be “all alike” 
(Nelson, 2006, p. 29), sharing similar characteristics, motives and other features (Aronson, et al, 
2002; Baron & Byrne, 2003; Nelson, 2006; Taylor, et al., 2006). However, according to the 
phenomenon of in-group bias (Aronson, et al., 2002; Baron & Byrne, 2003; Jones, 1997; Nelson, 
2006), members of in-groups are judged to be “as different as snowflakes” (Nelson, 2006, p. 29).   
The in-group, out-group distinction also has an effect on the way in which behaviour by 
members of these two categories is explained according to a dynamic called the ultimate 
attribution error. People have a tendency to attribute desirable behaviours by members of in-
groups to stable, internal causes (e.g., their admirable traits), while dismissing desirable 
behaviours by out-group members as the result of transitory factors or external causes (i.e., luck, 
special circumstances, or unfair advantages) (Baron & Byrne, 2003; Hewstone, 1990; Myers, 
2005).  Negative out-group behaviour is attributed to flawed, natural characteristics and 
dispositions, as illustrated by Hewstone (1990):  “They fail because they’re stupid; we fail 
because we didn’t try” (p. 366).   
A salient feature of the ultimate attribution error is that important situational forces that 
impact upon the members of the out-group are often discounted.  For example, the misfortune of 
slaves in the United States was often attributed to the slave’s flawed nature and deficiencies, 
while the effect of exploitation was disregarded (Myers, 2005).  Similarly, the poverty of Black 
people in South Africa has been attributed to biological inferiority, while oppression and social 
circumstances that denied Black people opportunities were disregarded (Duckitt, 1992b).  In-
group bias, however, does not automatically lead to out-group hate (Allport, 1954b; Voci, 2006), 
but may imply a variety of out-group evaluations ranging from mildly positive to blatantly hateful 
(Voci, 2006). 
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The Definition of Prejudice 
To social psychologists, prejudice is fundamentally about interpersonal relationships 
(Jones, 1997).  A large number of definitions of prejudice have been offered (Duckitt, 1994; 
Jones, 1997).  One of the foundational works for the study of prejudice was Allport’s (1954b) The 
Nature of Prejudice, which still remains one of the most widely cited works on prejudice 
(Dovidio, Glick & Rudman, 2005).  Allport (1954b) defined prejudice as “an antipathy based 
upon a faulty and inflexible generalisation.  It may be felt or expressed.  It may be directed 
towards a group as a whole, or towards an individual because he is a member of that group” (p. 9) 
and “thinking ill of others without sufficient warrant” (p. 7).  His definition, however, did not 
account for the complexities of prejudice that social psychologists have since considered (Eagly & 
Diekman, 2005).  For example, Harding, Proshansky,  Kutner & Chein (1969) highlighted the fact 
that prejudice can be considered as immoral by defining prejudice as “a failure of justice or a 
failure of human-heartedness in an individual’s attitude toward members of another ethnic group” 
(p.6).  Banton (1967) accentuated the emotional nature of prejudice:  “The essential features of 
prejudice would appear to be its emotional character…” (p.8).   
After reviewing all available definitions of prejudice, Ashmore (1970) identified four basic 
points of agreement common to most definitions of prejudice.  These were: (a) prejudice is an 
intergroup phenomenon, (b) prejudice is a negative orientation, (c) prejudice is immoral, and (d) 
prejudice is an attitude. Thereafter, Ashmore (1970) concluded that prejudice can be defined as “a 
negative attitude towards a socially defined group and toward any person perceived to be a 
member of that group” (p. 253).  Based on Ashmore’s (1970) review, Duckitt (1994) noted that 
prejudice could be viewed as “a negative intergroup attitude which is bad, unjustified, or irrational 
in some way or other” (p.9).   
 20
One important element of these views of prejudice, namely that prejudice is marked by 
negative attitudes (Jones, 1997), has been challenged by research in the late twentieth century 
(Eagly & Diekman, 2005).   Empirical work uncovered positive attitudes towards many racial, 
ethnic, and gender groups, leading to  speculation that out-groups do not necessarily activate 
negative attitudes, but merely fail to elicit positive evaluation (Eagly & Diekman, 2005).  In light 
of these developments in the understanding of the concept, Jones (1997) proposed the following 
definition of prejudice:  “Prejudice is a positive or negative attitude, judgement, or feeling about a 
person that is generalised from attitudes or beliefs held about the group to which the person 
belongs” (p. 10).  
 It is important to note that although prejudice can involve positive and negative 
evaluations and affects, social psychologists and people in general reserve the word prejudice for 
use primarily when referring to negative attitudes about others.  In this regard, some researchers 
(Aaronson, et al., 2002; Baron & Byrne, 2003; Brown, 2006; Duckitt, 1994; Franzoi, 2003; Jones, 
1997; Lord, 1997; Myers, 2005) further refined the definition of prejudice to only refer to 
negative attitudes or evaluations of individuals or specific social groups. 
Some researchers highlighted a fundamental aspect of prejudice that is also implicated by 
its morphological structure (Jones, 1997; Myers, 2005; Sampson, 1999; Taylor, et al., 2006).  As 
the word prejudice is comprised of the affix pre-, meaning before, and the word judgement, it can 
be implied that the definition of prejudice should also include the forming of a judgement before 
all facts are known (Sampson, 1999; Taylor, et al., 2006).  The definition of prejudice can 
therefore be expanded to also allow for the negative prejudgement of a group and its individual 
members (Myers, 2005).   
The definition of prejudice has thus expanded since its original definition in the first half of 
the twentieth century.  Another aspect of prejudice that has enjoyed a large amount of attention 
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from scholars has been the explanation of the origins of prejudice (Duckitt, 1994).  As prejudice is 
such a complex construct, the origins of prejudice has been conceptualised to be determined by 
many factors (Ashmore, 1970; Harding, et al., 1969).  A number of theories to explain the genesis 
of prejudice have been proposed.    
Origins of Prejudice  
 It has been the tendency of prejudice theorists to concentrate on only psychological or 
social subset of causal processes to explain the origins of prejudice (Duckitt, 1994).  In addition, 
social and psychological theories of prejudice have been regarded as competing theories (Duckitt, 
1993b; 1991a).  Thus, no integrated theory to comprehensively explain prejudice has been offered 
(Duckitt, 1994).  However, Duckitt (1994; 1992b; 1991a) asserted that social and psychological 
theories of prejudice can be regarded as equally important in the explanation of prejudice.  
Whereas social factors are more important in determining the general level of prejudice, 
psychological factors could account for the variation in prejudice around the general level 
(Duckitt, 1994, 1993b).   
Brown (2006) suggested four major approaches to conceptualise the origins of prejudice 
that reflects both social and psychological theories of prejudice:  (1) Realistic Group Conflict 
Theory, which argues that prejudice results when groups compete for finite resources; (2) 
motivational approaches, which maintains that prejudice stems from people’s need to feel better 
about themselves; (3) individual theories, which attempt to understand why some people are more 
prejudiced than others; and (4) learning theory approaches, which asserts that people learn to be 
prejudiced during social interaction.    
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Realistic Conflict Theory  
Realistic Conflict Theory (RCT) may be considered as a broad social psychological 
perspective which assumes that the conditions of intergroup contact and interaction develop into 
normative patters of prejudice (Duckitt, 1994). RCT, as proposed by Campbell (1965), suggests 
that prejudice is an inevitable consequence of competition between groups for scarce resources 
such as land, water, good schools, or safe neighbourhoods.  The group conflict is seen as realistic 
because it is based on real competition (Aaronson, et al., 2002; Myers, 2005), seems to involve 
“the hope of a gain rather than the fear of a loss” as the underlying motive (Duckitt, 1994, p.96), 
and is the result of a social comparison process (Brown, 2006).   
The perception of relative deprivation may give rise to feelings of prejudice and hostility 
towards out-groups in terms of important goals, such as good educational opportunities, 
employment, and housing (Nelson, 2006).  For example, a White person may develop prejudice 
towards Black people if Blacks are hired ahead of Whites due to affirmative-action policy.  In this 
regard, some researchers (Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman & Tyler, 1990) have suggested that merely 
seeing someone else as an out-group member is enough to arouse prejudice in the perceiver.   
RCT also asserts that when groups are in conflict, ethnocentrism develops.  This refers to a 
pattern of behaviour characterised by increased hostility toward the opposing out-group, 
accompanied by intensified loyalty towards the in-group (Franzoi, 2003; Taylor, et al., 2006).   
RCT makes two important predictions.  First, the theory predicts that people who are realistically 
threatened are more prejudiced than people who are not realistically threatened.  Secondly, it 
predicts that prejudice will be eliminated if enough resources exist (Brown, 2006).   
Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, and Sherif (1961, as cited in Brown, 2006) demonstrated 
how realistic group conflict could be a cause of prejudice through their landmark experiment with 
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a group of twenty-two 11-year old boys who were going to a summer camp at Robber’s Cave 
National Park in Oklahoma, United States.  First the boys were divided into two groups and to 
create in-groups and allowed to form in-group relationships and in-group identity.  Thereafter, to 
test the hypothesis that realistic group conflict creates prejudice, the groups had to participate in a 
series of competitive activities in which the winning team received prizes.  Thus, the boys were 
competing for a scarce resource.  As the RCT predicted, out-group prejudice between the groups 
developed that even resulted in name-calling and petty acts of violence.  Later attempts to reduce 
prejudice by having the groups interact in social situations that did not involve competition only 
served to increase distrust and enmity between the groups (Brown, 2006; Franzoi, 2003; Nelson, 
2006; Taylor, et al., 2006).   
From the preceding discussion, it is apparent that intergroup conflict of interest, perceived 
or actual, can induce prejudiced intergroup attitudes (Brown, 2006; Duckitt, 1994) as has been the 
case in South Africa (Duckitt, 1994).     
Motivational Approach 
This approach locates the roots of prejudice in certain inborn elements of psychological 
functioning, such as the motivation of human beings to attain their psychological goals (Duckitt, 
1994; Jones, 1997; Nelson, 2006). Although there are several motivation models, all postulate that 
humans have a tendency to dislike others in order to feel better about themselves (Brown, 2006; 
Nelson, 2006).  The most prominent theories under this approach are the Social Identity Theory 
by Tajfel and Turner (1986) and the Scapegoat Theory (Allport, 1954b; Berkowitz & Green, 
1962).   
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Social-Identity Theory.  Nelson (2006) asserted that no other theory of prejudice has had as 
strong an impact on the field of prejudice research than the Social-Identity Theory (SIT) by Tajfel 
and Turner (1986). This theory postulates that the self concept of human beings contains both a 
personal identity (a sense of personal attributes and attitudes) and a social identity (Myers, 2005), 
which includes other people and membership of various social groups (Brown, 2006).  SIT 
proposes that people naturally categorise their social world into in-groups (us) and out-groups 
(them) and derive a sense of collective self-esteem from their social identity as members of an in-
group.  In order to enhance their collective self-esteem, people are motivated to perceive their 
own in-groups as superior to other groups.  Maintenance of the perceived high status of an in-
group is achieved by derogating out-groups and other individuals that reflect negatively on the in-
group, as well as deviant or stereotype-confirming in-group members (Nelson, 2006) giving rise 
to prejudice (Nelson, 2006; Taylor, et al., 2006).  However, Brown (2006) cautioned the reader to 
bear in mind that in-group favouritism does not always lead to out-group derogation and 
prejudice. 
Often, people who lack positive personal identity, will seek collective self-esteem by 
identifying with a group (Myers, 2005), which they have reasoned, is in some way better than 
other groups to which they do not belong (Brown, 2006).  A person belonging to a specific ethnic 
group will therefore develop in-group favouritism and will believe that their ethnic group is better 
than other ethnic groups (Franzoi, 2003).   
The SIT postulation that people are highly motivated to show in-group favouritism and 
negatively evaluate out-groups (Nelson, 2006) has been confirmed by research.   For example, 
Lemyre and Smith (1985) found that participants in an in-group, out-group allocation condition 
who were given a chance to display in-group favouritism, felt better about themselves than 
participants who were not given the opportunity.  In addition, research has found that people who 
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strongly identify with an in-group derive pleasure when an out-group suffers misfortune or 
hardship (Leach, Spears, Branscombe & Doosje, 2003), confirming the claim that in-group 
favouritism increases self-esteem (Fein & Spencer, 1997).   
 
Scapegoat Theory.  The scapegoat theory conceptualised prejudice according to both the 
motivation approach and conflict-competition theories (Brown, 2006; Aronson, et al., 2002).  This 
theory proposes that merely derogating the proverbial black sheep can serve a motivational 
function by maintaining feelings of self-worth while repairing blemished in-group identity 
(Brown, 2006).  According to the conflict-competition approach, (Allport, 1954b; Berkowitz & 
Green, 1962) people may feel anger, irritation, or frustration (Nelson, 2006) in times of 
deprivation (Aronson, et al., 2002) or when prevented from reaching a particular goal (Nelson, 
2006).  A tendency to displace their aggression onto groups that are disliked, visible, and 
relatively powerless then emerges (Aronson, et al., 2002; Ashmore, 1970; Berkowiz & Green, 
1962).  This is true even when the out-group had nothing to do with the source of frustration and 
anger (Nelson, 2006) or a logical competitor does not exist (Aronson, et al., 2002).   For example, 
in Germany following the Second World War, inflation was high and people were extremely 
poor, demoralised, and frustrated.  As a result, when the Nazis gained power in the 1930s, they 
were able to focus the frustration of the German population on the Jews; an easily identifiable and 
powerless out-group (Berkowitz & Green, 1962). 
Duckitt (1994) has suggested that the correlation between frustration and prejudice does 
exist under certain circumstances and may contribute to explaining individual differences in 
prejudice.  However, Nelson (2006) reports that frustrated people may be equally prejudiced 
toward disliked and liked out-groups.  
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Prejudice in individuals is not merely a function of social influences and structures, as 
individuals who are exposed to similar social experiences and structures conducive to prejudice, 
may differ in the degree to which they come to hold prejudiced beliefs.  It seems therefore that 
psychological factors may modulate the degree to which individuals absorb prejudice from their 
social environment (Duckitt, 1994; 1992a).    
Individual Differences Approach 
This approach gained momentum in the aftermath of the strong anti-Semitism that 
characterized Germany during Hitler’s regime (Brown, 2006; Duckitt, 1994; Franzoi, 2003; 
Myers, 2005) when it was found that the holocaust could not easily be explained in terms of 
realistic conflict of economic and social interests (Duckitt, 1994).  One empirical finding also 
supports the view of prejudice as an individual phenomenon:  Prejudice tends to be generalised 
over a variety of targets (Duckitt, 2001).  A number of psychological factors that are thought to 
influence individuals’ predisposition or readiness for prejudice (Duckitt, 1992b, 1991a) will be 
discussed under this approach, such as political conservatism, religious fundamentalism, and 
authoritarianism (Duckitt, 1991a; Nelson, 2006). The most well-known and influential theory 
within this approach, based on psychoanalytic theory (Brown, 2006; Duckitt, 1994; Franzoi, 
2003) is Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford,’s (1950) authoritarian personality-
theory. 
 
The authoritarian personality.  This theory, proposed soon after World War II, focussed 
particularly on anti-Semitism (Taylor, et al., 2006). The theory proposed that a number of traits, 
needs, and dispositions together form a general pattern expressed as a personality syndrome that 
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made people especially likely to adopt prejudice (Duckitt, 1991a; Foster, 2001; Nelson, 2006; 
Taylor et al., 2006).  The basic characteristics of the authoritarian personality which distinguishes 
it from the non-authoritarian personality are as follows: 
• Rigid in outlook, intolerant of ambiguity or argument. 
• Strong emphasis on conventional and traditional values. 
• Admiration of power and toughness. 
• Belief in importance of obedience to, and respect for authority. 
• Only secure in a hierarchical structure. 
• Combines aggression with submission. 
• Exaggerated concern with sex. 
• Punitive orientation to those who differ. 
• Power orientated in family relationships. 
• Uses stereotypes of race, gender, age, class, etc. 
• Cynical about human nature. 
• Does not like to look inwards and examine own feelings and motives (Adorno, et al., 
1950). 
Adorno, et al. (1950) believed that the authoritarian personality hates deviant impulses 
(e.g., fear, aggression, and sex) and was more likely to project these unacceptable impulses onto 
other people (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Harding et al., 1969).  Those with authoritarian personality, 
more than other individuals, tend to hold prejudices against many groups (Duckitt, 2001; Nelson, 
2006) and are more likely to display exaggerated submission to authority, extreme and rigid levels 
of conformity to conventional standards of behaviour, self-righteous hostility, hero-worship, 
ethnocentric in-group glorification, politico-economic conservatism, pro-fascist attitudes, a 
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tendency to think in categorical (black-and-white) terms, and punitiveness towards deviants and 
members of minority groups than other individuals (Adorno, et al., 1950; Brown, 2006; Duckitt, 
2001; Nelson, 2006).  
The theory was detailed, comprehensive, and based on extensive empirical research that 
produced the F (fascist)-scale as a measure of the authoritarian personality (Duckitt, 1991a).  
However, after enjoying much prominence and generating a large amount of research, the interest 
in this theory has waned (Duckitt, 2001; Nelson, 2006).  Adorno, et al’s (1950) original 
investigation was criticised for serious methodological flaws.  In addition, subsequent research 
could not support postulations that high authoritarianism arises from psychodynamic assumptions 
such as a domineering father and a punitive mother (Brown, 2006; Duckitt, 1991a, 1993b).   
In recent years, a new perspective on the authoritarian personality has reappeared as right 
wing authoritarianism (RWA) (Altemeyer, 1981; Duckitt, 2001; 1994; 1993b; 1991a; Taylor, et 
al., 2006).  Both perspectives on authoritarianism described similar effects, such as submission to 
established authority figures, strong adherence to standard social conventions, and hostility 
towards out-groups (Franzoi, 2003).  However, Altemeyer’s (1981) research suggested that three 
of the nine facets of authoritarianism described by Adorno et al. (1950) - conventionalism, 
authoritarian aggression, and authoritarian submission - converged to form one social attitude 
dimension, namely RWA.  The RWA scale was developed (Altemeyer, 1981) to measure this 
dimension.    
The RWA scale has been extensively used in South Africa (Duckitt, 1994), revealing 
consistent group differences regarding the concept of authoritarianism.  For example, White 
Afrikaners consistently scored higher than English White people and the less educated scored 
higher than the better educated. Empirical support for the link between authoritarianism and out-
group prejudice, ethnocentricity, and anti-democratic tendencies were found.  For example, 
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improved measures of RWA have shown strong and reliable correlations (r=0.60+) with anti-
Black racism and social distance scales (Duckitt, 1994, 1993b; Duckitt & Farre, 1994; Foster, 
2001). 
RWA also described a pattern of generalised prejudice.  Altemeyer (1981) jokingly 
referred to people with RWA as “equal-opportunity bigots” (p. 136) when research revealed that 
RWA was associated with prejudice towards “virtually everyone” (Nelson, 2006, p. 94).  
Researchers (Brown, 2006; Cunningham, Nezlek & Banji, 2004; Duckitt, 1994; Franzoi, 2003; 
Nelson, 2006; Taylor, et al, 2006) reported that people with RWA exhibited implicit and explicit 
prejudicial attitudes and hostility towards racial, ethnic and disadvantaged groups that have little 
in common with one another, such as gays and lesbians, drug users, Jews, feminists, people with 
AIDS, the homeless, and overweight people.  Contradictory to the original perspective on 
authoritarianism, RWA attributes the roots of authoritarianism to social learning, rather than 
ingrained personality factors (Altemeyer, 1981; Foster, 2001; Franzoi, 2003; Nelson, 2006; 
Taylor, et al., 2006).    
According to Duckitt (1994), “religious and political belief systems may influence 
individuals’ proneness to prejudice” (p. 174).  For example, RWA is most widespread among 
political conservatives and highly religious communities that limit experiences with people that 
challenge established authority, unconventional people, and other ethnic groups (Taylor, et al., 
2006).  The effects of political conservatism and religion on prejudice are examined next. 
 
Political conservatism and prejudice.  Political conservatism is a correlate of prejudice (Brown, 
2006).  Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski and Sulloway (2003) found that conservative individuals tend to 
be resistant to change and strongly endorse Protestant values, in particular the values of 
individualism and self-reliance.  This leads many conservative individuals to believe that the 
 30
socially disadvantaged are responsible for their own difficulties because they don’t work hard 
enough to overcome obstacles and improve their conditions (Farwell & Weiner, 2000).  In some 
instances, these beliefs can increase prejudice towards members of disadvantaged groups, such as 
ethnic and racial groups (Brown, 2006).  
Political conservatism can also be correlated with a social domination orientation (SDO) 
(Brown, 2006; Jones, 1997; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth & Malle, 1994; Sidanius, Pratto & Bobo, 
1996).  SDO, an intergroup attitude, is a general tendency to believe that groups are inherently 
unequal, and to minimise conflict, more competent groups should dominate over less capable 
groups.  Ideologies, containing negative stereotypes and prejudicial attitudes about those they 
oppress, are developed by dominant groups to legalise the continued oppression of subordinate 
groups (Brown, 2006; Duckitt, 2001; Franzoi, 2003; Jones, 1997; Pratto, et al., 1994).   
This theory also proposes that support of social policies that have implications for group-
based hierarchies (e.g., immigration and affirmative action policies) will vary as a function of an 
individual’s SDO.  As affirmative action and immigration policies would advance low-hierarchy 
groups into higher positions or absorb resources that may have been used to support the more 
advanced in the social hierarchy, individuals with a high degree of SDO will be more likely to 
oppose these policies (Jones, 1997).   
Pratto, et al. (1994) developed an SDO scale to investigate people’s beliefs regarding the 
inevitability and desirability of group differences.  As was predicted by the SDO model, SDO 
scores were positively correlated with hierarchy-enhancing ideologies and beliefs such as 
political-economic conservatism, anti-Black racism, sexist attitudes towards women, and 
preference for the conservative United States Republican party.  On the other hand, SDO scores 
were negatively correlated with support of women’s rights, social programs, and gay and lesbian 
rights.     
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The issues of political conservatism, individualism, and an orientation towards social 
dominance discussed above, have had far reaching implications for issues facing industrialised 
nations in North America and Europe.  Once homogenous with respect to ethnicity, race and 
religion, many of these countries have been transformed by immigration patterns and war into 
multicultural societies. Conservatives, who generally believe that minority groups should 
assimilate to the dominant culture, have opposed programs that support multiculturalism and 
diversity, such as bilingual education policies.  This has lead to increased racial and ethnic 
inequality, prejudice, and ethnic conflict (Brown, 2006; Franzoi, 2003; Jones, 1997).   
 
Religion and prejudice.  It seems logical to assume that people who belong to organised religions 
would be more tolerant of out-groups than those who have no religious affiliations (Franzoi, 2003; 
Nelson, 2006).  However, research suggests this is not always the case, as empirical research 
shows a positive correlation exists between being more religious and having less tolerance and 
more stereotyped cognitions (Adorno, et al., 1950; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Brown, 2006; 
Duckitt, 1994; Franzoi, 2003; Gough, 1951; Hunsberger, Owusu & Duck, 1999; Laythe, Finkel & 
Kirkpatric, 2001).   
Allport (1954b) reflected contradictory postulations regarding the relationship between 
religion and prejudice:  “Some people say the only cure for prejudice is more religion; some say 
the only cure is to abolish religion” (p.444).  Research presents a similar contradictory picture 
(Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Brown, 2006; Duckitt, 1994; Franzoi, 2003).  Attempts to 
explain contradictory findings, lead to defining what is meant by “religion”.  Allport and Ross 
(1967) found that if being religious is defined by church attendance and superficial adherence to 
religious teachings, religious people are more prejudiced than nonreligious people, irrespective of 
the target of prejudice (Argyle & Beit-Hallahmi, 1975).   
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Religious fundamentalism, the belief that there is only one, unchanging truth about 
humanity and God that must be followed strictly to have a relationship with God predicts greater 
prejudice, intolerance, and hatred (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Hunsberger, 1996; Nelson, 
2006; Rowatt & Franklin, 2004), especially towards homosexuals (Hunsberger, 1996; 
Hunsberger, et al., 1999; Laythe, et al., 2001).  Fundamentalism is also a significant predictor of 
prejudice in controversial religious groups (O’Donnell, 1993).  The social learning theory, the 
simplest of general theories about the origins of group antagonism, views prejudice simply as 
being learned the same way people learn other attitudes and values (Taylor, et al., 2006).   
Social Learning  
The social learning approach asserts that learning in social situations, both inside and 
outside the home influences the development of the cognitive, affective, and behavioural 
components of prejudice (Brown, 2006; Nelson, 2006; Taylor, et al., 2006).  Therefore, children 
are not believed to be born with prejudice, but learn it from their family, peers, the media, 
schools, and society (Ashmore, 1970; Taylor, et al., 2006).  In early life socialization occurs 
mostly through significant others, such as parents (Brown, 2006; Chaiken & Eagly, 1993; Duckitt, 
1994; Nelson, 2006). Research by Kofkin, Katz, and Downey (1995, as cited in Aboud & Amato, 
2005), however, has suggested that children are influenced by their parents’ attitudes only when 
parents explicitly express their views regarding race and ethnicity. This typically occurs in regions 
with a high occurrence of ethnic conflicts (Aboud & Amato, 2003).    
Later, other agents of socialisation such as peers and the media play significant roles in 
determining prejudicial attitudes in adolescents and adults (Aboud, 1988; Ashmore, 1970; Brown, 
2006; Taylor, et al., 2006). Conformity, a process separate to socialisation, becomes more 
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important as children have more contact with peers, and is particularly important during 
adolescence (Ashmore & DelBoca, 1976).  The pressure to conform to social norms can induce 
compliance with prejudiced norms (Duckitt, 1994).  This is illustrated by studies done among 
Whites in South Africa and the American South by Pettigrew (1958) that revealed that people 
who conformed most to other social norms, were also the most prejudiced.  Le Roux (1986) 
confirmed this in a semi-autobiographical account of growing up as an Afrikaner in South Africa:  
Racial stereotypes which we acquired at home were mostly reinforced at school.  Our 
history books…, our literature…, and the attitude of teachers, preachers, parents and 
friends left us in no doubt that Africans were very different from Whites and had to 
be treated as a separate, inferior group (p. 198). 
This account (Le Roux, 1986) highlights the fact that stereotypes, as beliefs about an out-
group, are a significant component of intergroup attitudes.  It is thus important to examine the 
cognitive component of prejudice for a more comprehensive conceptualisation of prejudice.    
Stereotypes 
In the printing industry, “stereotype” refers to a metal plate that is used to make duplicate 
pages of the same type.  As early as 1922, social commentator and journalist Walter Lippmann, 
used the term stereotype as a metaphor to describe biased perception of people (Aronson, et al., 
2002; Kanahara, 2006).  Since this innovative use of stereotypes, the concept has been extensively 
examined by social and cognitive psychologists (Jones, 1997) and researchers became more aware 
of the ways people deal with differences by forming ready-made judgments of others (Sampson, 
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1999).  As researchers have learnt more about stereotypes, the definition of the concept has also 
been refined (Nelson, 2006).   
The Definition of Stereotypes 
One of the earliest definitions of stereotypes was by Katz and Braly (1935), who defined a 
stereotype as a bad generalisation because it is factually incorrect.  Allport (1954b) defined a 
stereotype as “an exaggerated belief associated with a category” (p. 191).  Noticeably, Allport 
(1954b) regarded stereotypes to be mere generalisations about a group without implying that 
stereotypes include positive or negative evaluations.  Currently, however, negative stereotypes of 
groups are better known, although positive attributions of groups can also be generalised (Nelson, 
2006).  For example, Brown (2006) stated among the most common positive stereotypes are the 
beliefs that “Black people are musical” and “the Chinese are mathematical” (p. 369).  
In the early 1970’s, cognitive and social psychologists came to regard stereotyping as the 
result of the inherent, automatic process of categorisation (Nelson, 2006; Sampson, 1999) that is 
believed to occur “in the thoughts of individuals or in the ‘consensus’ of an entire society” (Lord, 
1997, p.229).  People thus have a tendency to categorise according to what they perceive as 
normative in their culture (Aronson, et al., 2002; Kanahara, 2006). Stereotyping may also occur 
without any value attachment.  For example, when one believes that all Blacks have musical 
abilities, one may believe so “with a positive value, with a negative value, with a mixed value, or 
without a value” (Kanahara, 2006, p. 312). 
However, stereotypes involve generalising identical characteristics to all group members 
(Aronson, et al., 2002; Baron & Byrne, 2003; Brown, 2006; Franzoi, 2003; Jones, 1997; Taylor, et 
al., 2006) or generalising general beliefs to an individual (Jones, 1997).  For example, after 
 35
acquiring a stereotype “all Blacks are musical”, one may then apply the stereotype:  “John must 
have musical abilities as he is Black” (Kanahara, 2006).  Some researchers (Jones, 1997; 
Kanahara, 2006) have asserted that mere stereotyping can not be considered problematic.  
However, when the application of a stereotype influences behaviour towards a member of the 
stereotyped group, stereotyping does become problematic.   
Considering trends in and conclusions from stereotype research, Jones (1997) offered a 
comprehensive definition of a stereotype: 
A stereotype is a positive or negative set of beliefs held by an individual about the 
characteristics of a group of people.  It varies in its accuracy, the extent to which it 
captures the degree to which the stereotyped group members possess these traits, and 
the extent to which the set of beliefs is shared by others (p. 170). 
When defining stereotypes, Jones (1997) referred only to individually-held stereotypes.  
However, it is useful to consider the distinction between cultural (group-level) and individual 
stereotypes (Allport, 1954b; Jones, 1997; Nelson, 2006).  A cultural stereotype implies that 
particular beliefs are shared by a social group and reflect community-wide patterns (Jones, 1997) 
whereas an individual stereotype describes the beliefs held by one individual about the 
characteristics of a group.  One’s cultural stereotype about a group may not correspond to one’s 
individual stereotype about the group (Nelson, 2006).  For example, whereas Black people in 
South Africa may believe that all Afrikaners are racist (cultural stereotype), individually they 
might not believe this true of all Afrikaners.   
A stereotype can therefore be held by an individual (Jones, 1997; Kanahara, 2006; Nelson, 
2006) or can be shared by a large number of individuals (Jones, 1997; Schaller, Conway & 
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Tanchuk, 2002).  A stereotype can be temporary or permanent (Weary, Jacobson, Edwards & 
Tobin, 2001) and may be about out-groups or in-groups (Hippel, Hawkins & Schooler, 2001).    
Stereotypes may lead to prejudice and discrimination.  To find ways to reduce or even 
eliminate stereotypes, researchers have focussed a large amount of attention on answering 
questions about the origin and maintenance of stereotyping (Nelson, 2006).  Currently, it is 
understood that stereotype development is influenced by many factors such as social learning and 
cognitive processes, such as categorisation (Brown, 2006; Nelson, 2006).    
Formation of Stereotypes  
Categorisation 
According to the cognitive approach, stereotypes arise from the automatic cognitive 
tendency of humans to classify others into broad social categories, based on the perception of 
easily identifiable physical characteristics, such as race, gender, age, attractiveness, and height.  
This cognitive process is called categorisation (Brown, 2006; Franzoi, 2003; Jones, 1997; Myers, 
2005; Nelson, 2006).  Within these social categories, often referred to as basic categories, there 
also exist beliefs about the personalities, abilities, and motives of the social group (Franzoi, 2003; 
Nelson, 2006).  Other cues that can be used to classify people into categories include occupation, 
socio-economic position, accent, and clothing (Hamilton & Trolier, 1986).).  Some of these 
beliefs regarding categories are correct, while others are not (Brown, 2006).     
Social categorisation significantly influences the processing of social information and 
forms the basis for the activation of a stereotype.  The perception of a person leads to the 
categorisation of that person into a social category.  Thereafter, a stereotype of the social category 
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is automatically activated and the person is perceived to possess all the traits and characteristics 
associated with the social category (Franzoi, 2003; Nelson, 2006).   For example, when 
encountering a White, Afrikaans-speaking person, one could automatically assume that this 
person belongs to the social category of Afrikaner, along with all the stereotyped characteristics of 
Afrikaners.    
This categorisation occurs so rapidly that with repeated use the categorisation of an 
individual can become virtually automatic, effortless, and outside of conscious thought (Franzoi, 
2003; Nelson, 2006).  For example, when encountering the White Afrikaans-speaking person, one 
may automatically assume that he or she is racist, authoritarian, materialistic, and hardworking.  
People find it especially easy and efficient to rely on stereotypes when they are pressed for time, 
preoccupied, tired, emotionally aroused, and too young to appreciate diversity (Gilbert & Hixon, 
1991; Myers, 2005). Basic categories are used so often when automatically categorising people, 
they often are the central points around which stereotypes develop (Nelson, 2006).  For example, 
research has suggested that mere exposure to the face of a Black or White person is enough to 
instantaneously evoke associated thoughts, feelings, and beliefs regarding that racial group (Fazio, 
Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995).  By itself, such categorisation is not prejudice, but it does 
provide the foundation of prejudice (Myers, 2005).    
Social Learning 
In psychology, it has long been an accepted fact that children learn many of their values, 
attitudes, and social cognitions (Duckitt, 1994; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Nelson, 2006) through 
direct or observational learning of the rewards and norms that parents (and significant others) 
believe in and behave according to (Baron & Byrne, 2003; Nelson, 2006).  In addition, 
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stereotypes are also learnt through overt and covert messages about intergroup relations received 
from films, television, magazines, video games, and all other types of media.  By routinely 
observing stereotypes portrayed in the media, a child may come to believe that these attitudes 
represent the mainstream view of society.  Due to biased portrayal of crime in the Unites States, 
for example, a common belief among many Americans is that African Americans, more than 
other racial groups, are more likely to engage in criminal behaviour (Nelson, 2006).   
According to Aboud and Amato (2003), racial attitudes are gradually learnt in the first 
years of life.  Around age 4, most children exhibit an awareness of racial cues and prefer their 
own ethnic or racial group above others.  This racial bias sharply increases until it peaks at age 7, 
after which racial bias significantly decreases. The relationship between age and racial bias thus 
takes the shape of an inverted-U (Aboud & Amato, 2003).  In addition to decreasing in negativity 
with age, the racial attitudes of children also become more coherent, complex, and intense as they 
grow older (Aboud, 1988; Aboud & Amato, 2003; Nelson, 2006).   Similarly, Melamed (1968; 
1970) established that South African children had formed the basic features of racial 
differentiation and stereotypes by the age of six years.   
Stereotypes have a strong influence on a child’s perception of their in-group and out-
groups (Nelson, 2006).  For example, Corenblum, Annis, and Young (1996) found that majority-
group children held more positive attitudes toward their own group and believed that successful 
performances of their in-group members were the result of positive, internal, and optimistic 
attributions, while minority-group success was attributed to luck.  Surprisingly, minority-group 
children also held more positive views of the majority group and attributed in-group success to 
luck.    Also in South Africa, research has shown that White children display very strong in-group 
preference (Melamed, 1968; 1970). 
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It can be concluded that stereotypes are an extension of the innate human tendency to 
simplify the amount of information that must be dealt with at any given moment.  The acquisition 
of stereotypes is also informed by the direct or indirect transmission of values, beliefs and 
stereotypes by both parents and the media.  With this perspective, it is necessary to explore the 
cognitive tendencies and processes by which humans maintain stereotypes.  
Maintenance of Stereotypes  
As stereotypes enable the holder to make a rapid judgement about another person with 
little cognitive effort, humans are motivated to maintain stereotypes even though most people 
agree that stereotypes are undesirable, often promote inaccurate evaluations of other, and can lead 
to strained relationships between groups of people.  Four factors facilitate stereotype maintenance 
in daily social judgements, namely:  (a) selective attention to stereotype-relevant information, (b) 
subcategorisation of individuals, (c) illusory correlations, and (d) the motivation of the individual 
to maintain stereotypes (Nelson, 2006).   
Selective Attention to Stereotype-Relevant Information 
According to Jones (1997) “a stereotype will affect what we attend to and therefore, what 
we later remember” (p.190).   People are exposed to a variety of information that pertains to their 
stereotypes.  Some information is consistent with existing stereotypes; other information is not 
consistent with existing stereotypes.  Stereotype inconsistent information arouses dissonance and 
is perceived as threatening to one’s self concept (Nelson, 2006).  For example, a White person 
who holds the stereotype “Black people are lazy” will experience dissonance when encountering a 
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self-motivated, hardworking Black person.  His or her self-concept is thus threatened as 
stereotype inconsistent information implies his or her way of interpreting information is flawed.  
Instead of acknowledging that he or she might be irrational, the person will instead change the 
way he or she thinks about the validity of the stereotype-inconsistent information by applying 
heuristics (mental shortcuts) that only allow for the consideration of stereotype-consistent 
information (Baron & Byrne, 2003; Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987; Wigboldus, Dijksterhuis, 
& Van Knippenberg, 2003)  
Stereotypes enable people to expect certain attitudes and behaviours from others and 
people may be more likely to remember information that is not consistent with their expectations 
(Jones, 1997; Nelson, 2006).  For example, if the White person did not expect to encounter a 
hardworking Black person, he or she may be more likely to remember such surprising 
expectation-inconsistent information. However, when it comes to very strong expectancies, which 
describes most stereotypes, people are more prone to remember stereotype-consistent information.  
This serves to maintain existing stereotypes (Nelson, 2006).  For example, the White person that 
encountered a hardworking Black person may not pay enough attention to the stereotype-
inconsistent information in order to remember it.  Yet, when encountering a lazy Black person, 
the White person will be more likely to remember this encounter, as it is consistent with his or her 
expectation of Black people.   
It is an interesting fact that people are more likely to remember stereotype-inconsistent 
information regarding their in-group, suggesting that humans are willing to think of their in-
groups as consisting of individuals with unique characteristics.  On the other hand, people tend to 
remember stereotype-consistent information of their out-groups.  This suggests that people want 
to think of their out-groups of consisting of people who share common characteristics and who are 
more similar than different (Nelson, 2006).  
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Sub-Categorisation 
Stereotypes can also be maintained by the creation of specific subcategories for individuals 
of the stereotyped group that do not match the global stereotype (Baron & Byrne, 2003; Franzoi, 
2003).  At first, stereotype information about the group tends to be stored as information that 
applies to all group members.  As stereotype-discrepant information is perceived, separate 
subcategories for the deviant individual that does not match the global stereotype are formed 
(Franzoi, 2003; Nelson, 2006; Weber & Crocker, 1983).  The stereotype-inconsistent person is 
therefore seen as unrepresentative of the whole group, suggesting that group-stereotypes do not 
apply to the particular member (Nelson, 2006).  For example, celebrities such as Oprah Winfrey 
can be idolised by Whites who harbour negative racial attitudes towards Blacks because she is not 
perceived as representative of the average Black person (Franzoi, 2003).   
Sub-categorisation enables people to retain rigid and unflattering stereotypes in the face of 
stereotype-disconfirming evidence (Franzoi, 2003; Nelson, 2006).  It also enables one to think of 
oneself as unprejudiced toward a particular group.  Because stereotypes are largely negative, it is 
likely that stereotype-disconfirming group members will represent positive qualities not usually 
associated with the out-group.  As a result, people are more likely to have positive evaluations for 
those individuals for whom they have created subcategories (Nelson, 2006).  For example, a 
White person may create a subcategory for the self-motivated, hardworking Black person he or 
she observed, or for other stereotype-disconfirming group members such as Oprah Winfrey, 
Tokyo Sexwale, a Black co-worker, and a Black friend.  In this way, the White person can reason 
that he or she is not prejudiced because, according to him or her, some of his or her best friends or 
people he or she admires are Black.  
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A stereotype will be modified only when a stereotype-inconsistent individual is seen as 
representative of a group (Nelson, 2006).  For example, after observing a self-motivated and 
hardworking Black person, a White person may be motivated to change his or her stereotype 
about Black persons being lazy.  However, if the hardworking Black person is not seen as 
representative of the group, a White person is more likely to create a subcategory while keeping 
the stereotype intact.   
Research indicates that if people can explain a stereotype-inconsistent characteristic as 
being attributable to some aspect of the situation, or to vague stereotype-relevant information, or 
to any other ready variable that would explain the origin of the group-deviant characteristic, it 
would be used to subcategorise the person (Baron & Byrne, 2003; Garcia-Marques & Mackie, 
1999; Kunda & Oleson, 1985; Rothbart and Lewis, 1988).  For example, rather than change the 
existing stereotype of “Black people are lazy”, a White person will subcategorise the self-
motivated, hardworking Black person by explaining the stereotype-inconsistent behaviour as a 
result of a private school education where the value of hard work was instilled.   
Illusory Correlations 
To increase the predictability of the social environment, humans also have a tendency to 
notice correlations between events, objects, and people.  Some of these correlations are correct 
(Nelson, 2006).  However, it is also a fact that people often perceive a relationship between 
variables that are weakly correlated or not correlated at all.  This perceived correlation is called an 
illusory correlation and can lead to both the formation and maintenance of stereotypes (Baron & 
Byrne, 2003; Franzoi, 2003; Jones, 1997; Nelson, 2006).  For example, as the American media 
tend to over report crime perpetrated by African Americans, people can infer that African 
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Americans, more than any other ethnic groups, are more likely to be criminal (Taylor, et al., 
2006). 
The effect of illusory correlations is heightened by the human tendency to pay more 
attention to stereotype-consistent information, while disregarding information that is inconsistent 
with a stereotype (Franzoi, 2003; Nelson, 2006).  Through this process of selective attention to 
stereotype-consistent information, the stereotype can prove to be resistant to change (Franzoi, 
2003).  For example, if a White person believes that Black people are lazy, he or she is more 
likely to notice and remember examples of lazy behaviour in Black people and forget examples of 
hardworking Black people or lazy White people.  In this way, his or her stereotype leads him or 
her to perceive a strong (illusory) correlation between laziness and Black people.   
Motivation 
In addition to cognitive biases, heuristics, and other capacity limitations of the human 
cognitive system, stereotypes may also be formed and maintained simply on the basis of 
motivation to do so. Some people may have a specific interest in perceiving out-groups as 
inferior, and their effort and energy directed at meeting that need is what can be called motivation.  
On the other hand, some people are more motivated than others to form accurate impressions of 
others instead of relying on stereotypes in their social perceptions.  Stangor and Ford (1992, as 
cited in Nelson, 2006) have suggested that people can be identified as either perceiving others in 
an accuracy-oriented or expectancy-confirming manner.  Accuracy-oriented individuals tend to be 
motivated to be more accurate in their social perceptions than expectancy-confirming individuals 
who are more likely to perceive individuals based on stereotypes of the target group.  The latter 
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group focuses more on expectancy-confirming behaviour of the out-group members, and forgets 
instances of expectancy-disconfirming behaviour (Nelson, 2006).   
People are sometimes accuracy orientated, and sometimes expectancy orientated.  
However, most people are not motivated to avoid using stereotypes in social perceptions because 
there is usually no good reason to carefully consider others and expend that much cognitive 
energy in social evaluations.  Lack of motivation to avoid stereotyping others does therefore serve 
to maintain existing stereotypes (Nelson, 2006).   
Previously it was explained that some attitudes may be automatically activated, often 
without the awareness of the holder of the attitude (Dovidio, et al., 2003; Eagly & Chaiken, 2005).  
In a similar manner, stereotypes can also be activated outside the conscious awareness of the 
stereotype holder, as people can hold implicit stereotypes.    
Implicit Stereotypes  
It is a common misconception that people wilfully and consciously use stereotypes 
(Sampson, 1999).  Therefore, the prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory behaviour that follows 
stereotypes are considered to be intentional and the “symptoms of a bad person” (Sampson, 1999, 
p.138). However, as previously discussed, cognitive psychologists argue that stereotyping is part 
of normal human categorisation (Nelson, 2006; Sampson, 1999; Taylor, et al., 2006).  The idea of 
implicit stereotyping adds to the “picture of normalcy” (Sampson, 1999, p. 138) regarding 
stereotyping.  
 Implicit stereotypes refer to stereotypes that, although difficult to identify through 
introspection, still influence people’s beliefs regarding characteristics held by members of a 
particular social category.  Therefore, racial, ethic, or gender stereotypes of which people are 
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mostly unaware, can be activated merely by perceiving members of the groups to which these 
stereotypes apply.  Once activated, these stereotypes influence the cognitions, decisions, and overt 
behaviour regarding members of the stereotyped group (Baron & Byrne, 2003).  An interesting 
question arises as to whether people, who personally reject negative stereotypes, can successfully 
avoid using stereotypes when encountering an out-group member.  Devine’s (1989) activation-
application model addresses this issue.  
Devine’s Model of Stereotype Activation and Application  
Devine (1989) has developed a model about stereotype activation that distinguished 
between automatic processing of information and controlled processing of information.  This 
model is illustrated in Figure 2. Controlled processing refers to the more familiar, conscious, and 
voluntary cognitive processing of information that people engage in on a daily basis (Brown, 
2006; Devine, 1989; Taylor, et al., 2006).  Automatic processing refers to cognitive processing 
and stereotype activation over which people have no control (Aronson, et al., 2002; Devine, 
1989).  For example, even a person who scores low on a prejudice scale, is most likely familiar 
with certain stereotypes that exist in society that “pops into one’s mind” (Aronson, et al., 2002, 
p.474), such as “Jews are materialistic”, “homosexual men are effeminate”, “Afrikaners are 
racist”, and “Black people are violent”.   
Devine’s (1989) theory suggests that cognitive processing involves two steps:  The 
automatic processing brings up stereotypes, but the controlled (or conscious) processing can 
refute or ignore it.  For example, a person can refute the automatic stereotype by saying to him or 
herself that the stereotype is not right or fair since Black people are no more hostile than White 
people.  The person can therefore choose to ignore the stereotype about the person’s racial group 
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(Aronson, et al., 2002).  Thus, if information-processing demands are light (e.g., the individual 
has enough time to make a decision or is not attending to more than one stimulus at a time), low-
prejudiced people will successfully inhibit the use of automatically activated stereotypes.  If, 
however, information-processing demands are heavy, even low-prejudice people will be unable to 
prevent the second step, the application of stereotypes. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Devine’s model of stereotype activation and application. 
Source:  Brown, 2006, p. 375.  
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Dovidio, Moll, Hermsen and Russin (2000) found that even high-prejudice people can be trained 
to ignore or suppress stereotypes when thinking about out-group members. In summary, contrary 
to Devine’s (1989) postulation, some researchers have postulated that stereotype activation is not 
always automatic, and stereotype application not inevitable (Brown, 2006).    
Although stereotypes are considered to be cognitive and prejudice considered to be 
affective, the two concepts tend to operate together (Nelson, 2006; Taylor, et al., 2006).  For 
example, prejudiced individuals’ evaluation of unemployed Black people are likely to involve 
both a group label (e.g., Black people), it’s accompanying stereotypical traits (e.g., lazy), and the 
associate negative affect (e.g., disgust, irritation) regarding Black people.    
In the previous sections, it has been established that prejudice is a negative attitude 
directed toward people because they are members of a specific group.  Prejudiced attitudes often 
reveal themselves in biased behaviour (Franzoi, 2003).  Thus, as the behavioural component of 
prejudice, discrimination is closely tied to stereotypes and prejudice.   
Discrimination 
Although prejudice does not always lead to discrimination (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986; 
Franzoi, 2003) and discrimination may occur without prejudice (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986; 
Franzoi, 2003), it is a fact that negative feelings (prejudice) and beliefs (stereotypes) often go 
hand in hand with negative action or treatment (discrimination) (Lord, 1997).  Discrimination is 
generally described as that which is “actionable” (Jones, 1997, p.10).   
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The Definition of Discrimination 
Discrimination refers to “selectively unjustified negative behaviour towards members of 
the target group” (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986, p. 3) with the aim of maintaining the in-group’s 
preferred position at the expense of members of the comparison group (Jones, 1997).  
Discrimination therefore refers to unjustified negative or harmful actions towards a person, 
merely because of that person’s membership to a specific group (Aaronson, et.al, 2002; Baron & 
Byrne, 2003; Franzoi, 2003; Jones, 1997; Myers, 2005).  For example, during apartheid, Black 
people were not allowed to use beaches designated for White people, merely because they were 
Black (Sparks, 2003).   
Allport’s (1954b) definition of discrimination draws attention to the fact that 
discrimination does not only involve the person that discriminates, but also includes a recipient of 
discriminatory behaviour, who disagrees with this treatment.  He defined discrimination as 
behaviour that “comes about only when we deny to individuals or groups of people equality of 
treatment which they may wish” (p. 51). 
As seen in the definitions above, discrimination is often conceptualised only in terms of 
negative behaviour towards target groups.  However, it can also refer to positive behaviour 
towards a person based on positive attributes held towards the group to which that person belongs 
(Jones, 1997).  For example, a student with comparatively low Grade 12 results may be admitted 
to a tertiary institution, while another with higher marks may be rejected because the former is a 
son of an important alumnus. 
Discrimination also refers to a range of negative actions towards the target group.  Allport 
(1954b) described an intuitively based continuum of discrimination:  antilocution, avoidance, 
discrimination, physical attack, and extermination.  More recently, Essed (1991) included all 
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verbal, nonverbal, and paraverbal acts which result in negative or unfavourable consequences for 
the dominated racial or ethnic group into the definition of discrimination.   
When discrimination disadvantages members of groups based on racially-based criteria, it 
is referred to as racial discrimination (De la Rey & Duncan, 2003; Jones, 1997).  Racial 
discrimination can therefore be described as the behavioural enactment of racial prejudice (Essed, 
1991).  Traditionally, racial discrimination has been expressed either directly and blatantly or 
more indirectly.    
Direct and Indirect Racial Discrimination 
Direct racial discrimination refers to the intentional and fully reflected decision for the 
unequal treatment of people based on racial or related criteria (Essed, 1991; Mummendey & 
Otten, 2003) and is the form of discrimination that has been traditionally regarded as 
discrimination.  During direct racial discrimination out-groups are perceived as being distinct and 
deserving less positive or even negative treatment.  Consequently, out-groups will be consistently 
treated negatively, or others that do so will be supported (Mummendey & Otten, 2003).  Many 
examples of this form of discrimination were evident in apartheid South Africa (De la Rey & 
Duncan, 2003).  For example, educational, health and housing facilities available to White people 
were considerably superior to those of Coloured, Asian, and Black people (Duckitt, 1994; Sparks, 
2003).   
It is understandable that blatant discrimination will have many negative ramifications for 
its targets.  However, discrimination disguised as something else may also be particularly difficult 
to deal with (Taylor, et al., 2006).  Indirect racial discrimination is an example of disguised 
discrimination.  Indirect racial discrimination refers to the tendency to “adhere to the ‘equal 
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treatment’ of different racialised groups under systematically unequal conditions” (De la Rey & 
Duncan, 2003, p. 50).  Patterns of racial inequality may be perpetuated or even created when, due 
to indirect discrimination, people are unwilling to redress past patterns of inequality (De la Rey & 
Duncan, 2003).  For example, overrepresentation of White persons in positions of authority in 
South African institutions may point to an unwillingness to change selection, employment, and 
promotion practices to include members of previously disadvantaged groups.   
In recent years, due to social and historical changes in society, another manifestation of 
discrimination that overlaps significantly with indirect discrimination has emerged.   
Subtle Discrimination  
Subtle discrimination refers to a behavioural manifestation of prejudice that is vague, often 
not visible, and difficult to prove.  This type of discrimination may be intentional or unintentional, 
and together with indirect discrimination, is becoming the foremost mode in which racism 
currently manifests itself (De la Rey & Duncan, 2003).   
Subtle discrimination is usually expressed in disguised ways, such as paternalism and 
condescension, supportive discouragement, and stereotyped humour.  Paternalism and 
condescension refer to behaviour that is polite and nice on the surface, but which treats members 
of the target group as though they are children, lacking in some things or otherwise inferior.  For 
example, a White person that speaks loudly and slowly when addressing Black people, even if 
they have a good grasp of language in which they are addressed, practices this form of 
discrimination (De la Rey & Duncan, 2002).   
Second, supportive discouragement occurs when mixed messages about the abilities, 
intelligence, or accomplishments are conveyed to a person of the target group.  For example, a 
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White person may constantly complement the work of Black colleagues but not that of White 
colleagues.  This may be because the competence of White colleagues is always taken for granted, 
while Black colleagues are expected to fail.  The third form of subtle discrimination, stereotyped 
humour, refers to the telling of jokes that are based on stereotypes.  It may also include the 
imitation of accents to create humour (De la Rey & Duncan, 2003).   
Stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination thus leads to many difficulties between people, 
as it is an inappropriate and unjustified differentiation between people, based merely on their 
group membership (Mummendey & Otten, 2005).  While overt acts of prejudice might have 
declined in recent years, several researchers (Brown, 2006; Gibbons, Gerrard, Cleveland, Wills & 
Brody, 2004; Jones, 1997) suggest that targeted groups, such as racial and ethnic groups, still have 
to confront the devastating consequences of prejudice in their lives.   
Consequences of Prejudice on Its Targets 
Prejudice not only affects the prejudiced person’s thoughts, feelings, and behaviour, but 
also triggers adaptive responses in the target of prejudice (Jones, 1997; Meyers, 2005).  In this 
regard, Allport (1954b) stated: “one’s reputation cannot be hammered, hammered, hammered into 
one’s head without doing something to one’s character” (p. 139).   
Allport (1954b) reduced the reactions of the targets of prejudice to two basic types, 
namely:  (a) those that involve blaming oneself (e.g., withdrawal, self-hate, and aggression against 
one’s own group), and (b) those that involve blaming external causes (e.g., fighting back, 
suspiciousness, and increased group pride).  Fanon (1990) suggested that racism can be 
considered a form of systemic vertical violence.  In racist contexts, thus, the dominated group is 
kept in subjugation by force and social stratification.  More significantly, though, is the fact that 
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suppression is also be maintained when the dominated group internalises the dominant group’s 
racist beliefs.  Such internalisation results in intense intra-psychic stress and rage in the dominated 
group and is often turned inwards where it manifests in all forms of addictions.   The dominated 
group may also direct their rage at safe targets, such as other victims of racism.  Hence the high 
levels of abuse evident in many dominated and marginalised communities (De la Rey & Duncan, 
2003). 
In recent years it has also became clear that the study of the consequences of prejudice 
would not be complete without considering the influence of the target’s expectations on the 
perceiver in the social context.   For example, feedback from the target often confirms the 
expectations of the perceiver, while the behaviour of the perceiver often confirms the expectations 
of the target (Nelson, 2006).  The effects of prejudice on its targets reveals itself most prominently 
in five different observable phenomena, namely:  (a) identity maintenance, (b) stereotype threat, 
(c) the self-fulfilling prophesy of prejudice, (d) disidentification and disengagement, (e) system 
justification, and (f) the paradoxical effects of affirmative action.   
Identity Maintenance 
 Historically, racial, ethnic, or gender groups who are targets of prejudice because of their 
unique racial, ethnic, or gender characteristic have assimilated their identity into the dominant 
culture at the cost of losing their identity and racial or national heritage (Brown, 2006).  For 
example, Black persons have altered their mannerisms and changed their names and styles of 
dress in order to become more westernised (Brown, 2006).   
Yet, these groups have been able to maintain cultural identities through various strategies.  
One such strategy aims to protect self-esteem by attributing negative outcomes to prejudice 
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(Brown, 2006).  For example, if a person from a group regularly targeted by prejudice fails to be 
promoted at work, he or she may believe the outcome was due to prejudice.  Unfortunately, 
attributing failure to discrimination may be a psychological double-bind.  As people disapprove of 
individuals who evade personal responsibility for negative outcomes, this strategy may reflect 
poorly on the individual (Kaiser & Miller, 2001).  For that reason, research has shown, members 
of targeted groups are in many cases unlikely to report discrimination (Pillay & Collings, 2004; 
Ruggiero & Taylor, 1995; 1997) due to their awareness of the social cost of reporting 
discrimination to high-status others (Stangor, Swim, Van Allen & Sechrist, 2002). 
Investigations into self-esteem of Americans have suggested that group pride can insulate 
people from prejudice and protect them from the adverse effects of discrimination.  For example, 
most minorities in the United States have evaluated their collective identity in positive terms 
(Crocker, Luhtanen, Blaine, & Broadnax, 1994), while many report a personal level of self-
esteem that is equivalent to that of White Americans (Twenge & Campbell, 2002).   
The Stereotype Threat 
On average, minority groups in the United States of America, such as African Americans 
and Hispanic Americans consistently average about 15 units less on standardised intelligence and 
achievement tests than White Americans.  Even though many explanations for this effect, such as 
socioeconomic disadvantages and cultural biases imbedded into standardised intelligence tests 
have been offered, factors in the immediate testing situation are also considered to have an effect 
(Brown, 2006; Nelson, 2006).   
Research reported by Steele and Aronson (1995) suggested that the debilitating effects of 
stereotype threat may account for the disparity in achievement between African Americans and 
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White Americans.  The researchers discovered that African American students showed poorer 
performance on standardised tests when they felt the threat of their intellectual ability being 
evaluated.  However, when they were led to believe that the test does not count, they performed as 
well as White students.   
The apprehension of the African American students related to their fear of confirming the 
existing negative cultural stereotype of intellectual inferiority (Aronson et al., 2002), caused 
enough anxiety to disrupt their test performance, thereby fulfilling the stereotype (Nelson, 2006; 
Sampson, 1999).  The effort it takes to dismiss the accusations of stereotype threat increases 
mental demands and decreases working memory (Schmader & Johns, 2003).  Worrying about 
mistakes under stereotype threat can also impair performance and motivation (Seibt & Foster, 
2004).  
In addition to psychological consequences, stereotype threat may also have damaging 
physiological consequences.  Blasovich, Mendes, Hunter, Lickel, and Kowai-Bell (2001) varied 
stereotype threat while giving Black and White students a written test.  The Black students 
showed considerable higher blood pressure under the high stereotype threat condition than the 
White participants, but they did not differ in the low stereotype threat condition.   
The Self-Fulfilling Prophesy  
One mechanism whereby targets of prejudice may come to accept and believe negative 
stereotypes about their group, is through the self-fulfilling prophesy (Nelson, 2006; Jones, 1997; 
Sampson, 1999).  This refers to the phenomenon by which a perceiver’s expectations about a 
target eventually lead that target to behave in ways that confirms those expectations (Nelson, 
2006).  The self-fulfilling prophesy can be illustrated with the following example:  If a White 
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person believes that his Black domestic worker is not intelligent, the White person will probably 
not ask the domestic worker interesting questions, or listen intently while she is talking.  This 
behaviour will be due to a simple expectation regarding the domestic worker:  Why waste energy 
paying attention to the domestic worker if she is unlikely to say something clever or interesting?  
This is bound to have an influence on the behaviour of the domestic worker.  Since the White 
person is not paying much attention to her when she’s talking, she will feel uneasy and will 
probably not communicate the knowledge and wisdom that she possesses.  This will serve to 
confirm and justify the original stereotype of the White person, completing the self-fulfilling 
prophesy.   
Self-fulfilling prophesies can also operate on a societal level (Franzoi, 2003).  For 
example, general beliefs of White South-Africans regarding the intellectual inferiority of non-
White people led to inferior education for non-White South Africans through the promulgation of 
the Bantu Education Act of 1953.  As a result of inferior education, among other factors, up to the 
1990s non-White people could mostly only find unschooled and menial positions (Sparks, 2003), 
seemingly confirming the original belief of intellectual inferiority that created inferior education 
in the first place. 
Disidentification and Disengagement  
A consequence of repeatedly experiencing the stereotype threat is that the target may 
disidentify with whatever task is associated with the threatening evaluation (Brown, 2006; 
Franzoi, 2003; Taylor, et al., 2006). In disidentification, individuals disengage their identity from 
the achievement domain in question, thereby shielding their self-esteem and sense of self-
competence (Nelson, 2006). For example, African Americans disidentify with academic 
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achievement, while women disidentify with achievement in science and mathematics (Major, 
Spencer, Schmader & Wolfe, 1998).  
Disidentification can be both adaptive and maladaptive (Nelson, 2006).  On the one hand, 
since disidentification protects self-esteem, it can be regarded as an effective coping response in 
the face of prejudice and discrimination (Crocker, et al., 1998).  However, disidentification is also 
one of the factors that most undermines achievement and success in domains which society deems 
important.  It is not surprising, therefore, that the effects of prejudice are also most noticeable 
among social groups that have been historically disadvantaged (Franzoi, 2003).   
System Justification 
Ironically, members of disadvantaged groups may sometimes cooperate by endorsing 
negative stereotypes of their in-group (Jost & Banaji, 1994) to justify, rationalise, or explain the 
status quo.  For example, Triandis (1989) reported that Hispanic and African Americans have 
approximately the same stereotypes of one another that White Americans have of them.  Thus, 
wealthy Whites and poor Black Americans might both support the stereotype that poor people are 
less industrious and intelligent (Lord, 1997), thereby serving to maintain the status quo (Jost & 
Banaji, 1994).  Justifying the existing system enables members of disadvantaged groups to 
reassure themselves that they live in a just world where people get what they deserve (Hafer & 
Olson, 1993).   According to Jost and Banji (1994), system justification does not occur 
consciously and deliberately.  Instead, members of groups, disadvantaged by negative stereotypes, 
might “absorb” implicit messages from the media.  They thus come to believe that “the world has 
to work this way” (Lord, 1997, p. 328) without ever examining their reasons for system 
justification. 
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The Paradoxical Effects of Affirmative Action 
Members of stereotyped groups are sometimes the beneficiaries of policies and programs 
that aim to help them economically, occupationally, or educationally (Brown, 2006; Nelson, 
2006).  For example, in South Africa, affirmative action policy is designed to overcome the 
effects of past discrimination and current stereotypes.  These policies also function to help 
underrepresented members of previously disadvantaged groups to find good employment (Nelson, 
2006).   
However, the individuals who benefit from these programs might also be adversely 
affected (Brown, 2006).  Affirmative action programs may be seen as mere reverse 
discrimination, incurring psychological costs for those who benefit from the program (Nelson, 
2006).  For example, Schneider, Major, Luhtanen, and Crocker (1996) hypothesised that offers of 
help from the perceived prejudiced group might reinforce stereotypes of lesser abilities on groups 
that benefit from affirmative action, leading to negative effects on the self-esteem and beliefs of 
work competence of the stereotyped groups.    
Affirmative action can be beneficial to previously disadvantaged groups.  When 
beneficiaries of affirmative action were informed that their ability as well as group status were 
factors in the hiring decision, they did not suffer negative psychological effects, such as self-doubt 
(Brown, Charnsangavej, Keough, Newnam, & Rentfrow, 2000).  Affirmative action programs 
therefore need to be perceived as fair to both the beneficiaries and critics of the programs to incur 
positive effects (Taylor & Dube, 1986).   
Prejudice therefore has many negative consequences for its targets.  It is therefore 
necessary to explore the ways in which prejudice can be reduced.   
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Reducing Prejudice 
Given the deep roots and long history of the presence of prejudice, prejudice reduction is a 
difficult, but necessary challenge (Sampson, 1999).  Similarly, Brown (2006) asserted that no 
issue in the study of prejudice is more essential than considering how prejudice can be reduced.  
While Duckitt (1994) considered it unlikely that the universal psychological processes that 
underlie prejudice can be changed, other researchers (Franzoi, 2003; Jones, 1997; Sampson, 1999) 
believed it possible to decrease the degree in which prejudice is expressed.  Jones (1997) 
suggested the grouping of prejudice reduction strategies under two approaches, namely (1) 
individual-based approaches, and (2) group-based approaches.   
Individual-Based Processes 
As prejudice and discrimination are often based on stereotypical thinking it can be 
suggested that positive changes may occur if people make a conscious effort not to apply 
stereotypical thinking in their daily lives (Franzoi, 2003).  Allport (1954b) postulated that most 
people experience thinking about others in stereotypes as a negative experience because it brings 
about feelings of discomfort, guilt, and shame.  Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink and Elliot (1991) 
found that this was especially true for those individuals who pride themselves on their egalitarian 
attitudes.  It seems obvious, therefore, that people may try various strategies to avoid applying 
stereotypes, such as decategorisation and stereotype suppression.   
 59
Decategorisation 
Given that social categorisation may lead to prejudice, the opposite tendency, namely 
decategorisation may reduce stereotyping and prejudice (Jones, 1997; Sampson, 1999).  However, 
some social scientists believe that since social categorisation is an inevitable product of universal 
cognitive mechanisms (Cristonaffanini, 2004), it can not be changed (Franzoi, 2003), questioned 
or counteracted (Cristonaffanini, 2004).  For example, Fox (1992) postulated that although the 
content of a stereotype may change, the process of stereotyping is inherent and automatic and 
therefore inevitable.  He contends “the whole point of this argument has been to show that we 
have no choice but to think in stereotypes” (Fox, 1992, p.149).   
Fox (1992) furthermore asserted that humans are only motivated to change the contents of 
their stereotypes when such stereotypes lack social approval or conflicts with the values of the 
holder of the stereotype.  However, Franzoi (2003) cautioned against describing stereotypical 
thinking as inherent, natural and inevitable, as this might appear to condone the prejudice and 
discrimination that could result from negative stereotypes (Franzoi, 2003). 
Other researchers (Allport, 1954b; Billig, 1985; Devine, 1989; Franzoi, 2003; Sampson, 
1999) rejected the postulation that humans need this type of thinking to function.  Allport (1954b) 
believed that people can categorise without it inevitably leading to negative stereotyping, based 
on the fact that categories and stereotypes are not identical concepts.  Categories create order, are 
flexible and can change.  On the other hand, stereotypes are rigid, inflexible, and tend to link only 
one meaning to the out-group.  Similarly, Billig (1985) argued that people think not only by 
applying categories, but are also are able to making distinctions within categories by observing 
generalities and individual attributes.  Consistent with Billig’s analysis, Devine (1989) postulated 
that people can circumvent judgements based on stereotypical thinking by making a conscious 
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effort to use more rational, inductive cognitive strategies.  People should therefore be able to 
inhibit prejudice though conscious and deliberate self-regulation (Franzoi, 2003).   
Decategorisation as a conscious strategy to inhibit prejudice aims to lessen focus on the 
social identity of out-group members, concentrating more on the individual identity of out-group 
members (Sampson, 1999).  Several strategies facilitate decategorisation. One such strategy 
involves differentiating members of out-groups according to their individual entities distinctive to 
them as individuals of the out-group category.  For example, the role of parent can be emphasised.  
Another strategy entails personalising members of out-groups by responding to them in terms of 
their individuating information that is relevant.  For example, instead of categorising a person as a 
Black person, personal information such as “my neighbour” may be applied (Jones, 1997).  Due 
to the reality of social conditions that may limit contact between groups, Jones (1997) concedes 
that decategorisation may be difficult to achieve.  Another limitation of this approach is that it 
may undermine important social identities (Sampson, 1999). 
Stereotype Suppression 
Besides choosing to apply current personal beliefs instead of stereotypes, the strategy of 
stereotype suppression may also be utilised to avoid stereotypic thinking.  This strategy entails 
making a conscious effort of not thinking of someone in terms of a stereotype by quickly 
“pushing [the stereotype] out of mind” (Nelson, 2006, p.81) as soon as the stereotype is activated.  
Research investigating stereotype suppression, however, suggested that it is very difficult to avoid 
stereotyping.  Furthermore, the effect of stereotype avoidance only lasts a short time  and the 
stereotypic thoughts come back even stronger and more frequently (Gordijn, Hindriks & Koomen, 
2004; Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne & Jetten, 1994).   
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Nevertheless, some people are able to avoid the rebound effects of stereotype suppression 
(Rudman, Ashmore & Gary, 2001).  Monteith, Spicer and Tooman (1998) found that low 
prejudice people did not demonstrate stereotype rebound.  The researchers concluded that people 
who are motivated not to use stereotypes and posess well-practiced, alternative ways of thinking 
about other people, will be able to avoid stereotypic thinking without suffering stereotype rebound 
effects.  Dunn and Spellman (2003) suggested that access to stereotypical information might be 
inhibited for people who do not believe in stereotypes.  Such people were therefore less likely to 
stereotype an encountered individual.  It seems therefore that non-stereotypical responses can be 
practiced, as suggested by Macrae, et al. (1994):  “If stereotype activation can become routinized, 
automated, and triggered by external stimulus cues, then there is no compelling reason why 
stereotype inhibition should not take a similar course” (p.815). Cristonaffanini (2004) claimed 
that examples from history do in fact illustrate how political specific stereotypes can change as a 
product of historical context.  As example, Christonaffanini (2004) pointed out how the post-
Second World War Jewish stereotypes have changed to perceptions of “today’s European Jews” 
(p.9).   
Intergroup Processes 
Social psychologists believe that prejudice is not inevitable and can be reduced by several 
techniques that involve intergroup processes (Jones, 1997). Two of the most prominent techniques 
in this approach will be discussed, namely: (a) intergroup contact, and (2) recategorisation. 
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Intergroup Contact  
The idea of intergroup contact to reduce prejudice was proposed by Allport (1954b).  He 
held that reduced prejudice will result when four positive situations in the contact situation are 
present, namely:  (a) equal status between the groups, (b) common goals, (c) intergroup 
cooperation, and (d) the support of authorities, law, or custom (Baron & Byrne, 2003; Franzoi, 
2003; Jones, 1997; Kenworthy, Turner, Hewstone & Voci, 2005; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2005).  
Studies conducted since this original formulation generally support the importance of these four 
conditions for intergroup contact to reduce prejudice (Baron & Byrne, 2003; Pettigrew & Tropp, 
2005).   
When the four conditions of intergroup contact are met, several factors predict the success 
of intergroup contact as a prejudice reduction strategy (Pettigrew, 1997).  First, increased contact 
between persons from different groups can lead to a growing recognition of the similarities 
between them, which can enhance mutual attraction (Baron & Byrne, 2003).  Second, although 
stereotypes can be resistant to change, they can be altered when sufficient stereotype-inconsistent 
information is encountered, or when individuals meet a sufficient number of exceptions to their 
stereotypes (Kunda & Oleson, 1995).  Third, increased contact may counter the illusion of out-
group homogeneity (Baron & Byrne, 2003).    For example, some South African studies (Luiz & 
Krige, 1981; Spangenberg & Nel, 1983) indicated that increased quality of contact facilitated 
intergroup relations.  Similarly, Holtman, Louw, Tredoux, and Carney (2005) found that quality 
of intergroup contact with members of other race groups and increased contact in various contexts 
was the best predictor for improved racial attitudes of learners of previously segregated schools in 
South Africa.  Some research findings implied that only the dominant race group in a specific 
society benefits from contact.  For example, Finchilescu (1988) found that racially integrated 
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training in a school setting reduced prejudice among the White learners, but not among Black or 
Indians learners.   
Intergroup contact may also increase stereotyping and prejudice.  Holtman, et al., (2005) 
reported that a high degree of identification with one’s own race was in some instances 
significantly associated to less positive attitudes towards other groups.  This may by due to 
superficial contact between members of different groups which fails to provide new information 
about each group, thereby merely reinforcing existing stereotypes (Allport, 1954b; Kenworthy, et 
al., 2005).   
Contact between members of out-groups, especially when these groups are the target of 
strong prejudice, may also generate negative emotions such as anxiety, discomfort, and fear of 
appearing prejudiced.  Such reactions may also impact on the benefits of intergroup contact 
(Baron & Byrne, 2003).  Following this argument, Smith and Boero (2001) expressed their 
concern about the lack of equal status and high quality interracial contact in South Africa.  
According to these researchers, these conditions are essential ingredients for the decrease of 
prejudice through contact, but are largely absent in South Africa.  For example, a common context 
for interracial contact in South Africa is the superficial and scripted contact between a socially 
dominant White homeowner and domestic worker.   Another strategy that encourages perceivers 
to focus on additional dimensions of group membership is recategorisation.   
Recategorisation 
Decategorisation aims at separating individual identities from group identities to enable 
people to relate more as individuals.  Recategorisation challenges the distinction between in-
groups and out-groups by encouraging the development of a superordinate goal that will 
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transform people from us versus them to a common superordinate group identity of we (Crisp, 
Walsh & Hewstone, 2006; Dovidio, Gaertner, Niemann & Snider, 2001; Jones, 1997; Sampson, 
1999; Taylor, et al., 2006).  
 Recategorisation can be facilitated by reducing sub-group salience (Gaertner, Mann, 
Murrell & Dovidio, 1989), while enlisting members of all sub-groups in a common task.  For 
example, the salience of racial sub-groups during a common task will be decreased if both Black 
and White learners are given a similar headdress for the duration of the task.   This will increase 
the perception that both in-groups and out-groups are part of a larger, more inclusive group 
(Crisp, et al., 2006; Dovidio, Gaerter & Validzic, 1998).  As members conceive themselves as 
being part of a superordinate group, it has been found that attitudes towards former out-group 
members improve, thereby reducing intergroup prejudice (Dovidio, et la., 2001; Gaertner, 
Dovidio, Rust, Nier, Banker, Ward, et al.,1999; Gaertner, et al., 1990).  However, 
recategorisation’s superordinate goal may be successful in reducing prejudice only in the short 
term (Sampson, 1999).   
Reducing prejudice requires interventions at both individual level and group level, 
depending on the circumstances and the requirements of the intervention (Sampson, 1999).  Jones 
(1997) also regarded trust, individual desires to control prejudice reactions, and seeking common 
ground as essential ingredients to foster a positive basis for intergroup relations.  The level at 
which prejudice reduction interventions are aimed also directs the success of such interventions.  
In this regard, Duckitt (1994) asserted that the higher the level of intervention, the greater the 
potential impact of the intervention will be.  For example, prejudice reduction interventions at a 
school will have a larger impact than simply targeting an individual learner.  To further 
understand the effects of prejudice, and to develop strategies to reduce such negative effects, it is 
of great relevance that stereotypes and prejudice are accurately measured (Jones, 1997).   
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Measurement of Prejudice 
Prejudice rests primarily on attitudes and prejudice measurement thus rest on the 
techniques and methods developed to measure attitudes.  Attitude measurement is ever-present in 
various academic disciplines, such as social psychology, sociology, political science, and 
economic sciences.  News media regularly conduct and report surveys assessing public attitudes 
towards a range of objects (Krosnick, et al., 2005).  A well-known example is the routine 
measurement of South Africans’ approval of political leaders.  
  An attitude, like all psychological constructs, is a latent construct and can not be observed 
directly (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993;  Krosnick, et al., 2005).  In addition, attitudes are not “simple 
productions that emerge intact, ripe for measurement” (Krosnick, et al., 2005, p.63).  Attitude 
measurement therefore depends on those attitudes being revealed in verbal or nonverbal overt 
responses aimed at determining the stable construct underlying responses given during 
measurement (Krosnick, et al., 2005).  Attitude measurement procedures are generally divided 
into (a) direct measurements where the verbal self-report of attitudes are taken as indicative of 
latent attitudes and (b) indirect procedures where attitudes are inferred without asking people 
directly to report them (Krosnick, et al., 2005). 
Direct Self-Report Measures  
To determine people’s attitudes, a wide variety of measurement techniques that has varied 
across history has been used.  Initially, the pioneers of attitude measurement presumed that an 
attitude could be accurately assessed only by using a large set of questions that were selected 
through an elaborate procedure (Krosnick, et al., 2005).  Questions regarding the participants’ 
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beliefs, feelings, or behaviour were put directly to them and their responses were then self-
reported (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Manstead & Semin, 2001).   
One of the earliest attempts to create an attitude measuring tool was the time consuming 
and cumbersome Thurstone method of attitude measurement (Brown, 2006; Eagly & Chaiken, 
1993; Foster, 1991a; Krosnick, et al., 2005), later followed by the less labour intensive Likert 
scale (Brown, 2006; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Krosnick, et al., 2005).  The “Anti-Black Scale” 
(Heaven & Moerdyk, 1977) is a South African example of a Likert scale in which respondents are 
asked to rate their evaluation of their attitude according to a five-point response scale: strongly 
agree, agree, don’t know, disagree, and strongly disagree (Foster, 1991a).  
The simplest type of self-report attitude scale is known as the semantic differential scale 
(Krosnick, et al., 2005; Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum, 1957, as cited in Brown, 2006).  This scale 
focuses on people’s feelings, rather than their beliefs towards an attitude object (Brown, 2006).  
The generic nature of the semantic differential scale makes it easy to compare different attitudes 
towards any attitude object (Brown, 2006).  Direct self-report measuring techniques, which has 
been widely used to measure explicit, consciously held prejudicial attitudes (Nelson, 2006), has 
number of strengths and limitations. 
Strengths and Limitations   
Direct self-report methods have the disadvantage of being time consuming and demanding 
for respondents since completion of such measures involve the administration of a large set of 
questions to measure a single attitude.  In addition, the Thurstone and Likert procedures require a 
large amount of preparatory groundwork.  However, these methods have the key advantages of 
higher reliability and correlational validity of their items (Krosnick, et al., 2005). 
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Another factor that limits the validity of direct self-report measures is the social 
desirability response bias (Brown, 2006; Krosnick, et al., 2005; Lord, 1997).  This refers to the 
tendency of participants in attitude studies to give socially desirable answers, rather than their true 
attitudes (Orne, 1962) especially when highly personal or contentious issues are under 
consideration. As a result, it is especially difficult to measure people’s true attitudes regarding 
matters of sexuality and prejudice (Brown, 2006).    
Numerous attempts have been made to surmount the social desirability tendency of people 
during self-reported attitude measurement.  One such strategy is the bogus pipeline technique, 
which involves telling participants that the researcher can determine their true attitudes towards an 
attitude object by means of heart rate and blood pressure measurement (Brown, 2006; Krosnick, 
et al., 2005; Lord, 1997).  Even though the physiological measurement was fake (bogus), it was 
found that by merely telling participants that the truth can be detected was sufficient to increase 
(not ensure) the honesty of responses (Brown, 2006).  Under these conditions White participants 
were more willing to ascribe undesirable personality characteristics to Blacks and more desirable 
characteristic to Whites (Sigall & Page, 1971) and were more honest in reporting their dislike of 
Blacks (Allen, 1975).  However, the bogus pipeline technique is difficult to implement, ethically 
questionable, and might even alter weakly held attitudes (Lord, 1997), which limits its usefulness 
for the purpose of attitude measurement. 
To overcome limitations with intentional and unintentional distortion of reported attitudes 
during self-reported measurement of attitudes, research has increasingly focused on using 
measurement techniques that limit the occurrences of self-presentational distortions during a 
person’s deliberation of his or her evaluation. These techniques do not rely on self-reports of 
attitudes from participants, but on indirect or implicit ways of measuring attitudes.    
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 Indirect Measurement Techniques 
The expressed goal of indirect measures is to eliminate strategic misrepresentation by 
limiting participants’ control over the evaluation process.  By reducing the impact of self-
representational concerns during the assessment, it is assumed that the accuracy of attitude 
measurement will increase.  Indirect measurement techniques have increased in popularity as 
technology has become more sophisticated (Krosnick, et al., 2005; Manstead & Semin, 2001).  
Three kinds of implicit or indirect measures of attitude measurement have been used extensively 
in attitude research, namely:  (a) unobtrusive behavioural observation, (b) response latency 
measures, and (c) physiological measures. 
Unobtrusive Behavioural Observation 
Initially, measures designed to limit self-presentational distortions relied mainly on 
unobtrusive assessments of overt behaviours.  These assessments of attitudes hid the true purpose 
of the attitude scale (Brown, 2006) and sometimes even concealed the measurement itself 
(Krosnick, et al., 2005).  One strategy for unobtrusive observation is to disguise the attitude that is 
actually being studied.  For example, Gaertner & Dovidio (1977) considered helping behaviour in 
interpersonal contexts as a measure of racial attitudes by assessing how a person responds when 
given the opportunity to aid another individual who is either an in-group or out-group member.  
Although the participants of the study were aware of the fact that their behaviour was being 
recorded, they may have been unaware that their interracial attitudes were the focus of the 
measurement effort.  In addition, enacting the behaviour may be engrossing, resulting in less 
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opportunity for participants to modify their behaviour than in self-reported measures (Manstead & 
Semin, 2001).  
Another strategy in the set of traditional unobtrusive observation techniques concerns 
measures of nonverbal communication.  These techniques intend to capture implicit evaluations 
even in circumstances in which people are motivated to monitor the appropriateness of their 
behaviour (Krosnick, et al., 2005).  The general idea behind such measures is that nonverbal 
channels of communication are harder to control than aspects of verbal communication (Dovidio, 
et al., 2002).  For example, in an interracial interaction, people might be successful at keeping 
negative racial attitudes from influencing their verbal statements.  On the other hand, it might be 
harder to keep their negative racial attitudes from influencing their nonverbal behaviours such as 
body posture, eye contact, and fidgeting (Krosnick, et al., 2005).   
Since behaviour is generally influenced by a host of factors that includes attitudes, 
unobtrusive observation techniques can not guarantee that the attitude in question will be a 
particularly prominent influence on the assessed response.  As a result, unobtrusive observation 
measures have become less popular among attitude researchers.  Other indirect assessment 
techniques have been developed to overcome these limitations.  These measurement techniques 
assess evaluation activation that takes place independent of evaluative responses evaluative 
processing (Krosnick, et al., 2005).     
Response Latency Measures 
Response latency measures attempt to determine attitude activation from the impact that an 
attitude object has on the speed with which a person can make certain judgments.  One such 
measure, called the Implicit Association Test (IAT) (Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998), 
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requires participants to classify two sets of target items along two dimensions of judgment. For 
example, items such as flowers (i.e., tulips and roses) and insects (i.e., spiders and ants) may be 
paired with two dimensions of responses, such as pleasant and unpleasant (i.e., flower/pleasant 
and insect/unpleasant versus flower/unpleasant and insect/pleasant).   The critical measure then 
assesses which of these items produces more fluent, faster responses.  For example, relatively 
faster responses when flower is paired with pleasant and insect are paired with unpleasant would 
indicate that flowers automatically activate a more positive evaluation than insects (Krosnick, et 
al., 2005).  The IAT thus measures the extent to which people readily associate various objects 
with positive or negatively valued stimuli (Brown, 2006). The IAT has also been used to study 
attitudes towards race and gender groups (e.g., McConnell & Leibold, 2001; Neuman & Seibt, 
2001; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002; Wade & Lewis, 2004).  
While this measure has become the most widely used indirect attitude measure because it 
is possible to produce relatively large effect sizes with relatively limited technical effort 
(Krosnick, et al., 2005), it has also been criticized because to some extent it may tap widely 
shared evaluative associations that may not be personally endorsed (Karpinski & Hilton, 2001; 
Olson & Fazio, 2004).  Indirect attitude measures can also measure physiological correlates of 
evaluative responses (Krosnick, et al., 2005).   
Physiological Measures 
Although attitudes do not have a physical basis, they do have some measurable 
physiological responses (Brown, 2006) that people are generally not able to control.  This enabled 
researchers to consider assessment of autonomic responses such as galvanic skin conductance and 
pupilary responses to overcome intentional misrepresentation in direct attitude self-reports.  
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Rankin & Campbell (1955) were among the first to use galvanic skin response (GSR), a measure 
of the ability of skin to conduct electricity, in attitude research.  In their study, White participants 
showed an elevated GSR during interactions with a Black researcher compared to their responses 
with a White researcher. However, both GSR and pupilary response measurements have been 
proved to be inconsistent in the evaluation of attitudes (Himmelfarb, 1993).   
More effective measurement approaches measure subtle muscle activity in specific areas of 
the face such as frowning and smiling, modulation of eye blink reflexes during exposure to an 
attitude object, and activity in the brain through newly emerging brain imaging techniques 
(Krosnick, et al., 2005).   
As social psychologists have become increasingly sophisticated in their measurement of 
attitudes, the ability to detect prejudice or the potential for it has also increased (Jones, 1997). 
However, a variety of conceptual and methodological challenges has complicated the 
measurement of prejudiced behaviours, attitudes, and affects (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986; Duckitt, 
1992a).  One such challenge is the measurement of implicit prejudicial attitudes.   
 Measurement of Implicit Prejudice 
 Implicit prejudice refers to unconsciously held prejudicial attitudes (Franzoi, 2003) that 
predict spontaneous, unconscious, or less easily controlled behaviour, such as nonverbal 
behaviour (Brown, 2006). Fazio, et al. (1995) has studied racial attitudes through one such 
technique, namely the semantic priming technique in which participants make judgements about a 
target word after being exposed to a prime word.  Results of this study suggested that both White 
and African Americans had negative attitudes towards out-group members, as seeing the face of a 
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person of the other race facilitated the classification of negative traits but hindered the 
classification of positive traits.   
It is a surprising fact that there exists only a weak correlation between explicit and implicit 
attitudes (Fazio et al., 1995; Greenwald et al., 1998).  This suggests that measures intending to 
assess these attitudes may in fact capture somewhat different aspects of prejudicial attitudes 
(Brown, 2006).  However, depending on the context, both measures may be accurate in predicting 
behaviour.  Measures aimed at measuring explicit prejudicial attitudes will be more effective in 
predicting deliberate and conscious behaviour, while measures of implicit prejudicial attitudes 
will predict more spontaneous, unconscious behaviour (Brown, 2006). 
Measurement of Stereotypes 
Stereotypes have been assessed by assessment methods such as the adjective checklist (i.e., 
Katz and Braly, 1933) and the diagnostic ratio measure of stereotyping (i.e., McCauley & Stitt, 
1978).  These types of measures did indicate stereotypes predominant at the time of the research.  
For example, Katz & Braly’s (1933) study revealed that Germans were dominantly viewed as 
scientifically minded, Italians as artistic and passionate, and African Americans as superstitious, 
lazy, and ignorant.  
Another main approach in stereotype research is the determination of the conditions that 
facilitate or hamper the inclination to use stereotypes while making social judgements.  Utilising 
such measures, researchers have found that when people are happy (Bodenhausen, Kramer, & 
Süsser, 1994), angry (Bodenhausen, Sheppard & Kramer, 1994), and cognitively preoccupied 
(Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987), they are more likely to use a stereotype in their judgments 
about a target. 
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A variety of techniques have been developed to measure implicit stereotypes by measuring 
automatic associations in long-term memory.  For example, the evaluative priming technique is 
based on the idea that the evaluation of a stereotype-consistent word is faster after the presentation 
of a prime of the group (Nelson, 2006; Taylor, et al., 2006).  The prime, such as the face of a 
Black person or a White person, is supposed to activate unconscious associations to stereotypes.  
After being primed, the participant to the study is then asked to indicate as rapidly as possible 
whether stereotypical words (i.e., lazy, intelligent) are negative or positive words.   A White 
person who has a high number of implicit racial stereotypes should therefore respond quickly to 
the word lazy after being primed with a black person’s face, or to the word intelligent after being 
primed with the White person’s face (Fazio, Sanbonmatus, Powell & Kardes, 1986).    
Conclusion 
This chapter introduced the concepts of attitudes, stereotypes, prejudice, and 
discrimination.  In particular, the evaluative nature of an attitude was highlighted. As an 
evaluation of an individual on the basis of his or her group membership, prejudice can be 
considered to be an intergroup attitude.  Prejudice, consisting of negative feelings (prejudice) and 
beliefs (stereotypes) about out-group member characteristics may bring about negative behaviour 
(discrimination) towards out-groups that ranges from mild uneasiness towards members of out-
groups to more extreme behaviour such as intergroup hostility and violence (Aaronson, et al., 
2002; Brown, 2006; Franzoi, 2003; Nelson, 2006).  For example, virtually all of history’s wars, 
battles and other acts of group violence, such as the Holocaust and genocide in Rwanda have been 
driven by some form of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination (Eidelson & Eidelson, 2003). 
Prejudice thus has had a powerful impact on intergroup relationships.  
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One of the emerging issues regarding stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination introduced 
in this chapter, is the fact that these constructs may also exert influence on intergroup relations in 
more implicit, indirect, and subtle ways.   This is postulated to be result of changing social 
attitudes that make the explicit expression of stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination less 
acceptable (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005; Brown, 2006; Duckitt, 1994; McConahay, 1986; Nelson, 
2006).   A consequence of this change in the expression of prejudice, demonstrated in this chapter, 
is that the more contemporary forms of prejudice calls for the continuous revision of measurement 
methods to accurately measure contemporary forms of prejudice.  The current study thus seeks to 
add to the understanding of contemporary, subtle racism in the South African context, while 
simultaneously attempting to expand the body of national research.   
It became evident that prejudice has enjoyed a large amount of attention by researchers 
since early in the twentieth century.  However, as evident by the research presented, the largest 
amount of research on stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination has been conducted outside of 
South Africa.  This questions the relevance of the information presented in this chapter to the 
South African context and further emphasizes the need for South African research on critical 
issues regarding race and racism, as addressed by the current study. Having now introduced 
research on the concepts of attitudes, stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination, the following 
chapter will focus on the construct of racism.   
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CHAPTER 3 
RACISM 
Racism is not a recent phenomenon.  Jones (1997) regarded racism in the United States of 
America as “old as the country itself” (p. 365).  Similarly, in South Africa, racism has had a long 
history in creating and strengthening group differences.  Allport (1954b) observed:  “In South 
Africa, the English, it is said, are against the Afrikaner; both are against the Jews; all three are 
opposed to the Indians; while all four conspire against the native Black” (p.  3).    
 In the following section, racism is further explored and conceptualised with regard to the 
notion that racism as a construct and an ideology has its origins in the race dogma which 
prescribed theoretical assumptions such as immutable race groups and race hierarchies.  The roles 
of Afrikaner nationalism and apartheid in the shaping of racism in South Africa are also examined   
 Miles (1989) has asserted that racism takes various substantially different forms, “each 
historically specific and articulated in a different way in the societies in which they appear” (p. 
82).  Thus, like the race concept, racism does change with time to adapt to historically specific 
political- and social contexts.  Racism is therefore further conceptualised along the notion that it is 
an adaptable and changing construct.  First traditional expressions of racism are addressed.  
Thereafter, theoretical postulations regarding contemporary expressions of racism in countries 
such as the United States of America, Australia, New Zeeland, South Africa, and various Western 
European countries are examined to further inform on contemporary racism and its measurement.   
Finally, international and national research regarding the association between racism and 
the independent, demographic variables that are the focus of the present study (i.e., gender, 
language, age, and race) are considered.     
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  Race 
Even though “race” is a construct that has emerged in recent centuries (Smedley & 
Smedley, 2005), it has had a momentous global impact in shaping social and political interactions 
within societies (Solomos & Back, 1997).  In fact, the impact of race is so comprehensive that all 
human beings have been divided into racial categories that not only label their superficial physical 
differences, but also define how they should act and define themselves (Jones, 1997).  
 Despite the impact of race, there still is little consensus on what it actually means (Jones, 
1997).  In addition, the meaning of race has evolved over time from a word that referred to the 
breeding of a specific lineage of domestic animals (Fredrickson, 2002) to a construct that denotes 
observed or ascribed characteristics with socially significant meanings (Smedley & Smedley, 
2005).   Race was first used in connection with humans in the seventeenth century, when it was 
coupled with words such as tribe, religion, nation, lineage, physical differences, and geographical 
origins (Jones, 1997; Smedley & Smedley, 2005).  However, the construct did not specifically 
refer to skin colour (Jones, 1997), as indicated by the use of race when referring to differences 
between Celtics, Saxons, Gauls, Normans, Irish, and Welsh (Fredrickson, 2002).  In fact, history 
showed that Africans in Europe were assimilated into society without any significant social 
meaning attached to their dark skin colour and other physical differences (Smedley & Smedley, 
2005).   
In the eighteenth century the process of defining, describing, and categorising racial 
differences by scientists gave rise to the biological definition of race, mainly for descriptive 
purposes.  Since then, besides referring to the classification of differences between human beings, 
race also acquired various social meanings and value judgements that have provided the rationale 
for moral judgements and social, political, and economic policies (Jones, 1997).   
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Thus, the construct of race carries with itself a history and meaning which makes the 
definition of race complex.  Race cannot be separated from racism (Jones, 1997), the focus of the 
present study.  Therefore, to fully comprehend the ominous concept of racism, it will be 
meaningful to explore how the conceptualisation, definition, and meaning of race has evolved 
from a simple descriptive classification to a broad social construct.   
Changing Definition and Meaning of Race 
The biological classification of race was first developed from the work of eighteenth 
century naturalists who distinguished populations in different geographic areas on the basis of 
physical features, temperament, character, and other behavioural propensities that underlie genetic 
variation (Asia-Europe Foundation, 2005; Jones, 1997; Smedley & Smedley, 2005).  The result 
was the development of several racial taxonomies, based on the systematic measurement and 
comparison of observable physical features (Jones, 1997) such as skin colour, eye shape and 
colour, hair type and colour, and head shape and size (Aronson, et al., 2002; Asia-Europe 
Foundation, 2005).  For example, the Swedish biologist Linnaeus developed a taxonomy that 
described White Europeans as tall, flaxen haired, and blue eyed.  The Black race was described as 
having dull, kinky black hair, silken skin, flat nose, and thick lips (Foster, 1991c).   
As such physical characteristics were genetic and immutable, scientists of the time 
reasoned that race denotes distinct and separate subdivisions of the human species based on 
genetic or biological arguments (Jones, 1997).  According to this argument, race was defined as 
“an inbreeding, geographically isolated population that differs in distinguishable physical traits 
from other members of the species” (Zuckerman, 1990, p. 1297).   
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Race acquired social meaning when physical characteristics were also assumed to be 
fundamentally related to moral, intellectual, temperament, and other non-physical attributes and 
characteristics (Asia-Europe Foundation, 2005; Jones, 1997; Van den Berghe, 1967).  For 
example, Linnaeus described White Europeans as optimistic, nimble, and innovative. Less 
desirable characteristics, however, were linked to the Black race (i.e., cunning, lazy, sluggish, and 
careless) (Foster, 1991c).   Racial distinctions thus led to value judgements (Jones, 1997) that 
have been applied in the hierarchical value judgement of races into superior and inferior 
categories.  These value judgements are based on the value systems and cultural worldviews of 
societies at specific times (Jones, 1997).   
History has shown that these hierarchical categories of races have been used to justify 
race-based acts of domination such as slavery in the United States (Jones, 2007) and apartheid in 
South Africa (De la Rey & Duncan, 2003).  It has been suggested that it is the racial hierarchy that 
has done the most damage in social relations, especially when the hierarchy is supported by those 
in a position of authority and influence.   Racial classification affects access to resources, such as 
education and health care, the distribution of income and wealth, residential living patterns, and 
interpersonal relationships.  Moreover, the consequences of racial classification over time can 
create boundaries among racially defined groups that affect people on a daily basis (Jones, 1997).   
Even though the biological significance of race has largely been discredited by scientists, 
race is still used to organise people into socially significant categories with attached social 
meanings (Jones, 1997; Van den Berghe, 1967; Smedley & Smedley, 2005).  Thus skin colour, 
hair texture, nose width, and lip thickness are still perceived to be markers of racial identity 
(Smedley & Smedley, 2005).  
As a social construct, race is not a fixed concept, but may change over time as it is 
continuously redefined by social conventions, role definitions, and characteristics of societies at 
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specific times (De la Rey & Duncan, 2003; Jones, 1997).   For example, apartheid South Africa 
entrenched extensive racial taxonomies as “the cornerstone of the whole apartheid structure” 
(Sparks, 2003, p.83) through legislation such as the Population Registration Act of 1950, 
articulated in Table 1.  In present-day South Africa, however, individuals who were classified as 
Coloured in the apartheid years, refer to themselves as Black, ‘so-called Coloured’, “Coloured” 
and Coloured (Sparks, 2003).   
 
Table 1. 
Racial Categorisation in South Africa  
Category Definition 
White A person who is in appearance obviously a White person and who is generally 
accepted as a White person. 
Native  
(later Bantu) 
A person who is, or is generally accepted as, a member of any aboriginal race 
or tribe of Africa. 
Coloured A person who is not a White person or a Native.  Subgroups of the category: 
(a) the Cape Coloured group 
(b) the Malay group 
(c) the Griqua group 
(d) the Chinese group 
(e) the Indian group 
(f) the Other Asiatic group 
(g) the Other Coloured Group 
Source:  Adapted from Sparks, 2003 
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Thus, race relations are distinguished not by the biological significance of phenotypical 
features but by the social use of those features as signs identifying group membership and the 
“roles people are expected to play” (Banton, 1983, p. 77).  Race therefore “does not exist.  And 
yet it does.  Not in the way that people think; but it remains the most tangible, real and brutal of 
realities” (Guillaumin, 1995, p. 107).   
Confusion about the use of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘race’ exists.  The two terms are often used 
interchangeably (Harley, Jolivette, McCormick & Tice, 2002). For example, in Bosnia,“ethnic 
cleansing” was used to describe the systematic attempt to eliminate Bosnian Muslims by Bosnian 
Serbs - two racially similar groups.  Yet, the extermination of 6 million Jews in Nazi Germany is 
considered an act of racial genocide (Jones, 1997). 
Race and Ethnicity 
For many, ethnicity is simply a contemporary term for what was historically called race, 
types, or nationality (Harley, et al., 2002; Jones, 1997).  Yet, Van den Berghe (1967) defined 
ethnicity as a social group that is defined on the basis of cultural criteria.  This implies that 
ethnicity is mutable and a matter of choice.  This is distinct from the concept of race, which is 
considered to be immutable at some level and offers no choice.   The construct of ethnicity is thus 
less likely to include the type of biases that is associated with the race concept (Harley, et al., 
2002; Jones, 1997).  Another concept that is closely associated with race is culture.   
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Race and Culture 
Jones (1997) asserted that “everything we are and do, all that we have been and will be 
filters through the lenses of culture” (p. 361).  Thus, race also needs to be understood in the 
context of culture.  In fact, in its earliest usage in the sixteenth century, race was understood 
largely in cultural terms when it was coupled with words such as nation, tribe, and lineage (Jones, 
1997; Smedley & Smedley, 2005).  Culture refers to patterns of thoughts, feelings, and reactions 
derived from history and transmitted through symbols (Jones, 1997).  For example, the old South 
African flag represents different things to different people, depending on their cultural beliefs and 
values.  Some White people may regard it as a symbol of a proud Afrikaner heritage that does not 
necessarily include beliefs regarding White supremacy, while Black South-Africans may regard it 
as a symbol of racial oppression by the apartheid government.  
The concept of race has been central in the development of Western culture and is one of 
the symbols of culture.  This makes it difficult to separate the meaning of race from the meaning 
of culture.  For example, objectifying Black people in the absence of what White South Africans 
think about Black people is not possible.  Therefore, at its core, racial conflict may actually be 
indicative of dilemmas of the South African culture.  Given the influential role of culture in the 
daily lives of people, and the powerful place that the concept of race holds, it can be concluded 
that race is one of the most centrally positioned elements of South African culture (Jones, 1997).  
Constructed from the scientific and socially constructed notions of race, is the construct of racism. 
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  Racism 
In order to explore and conceptualise the construct of racism, it is useful to examine how 
the construct has been defined by various researchers.  However, to arrive at a single, clear 
definition of racism is confounded by three issues.  First, the term racism has many common 
meanings today and is often used very loosely to refer to racial prejudice, racial discrimination, to 
both of these (Duckitt, 1992a), or to institutionalised racism (Miles, 1989).  Second, the fact that 
racism is a multidimensional concept that occurs on individual and societal level complicates 
defining this complex construct (Jones, 1997; Miles, 1989).  Third, racism is a relatively new term 
in the English language that was only coined in the 1930s.  As scholars’ understanding of the 
construct has grown, so has the definition of racism become more complex (Jones, 1997).  In 
addition, definitions of racism have also expanded to incorporate the changing discourses about 
race (Miles, 1989).  It is therefore also necessary to take note that more recent definitions of 
racism are more comprehensive to account for the growing understanding of the complex and 
multidimensionality of the racism construct.   
Definition of Racism  
The earliest definitions of racism were narrowly defined to refer exclusively to the theory 
of the hierarchy of human races (Miles, 1989).  For example, in Race and Racism, Benedict 
(1943, as cited in Solomos & Back, 1996) referred to racism in terms of sets of ideas that defined 
ethnic and racial groups on the basis of claims about biological nature and inherent superiority or 
ability.  As a consequence, Benedict (1943, as cited in Solomos & Back, 1996) believed one race 
group is “condemned by nature to congenital inferiority and another group is destined to 
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congenital superiority” (Miles, 1989, p. 45).  Beliefs in a particular race’s cultural and biological 
inferiority (Miles, 1989) were legitimised in the 1930s and 1940s in the two most notorious 
systems of racism witnessed in twentieth century history, namely, apartheid and Nazism.  In these 
systems, Blacks and Jews were constructed as racially inferior to White South Africans and Aryan 
Germans respectively, and subjected to systematic subjugation and abuse (De la Rey & Duncan, 
2003).   The essence of Benedict’s definition of racism was repeated by writers in the 1970s such 
as Banton (1970).   
As scholars rejected the biological concept of race, definitions of racism changed in focus 
to become more descriptive (Miles, 1989).  For example, some writers (De la Rey & Duncan, 
2003; Jones, 1997) rejected the theory that the human race consists of discrete groups, but 
recognised that such beliefs, explicit or implicit, are used to legitimize inequality between racial 
groups (Jones, 1997; Miles, 1989).  Therefore, the domination of one racialised group over other 
groups can be regarded as both the central feature of racism (De la Rey & Duncan, 2003; Jones, 
1997) and the function and intention of those who hold racist beliefs (Miles, 1989).   
Later definitions of racism portray racism as operating at both individual and societal 
spheres of social influence.   Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary defined racism as being 
characterised by “discrimination, segregation, persecution, and domination based on a …doctrine 
or feeling of racial … superiority” (1965, p. 1485).  The exemplification of segregation, 
persecution, and domination implied that racism is organised at a societal level, while the 
involvement of feelings of superiority indicates that racism also occurs at the individual level 
(Jones, 1997).   Similarly, De la Rey & Duncan (2003) highlighted the societal nature of racism 
by defining the construct as “an institutionalised system whereby certain racialised groups are 
systematically dominated or marginalized by another racialised group or other groups” (p. 46).    
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Essed (1991) also acknowledged that racism operated at both an individual and societal 
level and drew further attention to how racist ideas, opinions, and behaviours that operate on an 
individual level in “everyday situations” produce “everyday racism” that becomes part of a racist 
system that operates on societal level.   Essed (1991) therefore regarded racism as what happens 
on an everyday basis between people of different races.  For example, vague notions of 
Eurocentrism may compel a Black person to do away with some of his or her cultural identity.  
However, since it becomes part of everyday life, the Black person may often not even be aware of 
the influence of everyday racism.     
The sociologist, Miles (1989) differed from other approaches to the concept of racism by 
proposing that the term racism should refer exclusively to a specific ideology.  Miles (1989) also 
differentiated between racism as an ideology and the closely related concept of institutional 
racism. Both phenomena operate on a broad societal level, but racist ideology may be expressed 
through institutional racism (Jones, 1997).   
Institutional Racism  
Institutional racism was first described in the 1970s (Jones, 1997).  Institutional racism 
refers to any organisational policy, practice, and structure in public and private institutions, 
schools, universities, churches, courts, and law enforcement agencies which systematically give 
White people a variety of social, political, and economic advantages, while marginalising and 
disadvantaging other racial groups (Erase racism, 2006; Jones, 1997; Sue, 2005).   Examples of 
institution racism include housing patterns, segregated schools, discriminatory employment and 
promotion policies, racial profiling, inequality in health care, segregated churches, and 
educational curricula that ignore or distort the history of disadvantaged groups (Sue, 2005).   
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Jones (1997) distinguished between two forms of institutional racism, namely: (a) 
individual-mediated, and (b) standard of practice institutional racism.  Individual-mediated 
institutional racism refers to individual leaders who hold racist beliefs or function under the 
influence of racial stereotypes, which may influence decision making in their institution in such a 
manner that racial inequality is promoted.  This form of institutional racism may be considered a 
mere extension of interpersonal prejudice and racism to the institutional setting (Jones, 1997).  
Examples of this form of institutional racism in South African history are extensive and were 
reflected in all spheres of South African society.  For example, segregation and gross inequalities 
have been evidence of racism in South African mental health for decades (Foster, 1991c).  As 
recently as 1987 a government report on disability in South Africa admitted that almost no 
facilities existed for Black mentally handicapped children (Hattingh, Harvey, Saayman & Van 
Jaarsveldt, 1987).   
The second form of institutional racism is not considered to be race conscious, but rather to 
have race effects.  It refers to standards of practice that systematically benefit White people, while 
disadvantaging people of other races, thereby maintaining racial discrimination, segregation, and 
inequality even in the absence of conscious racial animosity (Erase racism, 2006; Jones, 1997). 
 This type of institutional racism is evident when comparing broad societal patterns.  For 
example, in the United States of America, racial and ethnic minorities have lower income, poorer 
quality and more overcrowded accommodations, less desirable occupations, and longer periods of 
unemployment when compared to their ethnic majority counterparts (Karlsen & Nazroo, 2002).  
This phenomenon is demonstrated in South Africa when considering the distribution of and access 
to mental health care that has reflected the effect of entrenched institutional racism from 
apartheid.  For example, the application of the reformist Mentally Retarded Children’s Training 
Act of 1974 was restricted to apply only to White South Africans.   The Bantu Special Education 
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Act of 1964 only enabled the provision of facilities to Blacks with physical disabilities, while 
expressly excluding the provision of facilities for those with a mental handicap (Foster, 1991b).   
Even though South Africa has been a democratic country since 1994, remnants of 
institutional racism that neglected the needs of poor and mentally handicapped non-Whites 
(Foster, 1991b) are still evident in the provision of mental health care facilities. For example 
Ahmed and Pillay (2004) have noted that communities living in peri-urban, semi-rural, and rural 
areas still have little or no mental health facilities within reasonable distance, even though a large 
proportion (46,3 %) of the national population lives in non-urban areas (Statistics South Africa, 
2002). 
Likewise, South African psychology too has played a role in the perpetuation of apartheid 
(Foster, 1991b; Hook, 2004) through institutional practices.  The absence of research about the 
psychological consequences of apartheid oppression and the psychological life of Black South 
Africans have been cited as examples of South African psychology’s poor social and scientific 
record (Suffla & Seedat, 2004).  In addition, Black people are still significantly under-represented 
in academic and professional psychology in South Africa (Duncan, Seedat, Van Niekerk, de la 
Rey, Gobodo-Madikezela, Simbayi, et al., 1997).  
The effects of institutional racism, intentional or unintentional, magnify the racial biases of 
individuals in any given society and promote racial inequalities at societal level which serve to 
systematically undermine the physical and emotional well-being of countless people (Jones, 
1997).  It is for these reasons that institutional racism is considered to be closely related to the 
racial ideology of the society in which it operates (Jones, 1997; Miles, 1989).   
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Racism as Ideology  
Ideology refers to a fairly organised set of ideas, attitudes, beliefs, or values, such as 
liberalism or fascism (Foster, 1991c) which Adorno, et al. (1950) referred to as “a way of thinking 
about man and society” (p. 2).  An ideology also involves language and actions (Foster, 1993) and 
can therefore also be regarded as part of a social process in which humans are active agents 
(Althusser, 1969) reproducing the ideas, attitudes, beliefs, emotions, and values of an ideology in 
everyday language and actions.  This constant reproduction has the function of changing an 
ideology over time (Foster, 1993). 
Racism is regarded by some researchers (Foster, 2006; 1991c; Miles, 1989; Smedley & 
Smedley, 2005) as an ideology that has provided justification for legislation and social policies to 
justify exclusion and domination (institutional racism) in the United States and South Africa 
(Foster, 1993; Miles, 1989).  More specifically, in these countries, racism has enabled people of 
one skin colour to dominate those of a different skin colour through practices such as 
discrimination, slavery, segregation, and job reservation (Foster, 2006).  
Foster (1991c) asserted that such racist ideology has been operative in South Africa since 
the arrival of the first White settlers.  It has manifested itself in many different and changing 
forms, such as slavery, colonial conquest, extermination, segregation, political segregation from 
1910, petty apartheid, and grand apartheid from 1948 (Foster, 1991c; Giliomee & Schlemmer, 
1989).  Through social and political changes in the last three decades, racism as an ideology has 
become undesirable.  However, it is believed that racist ideologies still exert influence in societies 
by masquerading in other discourses, such as cultural pluralism, ethnicity, and first and third 
worlds (Boonzaier & Sharp, 1988).   One ideology that has received a large amount of attention in 
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South Africa, as one of the contributors to legalised racism of the apartheid system, is Afrikaner 
nationalism.      
Afrikaner Nationalism  
Afrikaner nationalism as an ideology developed over two centuries in response to 
perceived threats from the British Empire and the indigenous Black people of South Africa 
(Foster, 1991c).  In the first four decades of the twentieth century, the themes of mobilization, 
including the notions of independence, racism, and White superiority were particularly prominent 
within Afrikaner nationalism (Thompson, 1985).  Afrikaner nationalism was actively created 
through organisations such as the Broederbond, the Dutch Reformed Church, the South African 
Broadcasting Corporation, newspapers, and the system of Christian National Education.  
Simultaneously, the ideological message of Afrikaner nationalism was spread through symbols 
such as the flag, the national anthem, public holidays, monuments, and festivals (Foster, 1991c).   
During the establishment of Afrikaner nationalism, a strong association between racism 
and Afrikaans-speaking Whites developed.  In the 1870s, an Afrikaner cultural renaissance began 
based on Afrikaans as “the people’s language” (Johnson, 2004, p. 88).  Afrikaans was given a 
distinct White culture in the early part of the twentieth century by refining the language through 
poetry, language, and journalism.  Thereby, even though Afrikaans was spoken by Coloured and 
Black servants, Afrikaans was stripped of its non-White associations (Atwell, 1986) and became 
one of the cultural weapons and symbols of the Afrikaner, Afrikaner nationalism, apartheid, and 
racism in South Africa (Atwell, 1986; Johnson, 2004; Sparks, 2003).    
Afrikaner nationalism was thus used as a tool to mobilise and create a separate group of 
Afrikaners and to provide grounds for the exclusion of non-Whites (Foster, 1991c; Thompson, 
 89
1985) thereby culminating in Verwoerd’s “ideological vision of an apartheid order as the divine 
mission of Afrikanerdom” (Du Toit, 1983, p. 951).    
Apartheid  
“Apartheid” refers to the formal ideology, policies, and programs that maintained racial 
segregation and White domination in South Africa from 1948 until 1994 (Jones, 1997). As an 
ideology, apartheid aimed to justify White, racist domination of non-Whites.  The ideology was 
rooted in various myths and ideas, such as the Calvinist paradigm (De Toit, 1983; Thompson, 
1985), race, culture, class, nation, volk, Christianity, and law and order (Giliomee & Schlemmer, 
1989).   
Apartheid also included the idea that racial friction is best avoided by the segregation of 
races in all levels of society.  This notion was enforced through limiting racial contact through 
legislation (Foster & Finchilescu, 1986), such as the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1949, 
The Immorality Act of 1950, the Population Registration Act of 1950, and the Group Areas Act of 
1950.  When Black protest and disobedience emerged in response to forced segregation, the 
Public Safety and Criminal Law Amendment Acts of 1953 proved that apartheid was not meant to 
be a benign form of racism (Foster, 1991c).   
Apartheid, like all ideologies, has changed in form and content (Du Preez, 1980).  When 
grand apartheid of the 1950s triggered violent protest by non-Whites in the 1970s, neo-apartheid 
was initiated in 1983 to include Coloureds and Indians in the tri-cameral parliament (Sparks, 
2003). Even in post-apartheid South Africa where apartheid has ceased to be a formalised 
ideology, the core themes of apartheid are still discernable under new ideas and discourses such as 
ethnicity, the protection of minority group rights, and contemporary forms of racism (Foster, 
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1991c; 1993).  It is interesting to note that as the race concept has changed, racism has also 
adapted (Jones, 1997).  Contemporary forms of racism differ from the traditional expressions of 
racism, characteristic of apartheid and Jim Crow laws, and redneck forms of racism in the United 
States of America.   In order to further understand the multifaceted construct of racism, it is first 
necessary to describe the traditional form of racism.   
Traditional Expressions of Racism  
Traditionally, the expression of racist beliefs and feelings towards despised groups in 
countries such as the United States of America, Australia, and South Africa were performed in 
overt, obvious, recognisable ways (Duckitt, 1994; Pedersen & Walker, 1997), described as “hot, 
close and direct”  by Pettigrew and Meertens (1995, p. 57).  This form of racism has been referred 
to in various terms, such as blatant racism (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995), traditional racism 
(Brown, 2006), and old-fashioned racism (McConahay, 1986) as “these beliefs are…out of style 
in trendy circles as are wide ties and spats” (McConahay, 1986, p. 93).   
Traditional racism has three components, namely:  (a) a belief in inborn intellectual and 
moral White superiority, (b) racial segregation in all areas of life including schools, public 
amenities, and marriage, and (c) discrimination against all Black people in areas such as 
employment and education (Jones, 1997; McConahay, 1986; Sears, 2005; Taylor, et al., 2006).  
The traditional form of racism also tended to arouse strong emotions such as anger and contempt 
and often led to behaviour against the scorned group, such as physical violence (Franzoi, 2003; 
Jones, 1997).  Racism under apartheid took the traditional form, as apartheid included the notion 
of White superiority and legally enforced the segregation of races.  Apartheid resulted in 
disparities in wealth, living conditions, and access to resources such as education and employment 
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of all non-Whites in South Africa (Durheim, 2003; Foster & Finchelescue, 1986; Jones, 1997; 
Sparks, 2003)  
As there has been a trend over the last three decades for racism to be “politically incorrect” 
(Mellor, Bynon, Maller, Cleary, Hamilton & Watson, 2001, p. 473), traditional expressions of 
racism in the United States have declined sharply in response to such societal changes (Brown, 
2006; Devine, et al., 2003; Franzoi, 2003; McConahay, 1986).  However, there is evidence of 
continuing resistance to full racial equality in the United States.  For example, in 1996, 13 % of 
White people reported that they favoured laws against interracial marriages (Taylor, et al., 2006). 
It was also noted in the United States of America that anti-Black feelings showed only a fairly 
small decline (McConahay, 1986) while anti-Black attitudes were still being expressed, albeit in a 
different form (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; McConahay, 1986; Kinder & Sears, 1981) by those 
who claim to have renounced prejudice (Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson & Howard, 
1997).  This suggests that people in the United States of America have learnt to suppress 
prejudiced responses to avoid being labelled racist, but when the situation becomes safe, their 
prejudice is exposed (Aaronson, et al., 2002, p. 492).  That a similar trend is possible in other 
countries has been suggested by research in Australia, which revealed that Australian Aborigines 
continue to perceive much blatant racism, despite egalitarian legislation that protects their equal 
rights (Mellor, 2003).  Similarly, South African learners reported the presence of acts of overt 
discrimination (Finnemore, 1998; Pillay & Collings, 2004) in post-apartheid South Africa. 
As racism is a dynamic concept that evolves and adapts to new circumstances (Jones, 
1997; Pillay & Collings, 2004; Solomos & Back, 1996), it has been suggested that a 
contemporary form of racism, either co-existing with, or replacing traditional racism, has emerged 
in North America, Western-Europe, South Africa, New Zealand, and Australia  (Augoustinos, 
Ahrens & Innes, 1994; Devine et al., 2003; Duckitt, 1992a; Jackman, 2005; Kinder & Sears, 
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1981; Lea, Bokhorst & Colenso, 1995; Liu & Mills, 2006; McConahay, 1986; Meertens & 
Pettigrew, 1997; Pedersen & Walker, 1997; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995; Sears, 1988; Solomos & 
Back, 1996). 
Contemporary Expressions of Racism 
Contemporary racism is considered to be as more subtle, socially sensitive expression of 
racism (Brown, 2006; Devine, Plant & Blair, 2003; Jackman, 2005; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995) 
and is qualitatively different from negative racial attitudes of fifty years ago (Pettigrew & 
Meertens, 1995).  The contemporary forms of racism serve to maintain the racial status-quo but 
are justified on a non-racial basis (Augoustinos, Ahrens & Innes, 1994; Devine et al., 2003; 
Duckitt, 1992a; Kinder & Sears, 1981; Lea, Bokhorst & Colenso, 1995; Lui & Mills, 2006; 
McConahay, 1986; Meertens & Pettigrew, 1997; Pedersen & Walker, 1997; Pettigrew & 
Meertens, 1995; Sears, 1988; Solomos & Back, 1996).   
A number of theories have emerged to explain the complex, sometimes contradictory 
nature of contemporary racism.  These theories are all rooted in the assumption that people’s 
racial attitudes have shifted from being overtly negative to being more mixed or ambivalent in 
nature (Brown, 2006; Devine, et al., 2003, Durheim, 2003; McConahay, 1996).  Some theorists 
(Baron & Byrne, 2003) also indicated that the modern expressions of racism tend to attribute 
prejudiced racial attitudes to sources other than prejudice.  For instance, an individual may state 
that he or she is against interracial marriages because the children of such marriages may 
experience many difficulties.  However, this view may stem from the prejudiced belief that 
members of racial or ethnic groups, other than that of the perceiver, are inferior in various ways.   
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In France, Britain, Germany, Australia, and the Netherlands racism in its modern form is 
expressed in the form of exaggerated ethnic differences. This tends to be accompanied by feelings 
of diminished admiration and affection for immigrant minorities and a rejection of them for 
supposedly non-racial reasons (Augoustinos, et al., 1994; Meertens & Pettigrew, 1997; Myers, 
2005; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995).  In these countries, as in the United States, modern racism 
“surfaces when they [prejudiced attitudes] can hide behind the screen of some other motive” 
(Myers, 2005, p. 336).  Thus, it is reasoned, prejudice has “gone underground” (Devine, et al., 
200, p. 201) or has been transformed into subtle and increasingly covert expressions of racism 
(Devine, et al., 2003).   
Researchers differ in their labels for contemporary forms of racism.  In the United States, 
the more subtle form of racism has been referred to as modern racism (McConahay, 1986), 
symbolic racism (Kinder & Sears, 1981), and aversive racism (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986).  In 
Western Europe and South Africa, the term subtle prejudice and subtle racism is used to capture 
the more covert forms of prejudice (Duckitt, 1991b; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995).   
Symbolic Racism 
Symbolic racism as an explanatory construct was first proposed by Sears and Kinder 
(1971, as cited in Durheim, 2003) to explain White opposition to a liberal Black city counsellor in 
the 1969 mayoral campaign in Los Angeles (Durheim, 2003; Sears, 2005).  The researchers 
(Kinder & Sears, 1981; Sears, 1988) proposed that symbolic racism is more subtle, indirect, and 
unconscious than traditional racism.    Kinder and Sears (1981) also postulated that symbolic 
racism is rooted in mostly implicit “early learned racial fears and stereotypes” (p.  416) and deep-
seated feelings about social morality (Durheim, 2003). This perspective suggests that after early 
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socialisation, the basic affective component of racial prejudice remains very resistant to change 
(Duckitt, 1994). 
Institutional and structural changes in the United States of America in the wake of the civil 
rights movements in the 1950s and 1960s gave way to more egalitarian norms that prohibited 
explicit expression of racism.  Therefore, Kinder and Sears (1981) proposed that negative racial 
attitudes are more likely to be expressed symbolically in general beliefs that Black people violate 
traditional American values, such as self-reliance, individualism, hard work, and obedience 
(Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Nelson, 2006) or egalitarianism, honesty, and humility in New Zeeland 
(Liu & Mills, 2006). These beliefs are manifested in the form of animosity towards policies that 
symbolise the advancement of Black people’s interests at the expense of White people, such as 
affirmative action policies (Dovidio, et al., 2003; Lord, 1997).  Symbolic racism is thus “a blend 
of anti-Black affect and traditional American moral values embodied in the Protestant Ethic” 
(Kinder & Sears, 1981, p. 416).    
Those with racial attitudes consistent with symbolic racism deny holding racist attitudes 
(Dovidio, et al., 2003; Nelson, 2006), but explain their negative affect and attitudes towards 
racialised groups as a disapproval for groups that do not value traditional American values 
(Nelson, 2006).  Therefore, persons with symbolic racial attitudes would oppose racial 
segregation and discrimination, but would simultaneously resent Black people’s complaints about 
discrimination and mistreatment (Taylor, et al., 2006).    
Critics of the theory of symbolic racism have argued that symbolic racism is an ill-defined 
concept (Bobo, 1988; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993) merely representing “old wine in a new bottle” 
(Sidanius, Devereux & Pratto, 1992, p. 390), that is, a more socially accepted expression of 
traditional racism (Sidanius, Devereux & Pratto, 1992).  Researchers in the United States of 
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America (Sidanius, et al., 1992) and South Africa (Lea, et al., 1995) have also reported that it can 
not be empirically proved that symbolic racism is sufficiently distinct from traditional racism.  
However, over time and with expanding evidence, the theory of symbolic racism has 
evolved.  In recent years, it has been conceptualised and measured in terms of four themes, 
namely: (a) the denial of discrimination, (b) criticism of the work ethic of Black people, (c) 
resentment of demands made by Black people, and (d) resentment of unfair advantages given to 
Black people by broader society (Sears, 2005).  Moreover, Sears and Henry (2003) have shown 
that symbolic racism is distinct from the similar constructs of modern and aversive racism.    
Modern Racism   
McConahay (1986) initially supported the term symbolic racism, but later expanded on the 
theory of symbolic racism by redefining the construct of modern racism to “emphasize the 
contemporary, post-civil-rights-movement nature of the tenets constituting the new ideology or 
belief system” (p. 96).  According to McConahay (1986), the theory of modern racism asserts that 
some White people are ambivalent towards Black people as they are conflicted between their anti-
Black feelings and their beliefs that racism and discrimination is wrong.  However, those persons 
with attitudes consistent with modern racism only acknowledge behaviour and beliefs consistent 
with traditional racism as racist (McConahay, 1986).  Their own beliefs and attitudes such as 
“discrimination is a thing of the past because Blacks now have the freedom to compete in the 
marketplace and to enjoy those things they can afford” and “Blacks are pushing too hard, too fast, 
and into places where they are not wanted” are thus not considered to be racist (Jones, 1997; 
McConahay, 1986, p.92).   
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Similar to persons with symbolic racial attitudes, individuals with modern racial attitudes 
feel resentment over systems aimed at rectifying previous patterns of inequality (De la Rey & 
Duncan, 2003; Taylor, et al., 2006) as they believe it violates the work ethic that prescribes that 
advancement in life should be based on hard work rather than unfair shortcuts (Nelson, 2006).  
Persons with attitudes consistent with modern racism therefore disguise their subtle negative 
feelings towards Black people by expressing negative attitudes towards anyone who violates what 
they believe are traditional American values (McConahay, 1986; Jones, 1997; Nelson, 2006).   
The theory has good empirical support, and the Modern Racism Scale, a self-report scale 
devised by McConahay (1986) has been shown to have fair reliability and validity.  It has also 
been one of the most widely used measures of contemporary prejudice towards African 
Americans (Jones, 1997; Nelson, 2006).   
There is substantial similarity between the symbolic and modern racism theories. For 
example, both theories argue that negative feelings towards Black people are learnt relatively 
early in life and continue to influence evaluations and perceptions into adulthood (Jones, 1997). 
As a result, the concepts of modern and symbolic racism have at times been used interchangeable 
and synonymously (Duckitt, 1994; Lord, 1997; Myers, 2005; Taylor, et al., 2006). However, 
modern racism is regarded as a distinct theory from symbolic racism (Jones, 1997; McConahay, 
1986) as seen from its history.  Modern racism, more than symbolic racism, now emphasizes the 
cognitive aspect of racial attitudes and suggests that distinguishing between traditional and 
modern racial beliefs is a more conscious cognitive process (Jones, 1997).  Symbolic and modern 
racism are considered to reflect the racial attitudes of conservative Whites in the United States of 
America.  The theory of aversive racism is considered to describe the racial attitudes of most well 
educated, liberal White citizens of the United States of America (Dovidio, 1993; Dovidio & 
Gaertner, 2004; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005; Taylor, et al., 2006).  
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Aversive Racism  
Gaertner and Dovidio (1986) have conceptualised persons with aversive racial attitudes as 
White people who possess both unconscious negative racist feelings and beliefs towards Black 
people,  and conscious, sincere commitments to egalitarian values and beliefs (Dovidio, 2001; 
Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Dovidio, et al., 2003).  As racist attitudes are unconscious, persons 
with attitudes consistent with aversive racism truly believe they are not prejudiced and will make 
a great effort not to say or do anything that appears to be prejudiced.  However, when in the 
company of Black people, persons with attitudes consistent with aversive racism experience 
subtle, yet aversive feelings of “discomfort, uneasiness, disgust and sometimes fear” (Gaertner 
and Dovidio, 1986, pp. 62).  This type of racist therefore protects his or her egalitarian self-image 
by denying racist attitudes (Devine, et al., 2003).  Interracial encounters tend to make persons 
with aversive racial attitudes aware and ashamed of their attitudinal conflict, which motivates 
such persons to steer clear of interracial interactions to avoid evoking negative emotions and 
confronting their hidden prejudice (Devine, 2005; Franzoi, 2003; Taylor, et al., 2006).    
The aversive in aversive racism reflects two types of aversion.  The first refers to the 
aversive feelings experienced during interracial interaction that leads to avoidance behaviour.  
Also, as persons with aversive racial attitudes believe that they are non-prejudiced, they would 
find any thought or indication that they might be racists aversive (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005).   
Persons with attitudes consistent with aversive racism are most likely to express their 
negative racial feelings towards Black people under situational ambiguity (Crandall & Eshleman, 
2003;  Dovidio, et al., 2003) and when the attitude or behaviour that disadvantages Blacks can be 
attributed to causes other than prejudices or can be justified along non-racial grounds (Dovidio, 
2001; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Dovidio, et al., 2003).  For example, Dovidio and Gaertner 
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(2000) found that subtle and underlying hostilities towards Black applicants only emerged when 
the qualifications of the Black applicants were ambiguous, not better or worse, when compared 
with White applicants.  White participants then preferred to hire a White candidate.  
Dovidio (1993) has acknowledged that expressions of traditional racism still persist, while 
it is true that some White people are not racist.  In addition, Dovidio (1993) noted that there are 
individual differences in expression of aversive racism.   
Subtle Racism 
Contemporary racism in Western Europe and South Africa has been referred to as subtle 
racism (Aronson, et al., 2002) and subtle prejudice (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995).  Research in 
both South Africa (Duckitt, 1991b, 1993a; Lea, et al., 1995) and Western Europe (Meertens & 
Pettigrew, 1997; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995) has demonstrated the co-existence of traditional 
and contemporary forms of racism.  However, anti-immigration sentiment was more significantly 
associated with subtle racism than traditional racism in Western Europe.   
Research suggested that subtle racism is expressed in socially accepted ways such as the 
defence of traditional ingroup values, exaggeration of cultural differences, and denial of positive 
emotional responses towards the outgroup (Meertens & Pettigrew, 1997; Pettigrew & Meertens, 
1995) in everyday contexts such as shopping, using public transport, and eating in restaurants 
(Mellor, et al., 2001).  Persons with racial attitudes consistent with subtle racism therefore comply 
with egalitarian norms and “express their negative intergroup views only in ostensibly non-
prejudiced ways that ‘slip under the norm’” (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995, p. 73).  In this form, 
racism still has a significant negative impact on those who experiences it on a daily basis (Mellor, 
et al., 2001). 
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The conceptualisation of the different theories of contemporary racism share three 
common elements, namely:  (a) traditional forms of racism are generally replaced by an 
acceptance of formal racial equality, (b) continuing negative feelings toward Black people 
(whether animosity, uneasiness, or distancing), combined in some way with (c) non-racial values, 
such as traditional morality, individualism, and the Protestant ethic (Sears, 2005).    
Despite similarities, there are differences between the forms of contemporary racism.  
First, the contexts in which these types of racism occur vary.  For example, symbolic and modern 
racism are found primarily in politically conservative Whites, while aversive racism is associated 
with liberal Whites (Nelson, 2006).  Second, the different theories of contemporary racism 
propose different methods of coping with ambivalent racial attitudes.  Individuals with modern 
and symbolic racial attitudes cope with their ambivalence by rationalising their negative feelings 
in terms of abstract political and social issues (Devine, et al., 2003).  On the other hand, 
individuals with aversive racial attitudes deny their negative racial attitudes and avoid interracial 
contact to avoid uncomfortable feelings brought about by ambivalence.  In addition, these 
individuals only manifest their negative racial attitudes when a justification is readily available 
(Devine, et al., 2003).  Third, the forms of contemporary racism vary in subtlety in which racist 
attitudes are expressed.  Modern and symbolic racism are considered to be the least subtle, while 
aversive racism is the most subtle (Kleinpenning & Haagendoor, 1993).  Meertens and 
Pettigrew’s (1997) conceptualisation of subtle prejudice is believed to lie between the other forms 
of racism in terms of subtlety.  One common feature of all the contemporary theories of racism is 
the presence of racial ambivalence (Nelson, 2006).   
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Theory of Racial Ambivalence  
Some researchers (Katz & Hass, 1988; Katz, Wackenhut & Hass, 1986) have posited that 
value conflict in Whites leads to ambivalent attitudes towards Blacks.   According to this theory, 
many White Americans simultaneously hold two sets of conflicting values, egalitarianism and 
individualism, which affect their responses to Black people.   
Egalitarianism is grounded in democratic and humanitarian principles that give rise to 
genuine pro-Black sentiments such as sympathy for Blacks and favourable stereotypes about 
Black people.  Individualism, grounded in the Protestant work ethic, supports principles such as 
personal freedom, individualism, self-reliance, devotion to work, and achievement.  Individualism 
may give rise to anti-Black sentiments such as beliefs that unemployment, drug addiction, and 
criminal behaviour are rooted in personal weaknesses of Black people rather than in situational 
factors.  Holding these dual attitudes creates ambivalence, which may explain the persistence of 
prejudiced responses among people who appear to be low in prejudice (Devine, et la., 2003; Katz 
& Hass, 1988; Katz, et al., 1986).   
Ambivalent people are pulled in opposite directions at the same time (McConahay, 1986) 
and may experience psychological distress and sharp alterations in behaviour towards Black 
people (Devine, et al., 2003; Katz, et al., 1986; McConahay, 1986) as responses to Black people 
depend on which component of the ambivalent attitude is activated in a specific situation (Devine, 
et al., 2003).  A highly ambivalent person may be more positive than expected in some situations, 
and be more negative than expected in others, depending on the context and content of behaviour 
(Devine, 2005; McConahay, 1986).  For example, White people with ambivalent attitudes towards 
Black people may act overfriendly and attentive when being introduced to a Black person whom 
they perceive to be competent and ambitious to discredit the negative component of their 
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attitudes.  Likewise, they may react with great annoyance and anger when interaction with Black 
people who they judge to be incompetent and lazy to discredit the positive component of their 
ambivalent attitudes. 
Expressions of racial attitudes have therefore shifted from being obvious and overt to being 
subtle, distant, and hidden.  Sears (1988) asserted that it is essential to empirically distinguish 
between the traditional and contemporary forms of racism, as they have been shown to have 
different sets of predictors and correlates.  In addition, research has shown these contemporary 
forms of racism to be complex and multidimensional (Duckitt, 1994; Kinder & Sears, 1981; 
MacConahay, 1986; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995).  This suggests that measurement of racial 
attitudes also had to be adapted in order to accurately measure racial attitudes in its contemporary 
forms.   
 Measurement of Contemporary Racism  
Studies of traditional racism measured prejudiced attitudes towards out-groups (usually 
Black people) in an open and obvious manner, usually by means of direct self-report measures 
with extremely transparent expressions of racist derogation (Duckitt, 1991b; 1993a; 1994).  For 
instance, Heaven and Moerdyk’s (1977) adaptation of Ray’s Anti-Black Attitude Scale, used in 
South Africa includes statements such as “Blacks are a rather ugly race” and “Blacks are not very 
hygiene-conscious”.  Earlier measures contained even more transparent racist statements, for 
example: “There is something inherently primitive and uncivilized in the native, as shown in his 
music and extreme aggressiveness”, (Pettigrew, 1958) and “Africans are too lazy and ignorant to 
support themselves” (Colman, 1971, as cited in Duckitt, 1991b).  The obviousness of items in 
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these scales seemed to have ensured the content validity of these measures at the time (Duckitt, 
1991b; 1994). 
 When socio-political changes in the United States of America made the expression of 
traditional racism unacceptable, however, most White Americans reacted to transparent items in 
accordance with new social norms.  As overtly racist statements did not correlate with socially 
desirable answers, it increased the potential for faking and threatened the reliability and validity of 
these measures (Duckitt, 1991b; McConahay, 1986).   
As “looking for racism under the same old rocks and in the same old utterances” (Jones, 
1997, p. 125) have produced misleading data, researchers (e.g., McConahay, 1986) developed less 
reactive items to measure racial attitudes more accurately.  In line with the theories of symbolic 
and modern racism, the new items included a more abstract, moral tone such as “Over the past 
few years, Blacks have gotten more economically than they deserve” and “Discrimination against 
Blacks is no longer a problem in the United States (McConahay, 1986).  Samples of White 
suburbanites and students were more willing to endorse these subtler, more indirect contemporary 
racism items than traditional racism items (McConahay, 1986). One measure of contemporary 
racism in the United States of America, the Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986) has 
subsequently become one of the most used measures of White racial attitudes towards African 
Americans (Nelson, 2006).  
Contemporary racism in Western Europe has also been examined with the use of newly 
developed measures of contemporary racism such as the Blatant and Subtle Prejudice Scale, used 
to assess prejudice against Turks in Germany (Neumann & Seibt, 2001; Pettigrew & Meertens, 
1995).  Some of the items reflected sentiments of modern racism (i.e., “Turks living here should 
not push themselves where they are not wanted”), while some items of this scale tapped 
traditional racist beliefs relating to intimacy factors (i.e., “I would be willing to have a sexual 
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relationship with a Turkish person”) and threat and rejection beliefs (i.e., “Turks have jobs that 
Germans should have”). 
Socio-political changes in South Africa also necessitated the development of racial attitude 
measures along the lines of contemporary racism.  In the 1980s (Duckitt, 1991b) found that the 
collapsing legitimacy of apartheid in South Africa made it markedly less acceptable among 
certain White social groups to express racial attitudes consistent with traditional racism.  
According to Duckitt (1991b) such “crudely obvious and transparent measures” (p. 234) of 
traditional racism could no longer be relied on to adequately measure racial attitudes.  This 
seemed particularly relevant in the case of students at English universities in the larger urban 
centres, English speaking South Africans, and the Afrikaner elite (Duckitt, 1991b; 1993a).   
The Subtle Racism Scale (Duckitt, 1991b; 1993a) was subsequently developed to measure 
anti-Black sentiment, aspiration for equal status among all races, and the acceptance of interracial 
relationships with South African samples along the lines of the measures of modern racism used 
in the United States (Duckitt, 1991b; 1993a; Foster, 1991a; Holtman, Louw, Tredoux & Carney, 
2005; Smith & Stones, 2001).  The Subtle Racism Scale contained items that indicated anti-Black 
sentiment formulated to avoid being regarded as offensive or socially undesirable by liberal or 
sophisticated respondents (Foster, 1991a).  The measure includes items such as:  “Given the same 
education and opportunities, Blacks should be able to perform as well as Whites in any field” and 
“Although Black living conditions should be improved, it is crucial for the stable development of 
the country that Whites retain political control”.   
It is important to keep in mind that social desirability bias has an attenuating effect on the 
self-report of both traditional and contemporary racist attitudes and behaviours (Gonzalez, 2001; 
McConahay, 1986).  Most White people understand the societal expectations to be racially 
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tolerant.  Yet, internalised beliefs about White superiority, expressed in subtle ways, have been 
revealed in research (Wittenbrink, Judd & Park, 2001).   
In South Africa, relatively little research has been conducted on the prevalence of 
contemporary expressions of racial attitudes and if it differs from the more traditional, overt forms 
of racism.  Exceptions are Duckitt (1991b; 1993a) who claimed that his Subtle Racism Scale 
seemed to be “potentially able to tap more sophisticated and subtle forms of prejudice” (p. 238) 
and Durheim (2003) whose research into White opposition to transformation revealed that 
participants to his study scored higher on the measure of contemporary racism than the measure 
for traditional racism.  Durheim (2003) speculated that this research suggested that people will 
more easily endorse contemporary forms of racism compared to supporting expressions of old-
fashioned racism.  Although expressions of racism may have become more private, Durheim 
(2003) concluded that beliefs that formed the basis of traditional racism still exist and influence 
socio-political decisions in South Africa.  For example, traditional racism was found to predict 
White opinion on the Reconstruction and Development Policy and opposition to affirmative 
action policies (Durheim, 2003).  In an examination of racial attitudes, Pillay and Collings (2004) 
also found that a large proportion of participants in their study supported statements that reflected 
both traditional and contemporary expressions of racism.  The researchers (Pillay & Collings, 
2004) deduced that traditional forms of racism have not been replaced by contemporary racism.  
Rather, results of this study seemed to suggest that that contemporary racism is the predominant 
form of racism in contemporary South Africa, while significant remnants of traditional racism are 
also still present.  
Research into people’s experiences of racial discrimination strongly suggests that 
traditional racism is still prevalent in South Africa, as claimed by researchers such as Lea, et al. 
(1995).  For example, in a 1998-survey at the University of Port Elizabeth (now Nelson Mandela 
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Metropolitan University), 27 % of participants indicated that they had experienced racial 
discrimination from other students, administrative staff, and academic staff at the institution 
(Finnemore, 1998).  Similarly, Pillay & Collings (2004) indicated that 56 % of participants in 
their study reported having experienced a recent incident of racial discrimination in the form of 
racial jokes, racial comments, or discriminatory behaviours by other students and university staff 
(i.e., lecturer or administration).   
Having conceptualised both the various constructs and theories of importance in this study, 
and discussed evolving measurement techniques, the next section seeks to examine both 
international and national research on racial attitudes.  
  Research on Variables Associated with Racial Attitudes 
The study of racial attitudes has long been considered on of the most controversial areas in 
the social sciences and has therefore generated a considerable amount of research, especially after 
World War II (Duckitt, 1994).  As a result, the international racism research base is very broad 
and complex, with researchers having studied the impact of a variety of variables on racism in a 
range of contexts and populations.   Thus, only research that is of topical interest to the present 
study will be considered, namely national and international research regarding the relationship 
between racism and the explanatory variables of interest in this study, i.e., gender, language, age, 
and race will be reviewed.  Since societal factors shape expressions of racism into context-specific 
articulations (Miles, 1989; Pettigrew, 1979), specific attention will be given to South African 
research, the context of the present study.    
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Gender and Racism 
Gender differences in attitude research have been investigated in topics such as attitude 
change and persuasion (i.e., Cooper, 1979; Eagly & Carli, 1981).  The role of gender differences 
on racial attitudes, however, has not received much attention from attitude researchers.  Empirical 
evidence from international and national studies among tertiary and secondary level learners that 
have included gender as an explanatory variable in racial attitude research, have revealed 
conflicting results. One study (Van den Berghe, 1962) has found that there was no evidence that 
gender accounted for differences in racial attitudes.  Other studies, however, have shown that 
gender accounts for differences in racial attitude.  In the United States of America, Hoxter and 
Lester (1994) reported that White male tertiary level learners consistently revealed more 
prejudiced attitudes towards minority learners than White female tertiary level learners.  While 
investigating the interface between racism and sexism, Sidanius (1993) found that male tertiary 
level learners showed significantly higher sexist and racist attitudes than their female tertiary level 
counterparts.   
In South Africa, Dawes and Finchilescue (1994) reported that White and Indian male 
secondary learners were more racist than females on Duckitt’s (1991b; 1993a) Subtle Racism 
Scale, while Pillay and Collings (2004) reported that male undergraduate learners exhibited more 
traditional and contemporary racist attitudes than their female counterparts.    
Language and Racism 
In South African research on racial attitudes, home language has been “the single most 
dominant factor associated with differences in white racial prejudice” (Foster & Nel, 1991, p. 
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149).  However, in a multilingual society, such as South Africa, language categories are not clear-
cut social categories.  While home language does create clear-cut linguistic categories, such as 
Afrikaans-speaking, English-speaking, or Xhosa-speaking categories, it also serves an integrative 
function by integrating linguistic categories with wider social and ideological categories.  Thus 
Afrikaans-speaking individuals (linguistic category) may simultaneously belong to an ethnic 
category (i.e., Afrikaner) and a racial category (i.e., Coloured or White).  The boundaries between 
social, ethnic, and linguistic categories in South Africa are thus blurred, changeable, and 
confusing (Louw-Potgieter, 1991).  
 In order to limit the confounding effect of language, researchers who have investigated the 
association between home language and racial attitudes further demarcated race categories into 
linguistic categories.  Thus, White participants in a study were further separated into Afrikaans-
speaking and English-speaking Whites.  In this manner, consistent trends regarding the 
association between home language and racial attitudes have been found since the 1930s (Foster, 
2006).  Both English- and Afrikaans-speaking Whites have held negatives attitudes towards Black 
people, with Afrikaans speakers consistently showing a greater degree of prejudice (e.g., 
Appelgryn & Bornman, 1996; Dawes & Finchilescue, 1994; Hampel & Krupp, 1977; Mynhardt, 
1980; Plug & Nieuwoud, 1983; Smith & Stones, 1999; Stones, Heaven, & Bester, 1997; Thiele, 
1988, as cited in Foster & Nel, 1991).   One recent study that utilised the Subtle Racism Scale, 
however, revealed results that indicate a reverse in this trend.  Holtman, et al. (2005) found that 
White, English-speaking secondary level learners evidenced more racist attitudes than White 
Afrikaans-speaking learners.   
Despite being stable over a long period of time, racial attitudes may also change rapidly in 
response to events, such as peace, war, and alliance (Duckitt, 1994; Sinha & Upadhyaya, 1960).  
Nieuwoud and Plug (1983) revealed evidence that Afrikaans-speaking White attitudes towards 
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Blacks became significantly more negative after the eruption of open Black rebellion during the 
Soweto riots in 1976.  The researchers (Plug & Nieuwoudt, 1983) speculated that the effects of 
the Soweto riots in 1976 may have been amplified by television which was introduced in 1976.  
However, Thiele (1988, as cited in Foster & Nel, 1991) found no real evidence of changes in 
White attitudes towards Blacks after the 1976 political unrest. 
In the 1980s, English-speaking Whites showed some evidence of attitude change towards a 
more liberal stance (Hofmeyer, 1990).  Duckitt (1992a; 1994) postulated that much of this 
tolerance could be relatively superficial, as empirical studies have shown the co-existence of 
liberal attitudes in English South Africans with paternalistic reverse discrimination (Tyson, 
Schlacter & Cooper, 1988).  Results of research conducted in 1993 (6 months before the first 
democratic election in South Africa) and 1994 (6 months after the election) also indicated that 
White English-speaking tertiary level participants’ socio-political attitudes (i.e., patriotism, racial 
prejudice, and authoritarianism) changed after the elections and had become reflective of “a truly, 
non-sexist, and democratic society” (Stones, et al., 1997, p. 112).  However, Stones, et al. (1997) 
suggested that the unique social identity of the English-speaking community could account for 
such changes.  For example, writers such as Du Preez (1980) have speculated that the English-
speaking community in South Africa tends to adopt a “chameleon-like approach” (Stones, et al., 
1997, p. 112) to political issues.  
Research has further noted differences between Afrikaans and English-speaking White 
South Africans in their approach to change (Stones, et al., 1997).  It has been noted that White 
English speakers tend to be more catastrophic and paranoid in their attitude towards change, while 
White Afrikaans speakers traditionally have held a more conservative stance.  However, this has 
shifted towards a more catastrophic and paranoid attitude in more recent years (Foster & Nel, 
1991).  
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Age and Racism 
Research on the relationship between the age of a person and his or her racial attitudes in 
the United States of America has shown mixed results.  Some studies (Glover 1995; Seltzer, 
Frazier & Ricks, 1995) found that older populations hold more negative attitudes towards 
minority groups.  Other investigations (Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Bobo & Kluegel, 1993) found 
that age has no bearing on racial attitudes, while Heaven, Organ, Supavadeeprasit & Leeson 
(2006) found that older Australian participants had the most positive attitudes towards Middle 
Eastern people before and during the Iraqi war.   
South African research on racial attitudes has been conducted with children (i.e., Elliot & 
Tyson, 1983), adolescents (i.e., Dawes & Finchelescue, 1994), and adults (i.e.,Durheim, 2003).  
Such studies found that South African secondary level learners had less tolerant racial attitudes 
than their counterparts in the United States of America (Smith & Stones, 1999).  Other studies 
with secondary and tertiary learner populations showed mixed results.  Some studies (Collings & 
Naidoo, 2004; Finchelescu & Dawes, 2001) revealed contemporary racism scores higher than the 
theoretical midpoint of the scale used, while other researchers (Collings & Naidoo, 2004; Duckitt, 
1991b; 1993a; Duckitt & Farre, 1994; Holtman, et al., 2005; Lea, et al., 1995; Stones, et al., 2003) 
found research participants had contemporary racist scores moderately lower than the theoretical 
midpoint of the scale used.  
However, the association between age and racial attitudes towards Blacks has not enjoyed 
much attention by researchers.  An exception is research conducted by Durheim (2003) who 
investigated variables associated with opposition to racial transformation policy among White 
South-Africans.  Durheim (2003) found that relatively higher age significantly predicted 
favourable attitudes towards reconstruction and development policies and affirmative action 
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policies.  However, Durheim’s (2003) “older, postgraduate students” (p. 247) who supported 
racial transformation policy were relatively young (the maximum age of the sample was 23 
years).  The significance of age on racial attitudes in a sample with a higher maximum age and 
larger age range has therefore not been established. 
Race and Racism 
Race is one of the most salient and significant categories in which people are placed.  The 
association between race and racism has thus occupied a central role in global intergroup relations 
research.  More specifically, racist attitudes of Whites against Blacks have been the primary focus 
of research of racial attitudes in the United States and South Africa (Foster, 1991b; Jones, 1997; 
Louw & Foster, 1991b; Ratele, 2006; Wilson, 2006).  In fact, Jones (1997) asserted that the focus 
on Black-White relations “offers the most compelling glimpse into the operation of prejudice and 
racism in the United States” (p. 18).  Such a glimpse into racial attitudes in the United States of 
America is offered by surveys conducted in the United States of America in the early to mid-
1990s.   These surveys revealed that White American racial attitudes towards Black Americans 
were more pronounced, coherent, and crystallised than attitudes towards other groups.  For 
example, symbolic racist attitudes of White American towards Black Americans were more 
negative than attitudes towards Hispanic Americans, Asian Americans, legal immigrants, illegal 
immigrants, and other Whites (Jones, 1997).    
Similarly, South African psychological research into intergroup relations has been 
influenced by the perspective that relations between groups are shaped by the attitudes one race 
group holds towards other race groups (Louw & Foster, 1991b; Ratele, 2006). The racial attitudes 
of Whites towards Blacks have therefore enjoyed prominence in South African research (Foster & 
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Nel, 1991).  A number of investigations into racial attitudes by means of social distance scales 
(Heaven & Groenewald, 1977; Lever, 1969; 1972; Van den Berghe, 1962) and semantic 
differential scales (Nieuwoudt, Plug & Mynhardt, 1977; Plug & Nieuwoudt, 1983) revealed a 
consistent pattern of White racial attitudes: English- and Afrikaans-speaking Whites held negative 
attitudes towards all non-White groups.   
While systematic social psychological research on racial attitudes has declined 
considerably since South Africa’s transition to democracy, several studies have investigated 
whether White racist attitudes towards other race groups have changed along with positive 
political changes (Foster, 2006).  These studies with secondary and tertiary level learners, 
however, have replicated pre-democracy attitudinal trends and confirmed that White racist 
attitudes towards other race groups are deeply entrenched.   Pillay & Collings (2004) found White 
learners scored higher than other race groups on a measure of traditional racism towards Blacks, 
while Indian and White students scored highest on a measure of contemporary racism towards 
Blacks.  Similarly, Finchilescu and Dawes (2001) reported that pre-democracy patterns continued 
among secondary level learners as White learners scored higher on anti-Black measures than 
Coloured or Indian learners.  In addition, this study revealed that White anti-Black sentiment was 
higher in 1996 than in 1992.  This is contradictory to findings of Smith, et al. (2003) who found 
that anti-Black sentiment in White and Coloured tertiary and secondary learner samples had 
decreased between 1995 and 1999.  Smith and Stones (1999) also found ambivalent racist 
attitudes among White secondary level participants.  The White learners showed strong support 
for improved conditions for Black people and strong pro-White attitudes, but also an 
unwillingness to accept Black people as equals to Whites and a preference that racial groups in 
South Africa remain separate and distinct.  Yet, only 15 % of the White participants in the study 
reflected strong racist attitudes.   
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A neglected area of research, both internationally (Wilson, 2006) and in South Africa 
(Foster & Nel, 1991) has been the racial attitudes of Black people towards other racial groups 
(Foster & Nel, 1991). Although scant, research reveals a consistent pattern of Black attitudes:  
relatively positive views towards English-speaking Whites, but negative attitudes and even 
hostility towards Afrikaans-speaking Whites (Foster, 2006; Foster & Nel, 1991).  One such study 
conducted by Voster and Proctor (1976) measured the levels of bias of Black tertiary level 
learners towards English and Afrikaans-speaking Whites by letting Black participants listen to the 
recordings of White voices. Their findings showed a bias in favour of English White people, 
distinguished from Afrikaans-speaking Whites by their accents.  The English stereotype, as 
judged by Black participants, indicated that English speaking White people were better-looking, 
more likeable, more sociable, and kinder than the Afrikaans-speaking White participants. 
In more recent years, the Anti-White Sentiment Scale (AWS) (Duckitt & Farre, 1994) was 
developed to measure anti-White sentiment and attitudes held regarding the participation of White 
South Africans in the social, political, and economic areas of South Africa (Holtman, et al., 2005; 
Smith & Stones, 2001).  This scale contains items such as “Whites should not be allowed to keep 
their wealth.  It should be taken from them and re-distributed among all people of South Africa”, 
and “Whites should have to suffer for the wrongs of apartheid” (Holtman, et al., 2005).  
Investigations with the AWS have confirmed pre-democracy Black racial attitude trends.  For 
example, Duckitt & Mphuthing (1998) found that Black students have significantly more negative 
attitudes toward Afrikaans-speaking Whites than towards English-speaking Whites.  Finchilescu 
and Dawes (1994; 2001) also found that Black secondary level learners showed the most negative 
anti-White attitudes, followed by Coloured and Indian participants.  However, when compared to 
other groups, Blacks’ racial attitudes have been found to be more tolerant than other racial groups 
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in South Africa (Finchilescu & Dawes, 2001; Pillay & Collings, 2004; Smith & Stones, 1999; 
Smith, et al., 2003; Verganani, 1985, as cited in Foster, 1991c).  
Even though Smith and Stones (2001) have asserted that the factor structure of the Subtle 
Racism Scale does not lend itself for use as an aggregate total of the individual items with Black 
and Coloured participants, the Subtle Racism Scale has been administered to Black participants.  
For example, Smith, et al. (2003) administered the Subtle Racism Scale to two samples that 
included Blacks in 1995 and 1999. The results indicated moderately low ratings of anti-Black 
contemporary racist beliefs that fell below the theoretical midpoint.  Pillay and Collings (2004) 
assessed the racial attitudes of tertiary level learners, including those of Black learners, by 
administering a measure of both traditional and contemporary racial attitudes towards Blacks.  
While Blacks scored lower than all groups on both measures, it is interesting to note that the 
group scored higher on the items that reflected anti-Black sentiments along the lines of 
contemporary racism than on the items that reflected traditional racism.   
  As a distinctive group in South Africa, the Coloured group consists of people of mixed 
racial origin.  During apartheid the Coloured group was granted more privileges than Blacks, but 
fewer privileges than Whites.  Due to this social hierarchy and because this group represents a 
small minority of the South African population, the Coloured group have been marginalised in 
apartheid and post-apartheid South Africa (De la Rey & Duncan, 2003; Smith, Stratton, Stones, & 
Naidoo, 2003).  Similar to the previously reported trend of Black attitudes, investigations into the 
racial attitudes of Coloured towards Whites have revealed a consistent pattern:  Afrikaans-
speaking Whites were consistently rated as the least favoured group, followed by English-
speaking Whites (Morse & Peele, 1975; Thiele, 1988, as cited in Foster & Nel, 1991). However, 
Thiele’s (1988, as cited in Foster & Nel, 1991) assessment of the racial attitudes of Coloured 
adults also revealed that Coloured participants had more negative attitudes towards Blacks than 
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towards Afrikaans-speaking Whites. However, when contemporary racist attitudes were 
measured, Coloured participants were more tolerant towards Blacks than Whites were (Pillay & 
Collings, 2004; Smith, et al., 1999; Stones, et al., 2003).   
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the changing notions of race and racism across time and 
contexts.  It can be concluded that racism as an adaptable construct has evolved into more 
contemporary forms of racism, expressed in a more subtle, covert, and indirect ways when 
compared with traditional forms of racism.  
As the result of a considerable decline in systematic social psychological research on racial 
attitudes since the late 1980s, it has also been found that empirical evidence that describes post-
apartheid trends in South African race attitudes is scarce and somewhat equivocal.  Furthermore, 
the relationship between subtle racism and demographic variables such as age has not previously 
been investigated.  The present study thus seeks to address some of the empirical gaps present 
within existing research literature, while simultaneously attempting to increase the body of 
national research available on subtle racism. The following chapter will focus on the methodology 
adopted for the present study. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
Chapters 2 and 3 have contextualized the theory and research relevant to attitudes, 
prejudice, stereotypes, discrimination, and contemporary racism.  In these chapters, empirical 
evidence was provided regarding the complexity of the construct of racism and the changing 
nature of racism.  The limited number of studies that have investigated racial attitudes in post-
apartheid South Africa were also highlighted in Chapter 3.  The present study is therefore 
specifically aimed to address an empirical gap in South African race relations research as it aims 
to explore and describe the association between the dependent variable of subtle racism of 
undergraduate psychology learners and the independent variables of gender, language, race, and 
age of the participants.  This introduction provides the rationale for the two aims of the present 
study, which are formulated below. 
Primary Aim of the Research 
The primary purpose of this study was to explore and describe subtle racism among 
undergraduate psychology learners at a tertiary institution in the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
Municipality in 2004.  In particular this study aimed to:  (a) explore and describe subtle racism of 
undergraduate psychology learners and (b) explore and describe patterns of subtle racism amongst 
undergraduate psychology learners according to selected demographic variables.  
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Research Design 
According to Fouché and De Vos (2002), a research design can be considered to be a “plan or 
blueprint according to which data is collected” (p. 137) in accordance to the aims of the research 
study.  As the present study utilised a measure that collected numerical data, the study fell within 
the quantitative research domain.  A quantitative study enables the researcher to accurately 
present data generated by the study in a coherent and functional way (Struwig & Stead, 2001), 
while enabling the researcher to remain detached from the study object.  This increases the 
objectivity of the quantitative research design.  A disadvantage of the quantitative method is that 
detailed insight into the research problem might be compromised (De Vos, 1998).  
The current study was non-experimental, exploratory-descriptive in nature as data was 
gathered without the direct control or manipulation of independent variables (Kerlinger & Lee, 
2000; Leedy, 1993).   Exploratory research has the purpose of discovering relationships between 
variables (Kerliner & Lee, 2000).  The present study was exploratory in nature as it aimed to 
gather data on the association between the independent variables of race, age, gender, and 
language and the dependent variable of subtle racism of undergraduate psychology learners to 
determine if patterns emerged (Mouton, 1996). Another feature of the exploratory research design 
of this study was that it aimed to formulate and focus questions for future research (Kerlinger & 
Lee, 2000; Neuman, 2006).   
The study was descriptive in that the primary purpose of the study was to employ statistical 
data to provide an accurate description of subtle racism amongst undergraduate psychology 
learners in 2004.  Data regarding anti-Black subtle racist attitudes was collected for the present 
study with the Subtle Racism Scale (Duckitt, 1991b; 1993a).  The advantage of a non-
experimental, explorative-descriptive approach is that it attempts to provide a complete and 
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accurate description of a phenomenon (Struwig & Stead, 2001) while providing a description of a 
relatively large set of data (Van Lill & Grieve, 1994).  The disadvantages of this approach are that 
it is time-consuming (Struwig & Stead, 2001) and it has no method for controlling extraneous 
variables. Thus, no cause-and-effect conclusions can be drawn (Burns & Grove, 1993; Eaton, 
2001; Kerlinger & Lee, 2000).  
For the purpose of the present study, the demographic variables of race and language were 
categorised into sub-groups.  Grouping of race was necessary due to the sizes of the Coloured 
(n=45) and Asian (n=10) race groups in the sample that were too small for meaningful statistical 
comparison with the White (n=106) and Black (n=102) race groups.  Coloured and Asian 
participants were therefore combined into one race sub-group, namely Coloured/Asian group for 
the purpose of statistical analysis.   
Similarly, the demographic variable of language was also categorised into sub-groups.  
Within the sample, participants reported six different languages, namely English, Afrikaans, 
Xhosa, Sesotho, Tswana, Zulu, and Sepedi.  The following language sub-groups were utilised for 
the description and statistical analysis of data in the present study:  (a) English-speaking, (b) 
Afrikaans-speaking, and (c) African languages, incorporating Xhosa, Sesotho, Tswana, Zulu and 
Sepedi languages.    Age, as a continuous variable was not categorised for the purpose of the 
statistical analysis as the categorisation of a continuous variable has the disadvantage of failing to 
use all the information of the continuous variable (Harris, 1988).   
Other than race, age, gender, and language, another variable that had the potential to be 
associated with subtle racism is socio-economic status, defined as “the status of an individual’s 
position in a stratified society based on a variety of social and economic indices (Reber & Reber, 
2001, p. 692).  Foster and Nel (1991) claimed that socio-economic status is a potentially 
important variable in the study of racism.  However, since learner samples have dominated 
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prejudice research, socio-economic status has not been investigated, or has been of little 
pertinence.  In addition, the researchers (Foster & Nel, 1991) claimed that socio-economic status 
as a variable is at risk of being confounded by other variables, such as level of education.  
Furthermore, as information on comparative socio-economic status groups in the South African 
context are difficult to obtain (Müller, 2005), it was decided to omit this variable from the 
research design.  Consequently, results reported in Chapter 5 could have been influenced by 
socio-economic status, but the nature of such influence was not established.   
The time dimension of the present study is cross-sectional.  This entails collecting data at one 
point in time and taking a snap-shot approach of the social world.  This differs from the 
longitudinal approach, which involves multiple data collections from the same sample over a 
period of time.  The cross-sectional approach is also simpler and more cost -and time effective 
than the longitudinal approach.  However, the cross-sectional approach has the disadvantage of 
not being able to trace social change over a period of time (Nieuman, 2006).  Hence, the present 
study was unable to capture how subtle racism of undergraduate learners changed over a certain 
period of time.   
The present study made use of existing data that were collected by another researcher. As the 
data were collected by others, it has the disadvantage that there was no control over the quality 
and quantity of data and the manner in which data was collected (Leary, 1991).   
It is therefore acknowledged that the research design used in the present study offered certain 
advantages and limitations.  In addition, the researcher was aware of the fact that socio-economic 
status could not be controlled.  Findings of the present study should therefore be interpreted while 
taking these constraints into consideration. 
 119
Sampling  
This study formed part of a larger ongoing research study at a tertiary institution in the Nelson 
Mandela Metropolitan Municipality.  The larger study entailed gathering data on subtle racism 
with the Subtle Racism Scale (Duckitt, 1991b; 1993a) from undergraduate psychology learners 
registered for a second-year social psychology module at the tertiary institution in 1994 and 2004.  
The current study focussed on the 2004 sample.   
The population, the total set of entities from which the participants of the present study were 
acquired (Strydom & Venter, 2002), were undergraduate psychology learners who were registered 
for a second-year social psychology module at a tertiary institution in the Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan Municipality in 2004.  This population was selected due to the large number of 
undergraduate learners that registered for this module.  A large sample is desirable as statistics 
calculated from larger samples are more accurate than those calculated from small samples 
(Kerlinger & Lee, 2000).  Data collection was done during the introductory lecture of the social 
psychology module before any lectures on prejudice and racism took place, thereby restricting the 
potentially confounding effect of knowledge of contemporary racism on the anti-Black subtle 
racist attitudes of the participants of the present study.  
Participants for the present study were obtained through non-probability, convenience 
sampling in which the researcher simply included easily available participants into the study 
(Bailey, 1994; Leary, 1991; Struwig & Stead, 2001).    Thus, only undergraduate psychology 
learners, registered for a second-year social psychology module who attended a social psychology 
lecture on the day of data collection were included in the present study.  Learners who did not 
attend the social psychology lecture on the day of measurement were thus not included in the 
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sample, even though they had registered for the social psychology module.  The sample for this 
study consisted of 286 undergraduate psychology learners.    
Convenience sampling is a frequently used form of sampling (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000; Leary, 
1991).  It has both advantages and disadvantages.  The advantages of this sampling method are 
that it is cost-effective and less time-consuming than other methods.  A disadvantage of 
convenient sampling, however, is that generalisabilty is reduced (Bailey, 1994; Trochim, 2002; 
Struwig & Stead, 2001) as the degree to which the participants are representative of the 
population is not known.   When learner samples are used, such as in the present study, 
generalisability is further reduced as learners tend to be more intelligent and have more liberal 
attitudes than the general population (Leary, 1991).  However, since the present study was 
exploratory-descriptive in nature and concerned with describing the current sample, generalisation 
was not important (Neuman, 2006). 
  Demographic data such as age, gender, home language and race group were collected from 
the participants of the present study.  This data was utilised in the description of the sample, as 
well as in data analysis.  
Data Collection Method 
The Subtle Racism Scale (Duckitt, 1991b; 1993a) was developed as a measure of anti-Black 
attitudes with the purpose of reflecting more subtle and covert expressions of racial prejudice as 
well as more traditional, old-fashioned and cruder forms of racism (Duckitt, 1991b).  This 
measure was developed in accordance with symbolic or modern racism as it is known in the 
United States of America (Duckitt, 1993b).   
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The Subtle Racism Scale consists of 10 items (Duckitt, 1991b); five negatively formulated 
items (e.g., “It is almost certainly best for all concerned that interracial marriages not be allowed”) 
and five positively formulated items (e.g., “Given favourable conditions it is quite possible that 
Black majority rule could result in a stable, prosperous, and democratic South Africa”) (Duckitt, 
1992a).   The items were formulated to indicate anti-Black affect in a less direct and obvious 
manner than was typical in measures that were previously used to assess traditional forms of 
racism (Duckitt, 1993b) to prevent items being viewed as offensive or socially undesirable by 
liberal or sophisticated participants (Duckitt, 1991b; Duckitt & Farre, 1994).  The Subtle Racism 
Scale, as validated by Duckitt (1991b; 1993a) was a 7-point Likert scale with a range of 10 to 70, 
with lower subtle racism indicated by lower scores. However, Heine, Lehman, Peng, and 
Greenholtz (2002) asserted that cross-cultural comparisons of attitudes with the use of Likert 
scales needs to be approached with caution as the validity of results may be compromised due to 
different reference groups of individualistic and collectivist cultures.  This might limit the value of 
the 7-point Likert scale Subtle Racism Scale in the multi-cultural context of South Africa.   
 In the present study, the range of the Subtle Racism Scale was 10 to 30, with lower subtle 
racism indicated by lower scores.  All items were scored 3 for “yes”, 2 for “unsure”, and 1 for 
“no”.  Negatively-worded items were reverse scored.  
The Subtle Racism Scale was validated amongst psychology learners in two tertiary 
institutions in 1984.  It was administered to 217 undergraduate psychology learners at the 
University of Natal at Pietermaritzburg (Duckitt, 1991b) and 303 undergraduate psychology 
students at the University of the Witwatersrand (Duckitt, 1993a).  Construct validity has been 
established through an examination of the relationship between the Subtle Racism Scale and 
measures of other constructs to which subtle racism should be theoretically related.  For that 
purpose, other measures, such as Heaven and Moerdyk’s (1977) South African adaptation of 
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Ray’s (1976) anti-Black attitude scale, a social distance scale, Altemeyer’s (1981) Right-Wing 
Authoritarianism scale and an interracial behavioural intention scale were simultaneously 
administered to cross-validate the Subtle Racism Scale (Duckitt, 1991b).  
Results indicated that the Subtle Racism Scale outperformed the traditional anti-Black attitude 
scale in all five validity criteria utilised (Duckitt, 1991b).  The Subtle Racism Scale showed high 
concurrent validity (coefficient of 0.79) when correlated with the more transparent measure of 
anti-Black attitude, namely Ray’s (1976) anti-Black attitude scale.  This suggested that these two 
scales were measuring almost exactly the same dimension (Duckitt, 1991b), while it correlated 
more highly with indices of anti-Black racism and discriminatory behaviour than traditional 
measures of anti-Black prejudice (Duckitt & Farre, 1994). 
Reliability of the Subtle Racism Scale has been computed in various South African studies 
(Duckitt, 1991b; 1993a; Duckitt & Farre, 1994; Dawes & Finchilescu, 1994; Holtman, et al., 
2005; Lea, et al., 1995; Smith, et al., 2003).  These studies reported internal reliability coefficients 
ranging from 0.53 to 0.91.  In the present study, the Cronbach alpha was determined to be 0.71.  
Internal reliability of the Subtle Racism Scale in the present study thus fell within the moderate to 
low reliability level (Murphy and Davidshofer, 2001).  
Factor analysis is a construct validity tool used to examine the latent variables that underlie 
measurements of any kind (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000).  Duckitt (1991b) conducted a factor analysis 
to assess the dimensionality of the Subtle Racism Scale in 1984 with a final sample of 211 White 
undergraduate psychology learners at the “relatively conservative” (p. 235) University of 
Pietermaritzburg.  Black participants were excluded from the analysis.  Factor loadings were 
found to be greater than 0.50 for all ten items of the final scale.  This suggested that the Subtle 
Racism Scale was “adequately” unidimensional and measured only one underlying construct 
(Duckitt, 1991b, p. 237).   
 123
However, rapid social change in transforming societies such as South Africa may rapidly out-
date measures of social attitudes such as the Subtle Racism Scale (Duckitt, 1991b; 1993a).  A 
factor analysis was thus repeated to assess the dimensionality of the Subtle Racism Scale.  The 
result of the factor analysis indicated that the Subtle Racism Scale can not be regarded as 
unidimensional according to the present study, as factor analysis identified that two factors could 
be extracted from the Subtle Racism Scale.  Factor loadings for items 9 and 10 was smaller than 
0.50.  Factor analysis also revealed that Item 9 fell within both extracted factors.  This suggests 
that the Subtle Racism Scale should be reassessed and adapted in future studies to ensure 
unidimensionality.   
Procedure 
Data-collection in descriptive research can be done with most data-gathering techniques 
(Neuman, 2006). The Subtle Racism Scale (Duckitt, 1991b) was administered during a normal 
lecture period to a group of undergraduate psychology learners who were registered for a second-
year level social psychology module. The purpose of the study, the voluntary nature of 
participation, as well as the anonymity of the data were explained and emphasised to prospective 
participants before administration of the measure.   
Firstly, participants were asked to provide demographic information, such as their age, 
language, race group and gender in the spaces provided on the measure.  Thereafter, participants 
were requested to complete the measure by indicating whether they agreed or disagreed with each 
of the items.  The participants were also given the option to indicate whether they were unsure, 
agreed, or disagreed with each of the items, by marking the appropriate space.  Participants were 
given as much time as was required to complete the measure. 
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 Statistical Analysis 
The primary purpose of this study was to explore and describe subtle racism among 
undergraduate psychology learners.  Two specific aims focussed on the exploration and 
description of subtle racism among the present sample by concentrating on the relationship 
between participant demographic variables (i.e., gender, language, age, and race) and subtle 
racism.  As “statistics is a tool…[that] can be used to explain and clarify” (Hofstee, 2006. p. 215), 
the data gathered in the current study were analysed in terms of the aims and objectives of the 
study to explore and describe subtle racism.    The Microsoft Excel and Statistica (Statsoft, 1995) 
software packages were used to conduct the statistical analysis.   
Considering the exploratory-descriptive nature of the aims, descriptive statistics were 
calculated and used to describe the sample according to demographic variables.  Thereafter, 
descriptive statistics also allowed for the identification of general trends of subtle racism 
according to the selected demographic variables.   Furthermore, a multiple regression analysis was 
used to explore the association between participant demographic variables (i.e., gender, language, 
age, and race) and subtle racism.  This was considered the most appropriate statistical technique, 
as it allows for the exploration and description of the relationship between a dependent variable 
(i.e., subtle racism) and two or more independent variables (i.e., gender, language, age, and race) 
(Russo, 2003; Shavelson, 1988).  This type of statistical analysis may also be used in an 
exploratory fashion in an attempt to identify those demographic variables (i.e., gender, language, 
age, and race) significantly associated with subtle racism (Russo, 2003).   This is well-suited to 
the descriptive-exploratory aims of the present study.    
Significant independent variables were selected by means of multiple regression analysis.  
The dependent variable was subtle racism as derived from Duckitt’s (1991b; 1993a) Subtle 
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Racism Scale.  The independent variables in the initial models were the demographic variables of 
gender, language, age, and race.   A stepwise regression procedure was followed in which 
independent variables were repeatedly added and taken out of the model until the addition of 
variables produces no significant improvement in the squared multiple correlation coefficient (R
2
) 
and until the p-values of all the variables retained in the model were lower than 0.05, the 
maximum level at which one can still claim significance of the respective independent variable 
(Harris, 1988; Ramsey & Shafer, 2002).  All independent variables with a p-value lower than 0.05 
in the output of the stepwise regression were thus retained as independent variables in the multiple 
linear regression model.  As this study is non-experimental, significant independent variables 
should not be referred to as predictor variables, as this suggests that these findings can be 
generalized to the complete population of undergraduate psychology learners, which is not the 
case (C.  Bosma, personal communication, February 2, 2007).  Using stepwise regression 
increases the parsimoniousness of the statistical analysis, as only the variables that most explain 
variability in the dependent variable are included (Hinton, 2004).   
Dummy variables were used in the regression analysis for the categorical independent 
variables of race and language. Dummy variables are used to represent sub-groups of the same 
sample and are useful as they allow for the use of a single regression equation to represent 
multiple groups (Trochim, 2006).  In the present study, a 0,1 dummy variable was used  for both 
the race and language independent variables.  For the race variable, the White group were used as 
the reference group, while English-speaking participants were used as the reference group in the 
language variable. For example, the subtle racism scores of the Black and Coloured/Asian sub-
groups were compared against the White sub-group to determine which race sub-groups are 
significant independent variables of subtle racism.  Similarly, the Afrikaans-speaking and African 
languages-speaking sub-groups were compared with the English-speaking sub-group during the 
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multiple regression analysis to determine significant associations with subtle racism.   The 
advantage of using a 0,1 dummy-coded variable is that it enables the researcher to treat a nominal-
level variable like an interval-level variable in an statistical analysis (Trochim, 2006).   
As mentioned in Chapter 3, linguistic and race categories in South Africa are confounding.  
Researchers have generally attempted to overcome this confounding effect, by further dividing 
race groups into home-language groups. The present study too found an overlap between the 
demographic variables of race and language, as indicated by the multiple regression analysis. The 
model indicated a high partial correlation between the independent variables of language and race.  
According to the model, language had the highest p-level, and was removed from the model as it 
was considered to be spurious (C.  Bosma, personal communication, 8 December 2006).   
As previous research trends indicated that home language was an important independent 
variable to consider when investigating racial attitudes, descriptive statistics for White Afrikaans-
speaking and White English-speaking sub-groups were calculated.  Descriptive statistics for other 
Afrikaans-speaking race sub-groups were not calculated as sample sizes for the Afrikaans-
speaking Coloured/Asian (n=16) and Black (n=1) race sub-groups were considered too small for 
meaningful deductions to be derived (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000). 
Linear multiple regression analysis typically calculates a linear model that best represents the 
overall pattern of association between the dependent variable and the independent variables 
(Caldwell, 2007).  However, since it is unlikely that a model describing subtle racism is linear 
with respect to the age of respondent, a curvilinear model in which age was modelled in a 
polymonial form, was fitted  (C. Bosma, personal communication, April 16, 2007).  This 
curvilinear multiple regression model is more complex than a linear multiple regression model 
(Shavelson, 1988), but as the introduction of the curvature with respect to age in the model 
describing subtle racism proved to be highly significant (p<0.0028), it indicated a more accurate 
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reflection of sample characteristics than a linear model (C. Bosma, personal communication, 
February 2, 2007). 
Shavelson (1988) reported that a general rule of thumb regarding sample size needed to 
provide adequate estimates of the regression coefficients is that there should be at least 10 times 
as many subjects as independent variables.  As this study has 4 independent variables (i.e., 
gender, language, age, and race), the sample size of the current study (n=263) was considered 
sufficient for an adequate estimate of the regression coefficients of the present study.  A 
disadvantage of this type of statistical analysis is that no causal interpretation of the effect of the 
independent on the dependent variable should be made, as the independent variable was not 
manipulated by the researcher (Russo, 2003). 
Ethical Considerations 
Strydom (2002) defined ethics as “a set of widely accepted moral principles that offer rules for, 
and behavioural expectations of, the most correct conduct towards experimental subjects” (p. 75). 
This study utilised post-hoc analysis of existing data collected by another researcher.  During the 
collection of data in 2004, the purpose and voluntary nature of participation in the study were 
clearly explained to prospective participants to ensure that no deception of and possible harm to 
prospective participants took place.  The anonymity of the participants and the data collected were 
also ensured as participants were not required to provide their names on the questionnaire.  
Informed consent to use the data for research purposes was also obtained from prospective 
participants of the study.   
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In this chapter, the findings of the study are presented and discussed in relation to the two 
specific aims of the study. The first specific aim was to explore and describe subtle racism of 
undergraduate psychology learners.  The second specific aim was to explore and describe patterns 
of subtle racism among undergraduate learners with regards to sub-group demographic variables.   
Below, the sample is described according to demographic variables of gender, language, age, and 
race.  Thereafter, the results of the statistical analysis of the association between the demographic 
variables (as independent variables) and subtle racism (as dependent variable) is presented, along 
with a discussion of the findings within the context of theories of contemporary racism and 
previous research on prejudice and contemporary forms of racism as presented in Chapters 2 and 
3.   
Description of sample 
As mentioned earlier in this study, 286 undergraduate psychology learners attending a 
second-year social psychology lecture participated in the present study.  Twenty-three of the 
measures were incomplete and were therefore not considered for statistical analysis.  This gave a 
final sample of 263.  As a sample size of 30 is considered to be sufficient for basic statistical 
procedures (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000), the final sample size of present study was sufficiently large 
to allow for parametric techniques to be performed and for meaningful deductions to be derived.   
The gender distribution of this sample was disproportionate as 31 % of the participants 
were male, while 69 % of the sample was female.  Within the racial sub-groups of the sample of 
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the present study, the females consistently outnumber the males.  The gender distribution of the 
sample per racial sub-group, expressed as a percentage of the total sample, is presented in Figure 
3. 
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Figure 3.  Gender distribution per race sub-group expressed as a percentage of the total sample. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, language groups indicated by participants were divided into 3 
language sub-groups, namely English, Afrikaans, and African.  Of the sample, 48 % of 
participants were English-speaking, 18 % were Afrikaans-speaking, and 35 % of participants 
spoke an African language.  English-speakers were the majority language sub-group within both 
the White and Coloured/Asian race sub-groups.  The language distribution per racial sub-group, 
expressed as a percentage of the total sample is presented in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4.  Language distribution per race sub-group expressed as a percentage of the total sample. 
 
The mean age of tertiary learner samples usually range between 18 and 22 years (Leary, 
1991).  The mean age of the present study was 22.8 years (SD=6.04), slightly older than the 
reported learner sample mean age range.  Participants ranged between 18 and 57 years.  Measures 
of central tendency indicate that the Black race sub-group had the highest mean age (M=25.10, 
SD=7.04), while the White race sub-group had the largest range of ages (18-57 years).  The mean, 
standard deviation and age ranges per race sub-group are presented Table 2.   
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Table 2. 
Mean, Standard Deviation, and Age Range per Race Sub-Group 
 Race sub-group 
  White Black Coloured/Asian 
Mean age (years) 21.6 25.10 21.7 
SD (years) (5.48) (7.04) (2.95) 
Minimum Age (years) 18 18 18 
Maximum Age (years) 57 50 37 
 
The White (40 %) and Black race sub-groups (39 %) were similar in size, while the 
Coloured/Asian subgroup (21 %) was the smallest race sub-group.  The race sub-group 
distribution of the present study mirrors the racial distribution of the 2004 student body (R. 
Knoetze, personal communication, November 28, 2006).  A comparison between the racial sub-
group distribution of the present study and the 2004 student body, expressed in percentages, are 
presented graphically in Figure 5.  
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Figure 5. Comparison between race sub-group distribution of the present study sample and the 
2004 student body. 
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Subtle Racism 
As indicated in Chapter 4, the theoretical range of the measure used in the present study is 
10 to 30, with a theoretical midpoint of 20.  In order to define descriptive categories for scores 
obtained on the Subtle Racism Scale, the theoretical range was divided into equal categories of 7 
units each.  Therefore, a participant that obtained a score of 20 (the theoretical midpoint of the 
scale) will fall within the category that suggests moderate subtle racism according to this scale.  
The descriptive categories for the scores obtained on the subtle racism score are presented in 
Table 3.    
 
Table 3. 
Descriptive Categories for Subtle Racism  
Descriptive Category Category range 
Low subtle racism 10 -16 
Moderate subtle racism  17-23 
High subtle racism 24-30 
 
The average subtle racism score obtained by the present sample is 15.58 (SD=3.77).  This 
is below the theoretical midpoint of the scale and can be described as low subtle racism according 
to the descriptive categories established (see Table 3).  According to these descriptive categories, 
the largest percentage of participants (65 %) obtained scores that indicate low subtle racism.  A 
considerable smaller percentage of participants (32 %) had less tolerant racial attitudes towards 
Blacks as their scores indicated moderate subtle racism.  A small percentage of participants (4 %) 
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were the least racially tolerant towards Blacks and obtained scores which indicate high subtle 
racism according to this measure.  
Patterns of Subtle Racism According to Demographic Sub-groups 
Multiple regression analysis was conducted with four independent variables (i.e., gender, 
language, age, and race).  Two of the variables (i.e., age and race) were retained.  In Chapter 4, it 
was explained that dummy variables for the independent variables of race and language were 
utilised during the regression analysis.  The model that illustrates the use of dummy variables for 
the racial sub-groups (i.e., White, Black, and Coloured/Asian) of the present study is shown in 
Table 4.  Thus, by allocating codes to the dummy variables in this manner, the White sub-group 
was selected as the reference group.   
 
Table 4. 
Model of Dummy Variables for Race 
Race sub-group R1 R2 
White 
Black 
Coloured/Asian 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
 
The curvilinear regression model which gave the best fit to the data was: 
2413
2
210Racism Subtle Estimated RbRbAgebAgebb ++++=  
The term b0 represents the intercept, b the estimated coefficients for each independent 
variable retained by the model (i.e., age and race), Age refers to the independent variable of age, 
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while Age
2
 describes the curvature with respect to age.   According to the model for dummy 
variables for race expressed in Table 6, R1 thus refers to the Black sub-group, while R2 refers to 
the Coloured/Asian sub-group.   
A summary of the multiple regression analysis is presented in Table 5.  The table expresses 
the estimated coefficients for this model (b), as well as the p-value for each estimated coefficient.  
In addition, the t-values and SE-values, intermediate statistics to calculate the p-value, are 
presented in Table 5.  However, instead of discussing Table 5 here, separate subsections will be 
dedicated to each of the independent variables and its association with subtle racism as 
determined by statistical analysis.   
 The multiple regression model was able to account for 21 % of variance in subtle racism    
(R
2 
= .207 x 100).  This is relatively low, and implies that 79 % of variance in subtle racism is due 
to independent variables that were not included in the model, such as socio-economic status, 
educational level, religious commitment, political party orientation, or ethnic identity.   
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Table 5. 
Multiple Linear Regression Analysis Results for Gender, Language Sub-Groups, Age, Age
2
, Race 
Sub-Groups, and the Interaction Between Race Sub-Groups and Age, and Race Sub-Groups and 
Age
2
.   
Independent variable b SE t p 
Gender     
Gender 0.44 0.45 0.98 0.3274 
Language     
Afrikaans-speaking sub-group 
d
 0.58 0.57 1.00 0.3166 
African-speaking sub-group 
d
 -0.89 0.99 -0.90 0.3711 
Age 
Age -1.06 0.29 -3.61 0.0004*** 
Age
2
 0.01 0.00 3.02 0.0028** 
Race     
Black sub-group 
a
 -23.75 6.98 -3.40 0.0008*** 
Coloured/Asian sub-group 
a  
 -2.20 0.55 -4.00 0.0001*** 
Interaction between race and age     
Black*Age interaction 
b
 1.34 0.48 2.77 0.0060** 
Coloured/Asian*Age interaction 
b
 -1.63 1.23 -1.32 0.1869 
Black*Age
2 
interaction 
c
 -0.02 0.01 -2.40 0.0170* 
Coloured/Asian*Age
2 
interaction 
c
 0.03 0.02 1.26 0.2084 
* p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001  
 Note:  R=.455; R
2 
= .207; F(6, 257)=13.38, p<.000. 
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a
 Reference sub-group: White sub-group  
b
 Reference sub-group White*Age
 
interaction 
c
 Reference sub-group: White*Age
2 
interaction 
d
 Reference sub-group: English speaking 
The Association between Gender and Subtle Racism 
The descriptive statistics revealed that only a small difference of 0.3 units in average subtle 
racism scores obtained by males (M=15.89, SD=4.17) and females (M=15.59, SD=3.58).  
Likewise, the distribution of subtle racism scores according to descriptive categories (see Table 3) 
between the genders is fairly similar with 5 % more females than males in the low subtle racism 
category and 3 % more males than females in the high subtle racism category.  The distribution of 
participants according to gender for each descriptive category, expressed as a percentage of the 
total sample is presented in graphic form in Figure 6.  This trend reflects international and South 
African results for secondary and tertiary levels (i.e., Dawes & Finchilescue, 1994; Hoxter & 
Lester, 1994; Pillay & Collings, 2004; Sidanius, 1993) in which males consistently had higher 
levels of racism than females and is contradictory to Van den Berghe’s (1962) findings.  
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Figure 6.  Distribution of subtle racism scores for each gender according to descriptive categories 
expressed as a percentage of the total sample.   
 
However, in investigating the association between gender and subtle racism, multiple 
regression analysis revealed a non-significant relationship (p > 0.05).  In the present study, 
therefore, it could not be demonstrated that gender accounts for differences in subtle racism.  The 
absence of significant gender differences in the expression of racism is contrary to recent South 
African (Dawes & Finchilescue, 1994; Pillay and Collings, 2004) and international research 
(Hoxter & Lester, 1994; Sidanius, 1993).  It should be noted, however, that the unequal gender 
distribution of the present study could have contributed to the non-significant result in the present 
study.  With an equal gender distribution, the male contribution to the statistical analysis would 
have had more statistical power which may have resulted in a statistical result more representative 
of the association between gender and racism than in the present sample.   
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The Association between Language and Subtle Racism 
It could not be demonstrated with multiple regression analysis that language is 
significantly associated with subtle racism in the present sample (p > 0.05) (see Table 5). 
However, when the average subtle racism scores of the different language sub-groups were 
compared, it was possible to distinguish trends regarding the relationship between language and 
subtle racism.  In the present study, the Afrikaans-speaking sub-group (M=17.23, SD=4.34) had 
the highest average subtle racism of the sample.  The African language sub-group (M=13.77, 
SD=2.42) had the lowest average subtle racism score, while the English-speaking sub-group 
(M=16.49, SD=3.81) had a mean score higher than the African languages sub-group, but lower 
than the Afrikaans-speaking sub-group.   
A distribution of subtle racism scores according to language sub-groups (see Table 3), 
expressed as a percentage of the total sample is graphically illustrated in Figure 7.  According to 
this distribution, Afrikaans-speaking participants of the study had the lowest percentage of 
participants (9 %) in the low subtle racism category when compared to the other language sub-
groups of the present study.  From this one can conclude that Afrikaans-speaking participants of 
the present study have the least racially tolerant attitudes towards Blacks compared to the 
participants from other language sub-groups.   
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Figure 7.  Distribution of subtle racism of language sub-groups according to descriptive categories 
expressed as a percentage of the total sample. 
 
As explained in Chapter 4, descriptive statistics were calculated for the Afrikaans-speaking 
and English-speaking White sub-groups.  From the results, it emerged that Afrikaans-speaking 
White participants (M=18.53, SD=4.61) had scores that indicated moderate subtle racism, while 
the average subtle racism scores of English-speaking White participants (M=16.49, SD=3.81) 
indicated low subtle racism (see Table 3).  From these results one is thus able to conclude that 
within the language sub-groups; the White Afrikaans-speaking sub-group emerged to be the sub-
group with the least racial tolerance towards Blacks.   
These results reflect the strong association between racism and Afrikaans-speaking Whites 
that has spanned more than a hundred years as discussed in Chapter 3 and confirms earlier 
research in which Afrikaans-speaking Whites were consistently shown to have more racist 
attitudes towards Blacks than English-speaking Whites  (e.g., Appelgryn & Bornman, 1996; 
Dawes & Finchilescue, 1994; Hampel & Krupp, 1977; Plug & Nieuwoud, 1983; Smith & Stones, 
1999; Smith, et al., 2003; Stones, et al., 1997; Mynhardt, 1980; Thiele, 1988, as cited in Foster & 
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Nel, 1988).  This suggests that after ten years of democracy, Afrikaans-speaking Whites still hold 
more negative racial attitudes towards Blacks than English-speaking Whites, demonstrating the 
deeply entrenched anti-Black sentiment among Afrikaans-speaking White South Africans.       
The Association between Age and Subtle Racism 
 It was previously mentioned that age is a continuous variable.  Therefore, age was not 
categorised for the purpose of statistical analysis.   However, for the purpose of describing subtle 
racism of the present sample, the age range (18 years to 57 years) was divided into 4 equal sub-
groups each spanning 10 years.   The average subtle racism score for the sample according each 
of the age sub-groups are graphically expressed in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8.  Average subtle racism score per age sub-group. 
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 From the graph, it can be concluded that the association between age and subtle racism is 
not a simple, linear relationship in which subtle racism simply increases or decreases with age.  
Rather, subtle racism decreases along with age to a certain age (i.e., in the 38 -47 years sub-
group), when it again increases.   Participants in the 38 – 47 years sub-group therefore exhibited 
the most racial tolerance towards Blacks, while participants in the 18 – 27 years sub-group were 
the least tolerant towards Blacks.  It is noticeable, however, that even though the average subtle 
racism score for the sample varies up to approximately 3 units between the different age sub-
groups, the average subtle racism score remains within the low subtle racism category (see Table 
3).  This is indicative of low anti-Black sentiment within all four age groupings is and is 
comparable to other studies with undergraduate learner samples in which mean ratings were lower 
than the theoretical midpoint (i.e., Duckitt, 1991b; 1993a; Duckitt & Farre, 1994; Smith, et al., 
2003; Stones, et al., 2003).   
Multiple regression analysis with age as an independent variable indicated a significant 
relationship between age and subtle racism (p < 0.001). According to the model, the age 
curvature, modelled by Age
2
 also revealed a significant association with subtle racism (p < 0.001).  
According to Ramsy & Schafer (2002), significance at this stringent level of significance 
(p<0.001) could be considered as convincing evidence of significance and strongly suggests that 
the relationship between age and subtle racism of the present sample is an accurate reflection of 
tendencies of this sample and not due to chance.   This is contradictory to research that has found 
no association between racial attitudes and age (e.g., Bobo & Kluegel, 1993; Bobo & Hutchings, 
1996) and the finding that older Australians had more positive attitudes towards ethnic out-groups 
than younger people (Heaven, et al., 2006)   
According to Miles (1989) social and historical contexts have an effect on the form of 
racism articulated in a specific society at a specific time.  In addition, many psychologists agree 
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the interpersonal and intergroup processes are rooted within socio-historical contexts.  Shifts or 
perceptions of shifts within these contexts are thus likely to bring about changes in intergroup and 
interpersonal processes (Stevens & Lockhat, 2003).  The level of subtle racism revealed by each 
age sub-group may thus provide a snapshot of the interaction between racial attitudes and the 
socio-political and historical context of South Africa.  
Social learning theory emphasises the role that socialising agents such as parents, peers, 
schools, society, and the media play in the acquisition and modification of racial attitudes 
(Ashmore, 1970; Brown, 2006; Chaiken & Eagly, 1993; Duckitt, 1994; Nelson, 2006; Taylor, et 
al., 2006).   The relatively negative or positive racial attitudes towards Blacks amongst 
participants may thus be better understood when the historical context at the time when racial 
attitudes were formed and refined is examined.   
The 48-57 year age sub-group were born and raised in the late 1940s and 1950s.  After the 
Second World War, the rest of the world began to move away from racist ideas and began to 
abandon racial discrimination (Louw & Foster, 1991; McConahay, 1986).  South Africa, on the 
other hand, established the apartheid structure based on the stark hierarchical definition of races 
and other notions included in the traditional form of racism such as White superiority, racial 
segregation, and disenfranchisement of all non-Whites (De la Rey, 1991; Durheim, 2003; Foster 
& Finchelescue, 1986; Jones, 1997; Sparks, 2003).  Thus, older participants in the study were 
generally raised in a social context where negative racist attitudes towards Blacks were explicitly 
expressed by parents, peers, and in the media (Sparks, 2003) enabling the socialisation of anti-
Black racial attitudes. Furthermore, according to contemporary theories of racism, the affective 
component of racist attitudes stays stable, even if the cognitive and behavioural components of 
racist attitudes may change (McConahay, 1986). Thus, even though the cognitive and behavioral 
components of the racial attitudes of the older participants might have changed in post-apartheid 
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South Africa, it is likely that the negative affective component of their racial attitudes may have 
remained stable.  This may provide a possible explanation for the high level of subtle racism 
among the older participants in the present study, a trend that has also been found in other studies 
(i.e., Glover 1995; Seltzer, et al., 1995).    
The least negative racial attitudes towards Blacks were found in the sub-group of 
participants that were born in the era of high apartheid, that is, between 1957 and 1976. This age 
sub-group were socialised in the ambivalent context of growing racial oppression and censorship 
on the one hand, and growing anti-apartheid sentiment among some White groups and non-White 
groups on the other hand.  Peaceful protests, which gained momentum in the late 1950s, was met 
with brutal opposition from the White South African government (Finchilescu & Dawes, 2001). 
This era was thus characterised by events such as the shootings at Sharpville and Langa (1960), 
the Soweto riots (1976), the banning of the African National Congress (1960), the Rivonia trials 
(1963), the approval of detention without trial (1963) and the independence of the first homeland, 
Transkei (1976) (Attwell, 1986; Beinhart, 1994; Johnson, 2004).  
During the 1970s and early 1980s, some White South Africans grew in their beliefs that 
racism and discrimination is morally wrong (Beinhart, 1994).  Within the White English-speaking 
community, attitude change towards a more liberal stance was evident (Hofmeyer, 1990).  Also in 
the White Afrikaans-speaking communities a “better educated, more urbane and travelled 
generation of Afrikaners” emerged (Sparks, 2003, p.321) who were aware of the “unworkability 
of apartheid” and were “embarrassed by its crudity” (Sparks, 2003, p. 321).   These changes 
within White South Africa could account for more tolerant racial attitudes towards Blacks 
revealed by the present study.   
The present study revealed that the youngest participant sub-group evidenced the highest 
level of subtle racism.  As a sub-group that have lived for a large part of their formative years in a 
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post-apartheid environment in which they have been exposed to more liberal racial and social 
attitudes (Pillay & Collings, 2004; Stones, et al., 2003) this is a surprising result.  However, this 
result may also reflect this sub-group’s racial attitudes to be consistent with contemporary racist 
beliefs.  Along with the theory of modern racism, participants in this sub-group may have 
ambivalent attitudes towards Blacks.  On the one hand participants believe that racism and 
discrimination is wrong (Duckitt, 1994; McConahay, 1986).  On the other hand, the political 
unrest and violence of the late 1970s and 1980s (Attwell, 1986; Johnson, 2004), the era in which 
the racial attitudes of this subgroup were socialised,  might have led to beliefs consistent with 
contemporary racism, such as “the large scale extensions of political rights to blacks will 
inevitable lead to chaos”.  As individuals with subtle racial attitudes only acknowledge behaviour 
and beliefs consistent with traditional racism as racist (McConahay, 1986), agreeing with 
contemporary racist statements is not considered to be indicative of anti-Black attitudes.  This 
could account for high subtle racism scores of this particular age sub-group.  As a result of the 
phenomenon of system justification, Black participants could share contemporary racist beliefs 
about their own race group (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Lord, 1997), which would further explain the 
relatively high subtle racism scores of the youngest sub-group of participants.   
The Association between Race and Subtle Racism 
Descriptive statistics reveal that White participants of the present study (M= 17.53, SD = 
4.19) were the least tolerant towards Blacks, when compared to the Coloured/Asian sub-group 
(M=15.47, SD=3.20) and Black sub-group (M=13.87, SD=2.49).  Moreover, the White sub-group 
had the least tolerant racial attitudes towards Blacks with the highest proportion of participants in 
both the moderate subtle racism (46 %) and high subtle racism (9 %) categories and the smallest 
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proportion of participants (45%) in the low subtle racism category (see Table 3).   The 
Coloured/Asian sub-group consistently proved to exhibit more tolerance towards Blacks than the 
White sub-group, but less tolerance than the Black sub-group.  Comparisons between percentages 
of racial sub-groups per descriptive categories are expressed graphically in Figure 9.   
Multiple regression analysis with dummy variables (with the White sub-group as the 
reference sub-group), indicate that there is a statistically significant association between race as an 
independent variable and subtle racism (p <0 .001).  This could be considered as convincing 
evidence of significance (Ramsy & Schefer, 2002) and a strong indication that the relationship 
between race and subtle racism of the present sample is not due to chance, but is an accurate 
reflection of tendencies of this sample.    
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Figure 9.  Distribution of subtle racism scores for each race sub-group according to descriptive 
categories. 
 
By revealing that the White sub-group had the most negative racial attitudes towards 
Blacks, the present study thus replicated consistent trends in White racial attitudes towards Blacks 
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reported from pre-democracy (Heaven & Groenwald, 1977; Lever, 1969; 1972; Nieuwoudt, et al., 
1977; Plug & Nieuwoudt, 1983; Van den Berghe, 1962) and post-apartheid research in South 
Africa (Finchilescu & Dawes, 2001; Pillay & Collings, 2004; Smith, et al., 2003; Smith & Stones, 
1999; Stones, et al., 2003).   
Furthermore, the Coloured/Asian sub-group revealed more positive racial attitudes towards 
Blacks than the White sub-group.  This confirms the findings of Pillay and Collings (2004), 
Smith, et al. (1999), Stones, et al.(2003) and Thiele’s (1988, as cited in Foster & Nel, 1991) 
findings.  In line with Stone, et al.’s (2003) investigation of anti-Black attitudes, Black racial 
attitudes on the Subtle Racism Scale were also the lowest of all the race sub-groups.  Pillay and 
Collings (2004) reported a similar finding on a different measure of racial attitudes.  These 
findings regarding the relationship between race and racial attitudes suggest that racial attitudes 
are indeed as resistant to change as has been reported in the literature (Foster & Nel, 1991; 
McConahay, 1986; Pratto, et al., 1994).    
The relatively stable pattern of interracial attitudes can be more clearly understood in the 
context of the history of South African race relations.  White representations of Black people were 
already predominantly negative at the establishment of a staging post in South Africa in 1652.  
Fuelled by racial hierarchies proposed by scientists, the notion of White superiority and Black 
inferiority were entrenched in South Africa through many different forms over the last three and a 
half centuries:  slavery, extermination, segregation, influx control, petty apartheid, and grand 
apartheid (Foster, 1991c; Giliomee & Schlemmer, 1989; Miles, 1989).   
Social identity theory proposes that racial prejudice increases when groups seek to 
maintain or increase positive evaluations of their in-group through negative comparisons and even 
derogation of out-groups (Nelson, 2006; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Taylor, et al., 2006).  By 
representing Africans as inherently different and lower on the scale of human progress or 
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civilisation (Miles, 1989), White South Africans were able to increase collective and individual 
self-esteem, which in turn acts as a strong motivating force to maintain prejudicial attitudes.   
The perpetuation of White attitudes towards Blacks may also be explained by the theories 
of modern and aversive racism.  Modern racism holds that the affective component of anti-Black 
attitudes may remain stable, even if the cognitive component of such attitudes has changed 
(McConahay, 1986).  Consistent with the theory of modern racism, more conservative White 
South Africans may thus cognitively agree with the notion of racial equality, but have strong anti-
Black affects that unconsciously affect their evaluations of Blacks (McConahay, 1986; Nelson, 
2006) and their beliefs about how previous patterns of racial inequality should be rectified (De la 
Rey & Duncan, 2003; Taylor, et al., 2006).   
Liberal White South Africans’ racial attitudes towards Blacks may be better conceptualised 
with the theory of aversive racism.  Liberal White South Africans are postulated to simultaneously 
possess unconscious negative racist feelings and beliefs towards Black people, and conscious, 
sincere commitments to egalitarian values and beliefs (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Dovidio, et al., 
2003).  Persons with racial attitudes consistent with aversive racism are more likely to express 
negative racial attitudes towards Blacks when such attitudes can be justified along non-racial lines 
(Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Dovidio, et al., 2003).  A measure like the Subtle Racism Scale that is 
worded to avoid or minimize the risk of being construed as racist (Duckitt, 1991b) thus makes it 
more likely that persons with racial attitudes consistent with aversive racism express negative 
racial attitudes towards Black people.    
Because society tends to emphasize Black-White group boundaries, members of mixed 
origins, such as the Coloured group in South Africa are often marginalised.  Conceptualising and 
explaining prejudiced attitudes of Coloureds towards out-groups is thus complex.  While the 
social identity theory maintains that both Whites and Blacks should be rejected in order to main 
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social identity, Smith, et al., (2003) maintained that “it is difficult to reject a group that is 
fundamentally similar to your own” (p. 285).  It is thus uncertain to what extent the assumptions 
of the social identity theory explains Coloured racial attitude trends (Smith, et al., 2003).   
According to the social dominance theory (Sidanius, et al., 1992), a marginalised mixed group 
may identify more with the group of origin with the lower status and hold prejudicial attitudes 
towards the group of higher status (Smith, et al., 2003). Coloured South Africans may thus reveal 
less subtle racism towards Blacks than Whites would, as Coloureds may identify to some extent 
with Blacks.  This notion has been supported by South African research trends in which Coloured 
participants consistently revealed lower anti-Black sentiment consistent with subtle racism when 
compared to White anti-Black sentiment (Pillay & Collings, 2004; Smith, et al., 1999; Stones, et 
al., 2003). This trend was also apparent in the present study.  However, responses of Coloured and 
Asian participants in the present study were combined.  Thus, this finding only suggests support 
for the notion that mixed-group participants hold more tolerant racial attitudes towards the lower 
status group of origin.    
The Association between the Race - Age Interaction and Subtle Racism 
As discussed above, the results of a stepwise multiple regression analysis revealed that the 
independent variables of race, age, and the age curvature (Age
2
) were significantly associated 
with subtle racism.  To further explore patterns of subtle racism among sub-groups among 
undergraduate psychology learners, the association between subtle racism and the race – age 
interaction were explored with multiple regression analysis.   The curvilinear regression model, 
fitted for this purpose, can be expressed separately for the three race sub-groups under study. The 
three relevant models are stated in Table 6.   
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Table 6. 
Curvilinear Regression Model Expressed Separately for White, Black, and Coloured/Asian Sub-
Groups  
Race sub-group Model 
White Estimated SRS= 33.75 – 1.062 Age + 0.0136 Age
2
 
Black Estimated SRS= 10 +0.78 Age - 0.0047 Age
2
 
Coloured/Asian Estimated SRS= 31.55 – 1.063 Age + 0.0136Age
2
 
 
According to the previously discussed Figure 8, it was established that subtle racism 
decreased up to the age sub-group of 38 – 47 years, when it increased again.  When the estimated 
average subtle racism per age sub-group is further divided into the race sub-groups, a different 
age-subtle racism trend for the White and Black sub-groups is revealed.  The White sub-group 
exhibits a pattern of subtle racism similar to the trend described by Figure 8.  The trend for the 
Black sub-group, however, indicates that subtle racism increased with age up to the age sub-group 
of 28-37 years, when it decreased again.  The Coloured/Asian sub-group has a subtle racism 
pattern that is similar to that of the White sub-group: subtle racism decreased with age until the 
age sub-group of 38-47 years, when it increased again.   
Multiple regression analysis, using dummy variables with the White sub-group as 
reference group (see Table 8) revealed that the Black sub-group-age interaction was significantly 
associated with subtle racism (p < 0.01) at a moderately convincing level of significance (Ramsy 
& Schafer, 2002). According to the model, the relationship between the age curvature (modelled 
by Age
2
) of the Black sub-group and subtle racism was also significantly different from the subtle 
racism – age curvature interaction of the White sub-group (p<0.05).  However, significance at the 
less stringent level of significance (i.e., p<0.05) offers less convincing evidence of a significant 
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relationship.  Thus, the relationship between subtle racism and the race – age interaction of the 
Black sub-group is a more accurate reflection of the tendencies of the present sample than the 
race-Age
2
 association with subtle racism of the same sub-group.  From this data, it can not be 
demonstrated that the age-race interaction for the Coloured/Asian sub-group is significantly 
associated with subtle racism or that age curvature of the Coloured/Asian sub-group differed 
significantly from that of the White sub-group (p>0.05).  The estimated subtle race score for each 
race sub-group according to age is graphically expressed in Figure 10.    
 
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
12 17 22 27 32 37 42 47 52 57
Age (Years)
White sub-group Black sub-group Coloured/Asian sub-group
  
Figure 10.  Estimated subtle racism for each race sub-group according to age indicating the age 
curvature for each race sub-group.   
 
Figure 10 indicates that the estimated subtle racism score per age for the White sub-group 
is 11 % (2.2 units) higher than that of the Coloured/Asian sub-group.  This difference is constant 
for all ages but not statistically significant according to the multiple regression analysis (p>0.05).  
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Conversely, according to the model, the significant differences (p<0.01) in the estimated subtle 
racism score between the White and Black sub-groups are dependent on their age.  At age 18, the 
White sub-group displays subtle racism that is 27.4 % (5.5 units) higher than that of 18-year old 
Black participants in the present study.  The difference between these two race sub-groups 
declines to zero for both race sub-groups between 29 and 30 years old.  Unexpectedly, between 
the ages of 30 and 45, the trend between the two race sub-groups reverses and the estimated subtle 
racism of the Black sub-group is 0.8 % to 5 % (0.1 to 1 units) higher than the White sub-group.  
Thereafter, the estimated average subtle racism of the two race sub-groups reverts back to its 
former pattern where the estimated average subtle racism of the White sub-group increases again 
with age, while the estimated average subtle racism of the Black sub-group decreases with age.  
At approximately age 57, the White sub-group scores 32.1 % (6.4 units) higher than the Black 
sub-group of a similar age.      
According to the model, the estimated average subtle racism score for the White sub-group 
was the highest around age 18 (M=19.02) and the lowest at approximately age 39 (M=12.92). 
Similarly, the Coloured/Asian sub-group shows its highest estimated average subtle racism score 
at age 18 (M=16.81) and the lowest estimated average subtle racism at age 39 (M=10.72).  The 
Black sub-group exhibits the highest estimated average subtle racism between the ages of 29 to 32 
(M=14.21) and the lowest estimated average subtle racism score at approximately age 57 
(M=10.81).   
Previously it was postulated that socio-political events in the lifetime of the participants 
may have an impact on the level of anti-Black sentiment exhibited by participants of different age 
groups.  The socio-political landscape as experienced by the participants at the time that their 
racial attitudes were formed and refined were also elaborated on.  However, the reversed subtle 
racism trend among Black participants and the fact that anti-Black sentiment among the Black 
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sub-group at a certain age is higher that that of the White sub-group, suggests that anti-Black 
attitudes of the Black participants in the study developed in a distinctly different fashion than 
other racial sub-groups in the present study.  This supports the notion presented by De la Rey & 
Duncan (2003) that apartheid did not affect the dominant and the dominated racialised groups in 
the same manner.   
As the dominated group, Black participants had internalised the racist messages and 
representations of themselves and that of Whites (De la Rey & Duncan, 2003; Fanon, 1990).   
Stevens and Lockhat (2003) further suggests that such psychological consequences appear 
particularly in contexts such as South Africa, where state repression, counter-violence, and 
interpersonal and intrapersonal violence had become endemic to White and non-White society.  
For example, in the mid-1960s, Atwell (1986) reported that in White and non-White South 
African societies, very high levels of domestic abuse, general violence, and substance abuse 
occurred when compared with similar societies such as Australia.  This further created a fertile 
environment for the internalisation of racist messages that may account for the relatively high 
anti-Black sentiments among Black participants of the present study who were in late adolescence 
and early adulthood in 1994.    
Relatively high anti-Black sentiment expressed by this group may also be the consequence 
of confusing post-apartheid demands on identity development.  The heightened politicisation of 
adolescents between 1970 and 1990 offered certain Black adolescents, through the identification 
of a common enemy and common objectives, the opportunity to develop a common social 
identity.  The demise of apartheid, however, called for the rapid redefinition of Black identity.  
This process may have been frustrated by certain psychological double-binds.  One such double-
bind is the expectation of economic freedom (i.e., through employment) consistent with a 
capitalist framework.  However, due to the legacy of apartheid-capitalism such expectations are 
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frequently unattainable.  Thus while the role expectations of this group of Black participants may 
have changed, their social realities and actual roles did not change, thereby hindering Black 
identity development (Stevens & Lockhat, 2003).   
Furthermore, the acceptance of Western economic models and the influence of Western 
ideologies have encouraged a shift from collectivism to individualism in Black South Africa 
society.  However, straddling individualism and collectivism may lead to increased psychological 
tension, increased alienation from both worldviews, and increased identity confusion of Black 
individuals (Stevens & Lockhat, 2003). 
Another psychological double-bind that could have a negative influence on self-perception 
of competence amongst Black individuals (Schneider, et al., 1996) and may have increased anti-
Black sentiment is affirmative-action measures implemented in South Africa through the 
Employment Equity Bill (December, 1997).  While this policy aims to redress past discrimination 
in the labour market by promoting employment equity and equal access to resources (Franchi & 
Swart, 2003), it could have psychologically detrimental effects on those who benefit from the 
program (Nelson, 2006).  This negative effect on Black identity may be especially true if 
affirmative action measures are not perceived as fair to both the beneficiaries and critics of the 
measures (Taylor & Dube, 1986).  This phenomenon may explain the relatively negative attitudes 
towards Blacks by this particular group of Black participants.  
A decline in anti-Black sentiments amongst Black participants born in 1977 and later, 
however, may be indicative of a transformation in the socio-historical context of these participants 
that had a positive effect on in-group evaluations.  One event that may account for such a 
transformation is the Soweto riot that took place on 16 June 1976.  After being fired on by police, 
a student protest against being taught in Afrikaans, turned into four days of rioting in Soweto and 
the Western Cape, which in the following months also spread to the Eastern Cape (Atwell, 1986; 
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Johnson, 2004).  The Soweto riot had an effect on Black South African youths, as it demonstrated 
to them that the unarmed, impoverished, and disenfranchised the Black population “are not 
impotent” (Atwell, 1986, p. 134) but that they could “contribute to their own destiny” (Atwell, 
1986, p. 134).   
After the Soweto riot, political activism became a prominent feature of the lives of many 
Black South Africans (Finchilescu & Dawes, 2001).  The overt rejection of racist messages of 
Black inferiority may thus account for the increased decline in anti-Black sentiment amongst the 
Black participants in the present study.  Increased group pride, social identity, and ingroup 
favouritism may have also protected the self-esteem of Black participants born after the Soweto 
riot, thereby increasing pro-Black attitudes of this specific Black sub-group (Atwell, 1986; 
Brown, 2006; Taylor, et al., 2006). 
 155
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Conclusions 
The principal objective of this study was to explore and describe subtle racism among 
undergraduate psychology learners at a tertiary institution in the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
Municipality in 2004.  In particular this study aimed to:  (a) explore and describe subtle racism of 
undergraduate psychology learners, and (b) explore and describe patterns of subtle racism 
amongst undergraduate psychology learners according to selected demographic variables.  
It has been established that the internal reliability of the Subtle Racism Scale in the present 
study fell within the moderate to low reliability level.  Furthermore, factor analysis revealed that 
in the present study, the Subtle Racism Scale was bi-dimensional and measured two underlying 
constructs.  These findings suggest that the internal reliability and dimensionality of the Subtle 
Racism Scale be investigated.  
To achieve the first and second specific aims of the present study, descriptive and 
inferential statistics were reported.  These demonstrated that there was an absence of any 
significant gender and language differences in relation to subtle racism. Possible reasons for the 
absence of significance were highlighted.  However, there were differences in average subtle 
racism among Afrikaans-speaking and English-speaking Whites, with Afrikaans-speaking White 
sub-group emerging to be the sub-group with the least racial tolerance towards Blacks in the 
present study.  This finding supported previously reported patterns in racial attitude research in 
which White Afrikaans-speaking South Africans were consistently found to have to more 
negative racial attitudes towards Blacks than English-speaking Whites.   Further, consistent with 
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national research trends reported for secondary and tertiary level learners, the White sub-group 
revealed anti-Black subtle racism scores that were significantly higher than that of the Black and 
Coloured/Asian sub-groups.   
Previously reported patterns of anti-Black sentiment in South Africa have thus been 
confirmed in the present study:  Afrikaans-speaking Whites have more negative anti-Black 
attitudes than other language groups, and Whites show stronger anti-Black sentiment than other 
race groups.  This supports the theory and empirical findings of other race attitude researchers 
(McConahay, 1986) who postulated that racial attitudes may be particularly resistant to change.  
The persistent pattern of anti-Black sentiment as revealed by the present study further supports 
postulations that transformation of racial attitudes in South Africa may be restricted by deeply 
entrenched social and psychological divisions and a deep-seated mistrust between races.  
Moreover, it could be speculated that racism in South Africa has persevered, albeit in the form of 
contemporary, more subtle racism.   
Significant findings regarding the relationship between subtle racism as dependent variable 
and the race – age interaction (as independent variable) were reported.  According to the data 
analysis, it was revealed that the race - age trend for the Black sub-group was significantly 
different from the White sub-group trend. The estimated average subtle racism of the White sub-
group decreased with age until approximately age 39, when it sharply increased again.  
Conversely, the estimated average subtle racism of the Black sub-group gradually increased with 
age until approximately age 29 to 32, when it decreased again.  These research results suggest that 
levels of subtle racism vary according to the age and race of the participants, thereby supporting 
the notion that racism in apartheid South Africa has influenced different age and race groups in 
different ways.  This provides additional information on the nature of contemporary, subtle racism 
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unique to the South African context.  Having presented and discussed the conclusions of the 
present study, it is also necessary to acknowledge the existence of limitations.   
Limitations 
Firstly, difficulties with regard to the availability of relevant literature on the topic of 
contemporary, subtle racism in South Africa were encountered.  This was due to the limited 
number of studies that have focussed on contemporary racism in post-apartheid South Africa.  
Further, difficulty was experienced in obtaining South African research on contemporary subtle 
racism, due to unavailability of unpublished masters or doctoral research, and due to the high cost 
of obtaining internationally published articles unavailable in South Africa.  As a result, theoretical 
postulations regarding contemporary forms of racism presented in the present study were mainly 
of international origin and may have limited relevance to the South African context.     
Limitations concerning the research design and methodology of the present study were 
also experienced.  The data utilised in the present study were collected by other researchers as part 
of a larger ongoing research study at a tertiary institution in the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
Municipality.  A number of limitations of the present study result from the fact that the present 
researcher had no control over the number and type of data measuring techniques utilised and the 
quantity and quality of data collected.  As only the Subtle Racism Scale was utilised for data 
collection purposes, only anti-Black sentiment could be investigated in the present study.  Racism 
towards other race groups could therefore not be investigated.  Furthermore, the researchers who 
had collected the data had changed the Subtle Racism Scale from a 7-point Likert Scale to a 3-
point response format (Yes, No, and Unsure). Thus, comparisons of present research findings with 
previous studies that have utilised the original form of the Subtle Racism Scale were restricted.  
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Furthermore, by restricting the number of response options, more sensitive and accurate 
measurement of subtle racism of the participants was restricted.  
The present researcher also had no control over the sampling procedure utilised by the larger 
study.  Convenience sampling that was employed, presents a number of limitations that restricts 
the generalisation of the present findings to the wider population.  The present findings were 
obtained from a sample of tertiary level learners, who were not representative of the general 
population of South African adults or tertiary learners. Secondly, due to convenience sampling, 
the sample was disproportionate in a number of ways.  For example, the number of female 
participants was far greater than the number of male participants, while the White and Black race 
groups far outnumbered the Coloured and Asian participants.  The lack of statistical strength of 
smaller sub-groups (i.e., male sub-group, Coloured/Asian sub-group) within the present sample 
may have impacted on statistical significance of research findings as a relatively large sample size 
is needed to demonstrate statistical significance of lesser relationships between the dependent and 
independent variables. In addition, the small number of Coloured and Asian participants in the 
present study necessitated the combination of participants from these two race groups for the 
purpose of statistical analysis. While the Asian and Coloured race groups were both 
disadvantaged by the apartheid regime, anti-Black sentiment of these two groups could be 
dissimilar. Research findings regarding these groups could thus have been distorted.    
Thirdly, the final sample was drawn from the population of learners registered for an 
undergraduate psychology second-year module in social psychology.  Although data was 
collected at the beginning of the social psychology module before the section on prejudice and 
racism was lectured, it is possible that as psychology students, the participants possessed greater 
understanding of, or sensitivity towards the topics of prejudice and racism which would have 
impacted on their responses on the Subtle Racism Scale.  Finally, generalisation of the findings 
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may be further limited as the participants were drawn from a specific geographical area on a 
specific day during a specific lecture.  Thus, data were collected only from those learners who 
attended the specific social psychology lecture on that specific day.  It is uncertain which factors 
could have contributed to the absence of learners who were registered for the social psychology 
module but who did not attend the lecture during which the data were collected and whether these 
factors may have further biased the sample.    
A further limitation pertains to the use of race categories in the present study.  Delineation 
of humans into race categories is a legacy of the apartheid regime and the government still uses 
race categories to track economic and socio-political patterns in South Africa.  However, as the 
present study conducted data analysis based on self-reported race groups of the participants, the 
ambiguity, uncertainty, and discontent that exist in South Africa regarding the use and application 
of race categories may have biased results of the statistical analysis.  For example, a number of 
participants of the present study did not indicate to which race group they belonged.  As a result, 
these measures were not included in the final statistical analysis.  If it is postulated that 
individuals who are sensitive to prejudice and racism issues omitted their race group, the omission 
of these participants in the study could have biased the present research findings.  
A number of limitations pertain to the Subtle Racism Scale that was utilised in the present 
study.  Firstly, the self-report nature of the Subtle Racism Scale may be problematic.  Social 
desirability is a common form of response bias that may affect the validity of studies such as the 
present study in which highly contentious attitudes are under consideration.  A decade after the 
demise of apartheid, it is common knowledge that racism is undesirable.  As a result, participants 
may have been reluctant to report their true racial attitudes.  Secondly, although the Subtle Racism 
Scale was found to be unidimensional in the early 1990s, factor analysis in the present study 
revealed that the measure in this context consisted of two factors.  Thirdly, the Subtle Racism 
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Scale was developed the early 1990s.  As racial attitudes may adjust in line with prevailing social 
attitudes, it is thus likely that items of this measure might have become less valid over time.  
Fourthly, a standard qualitative description for scores obtained on the Subtle Racism Scale has 
not been established.  Comparisons of qualitative descriptions given to Subtle Racism scores in 
similar studies as the present study are therefore unclear and confusing and make comparison 
between studies problematic.  Finally, the validity of cross-cultural comparisons in South Africa 
with the 7-point Likert scale Subtle Racism Scale may be compromised due to different reference 
groups of individualistic and collectivist cultures.   
Recommendations 
As convenience sampling was used with the present study, it has been noted that 
generalisation of research findings to the population of the study is limited.  However, the present 
study revealed certain research findings of particularly convincing statistical significance.  This 
suggests that some of the research findings could be a reflection of subtle racism of the population 
of the present study.  This warrants further investigation into subtle racism among different 
contexts in South Africa.   
However, in order to increase generalisation of future research findings, it is recommended 
that a randomised sampling procedure is followed.  Through randomisation, disproportionate 
distribution of demographic variables (i.e., gender, race) can be avoided.  Furthermore, the 
conceptualisation of contemporary subtle racism in the South African context may be facilitated 
with the inclusion of more independent variables in future investigations.   
Second, several practices can minimise socially desirable responding in future investigations 
into subtle racism.  It is recommended that future research should ensure that participants are 
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explicitly assured of the confidentiality of their responses prior to data collection by explaining 
how the coding system ultimately guarantees anonymity.  In addition, participants should also be 
asked to provide responses that are reflective of their true attitudes.   It is also recommended that 
future research includes a measure that assesses general social desirability and also examines the 
relationship of this variable to the other self-report measures utilised.   
Third, in light of present research findings regarding dimensionality of the Subtle Racism 
Scale and in context of changing social values regarding racial attitudes in South Africa, it is 
recommended that the factor structure and dimensionality of the Subtle Racism scale be 
reassessed in different contexts in future studies.   
Fourth, to enable the accurate description of measured levels of subtle racism and to facilitate 
comparison between different studies, it is recommended that a standard qualitative description 
for scores obtained on the Subtle Racism Scale be investigated further.   
Fifth, to increase the validity of cross-cultural comparisons of the Subtle Racism Scale it is 
recommended that strategies that take reference-group effects into consideration be investigated.   
Finally, it is recommended that future studies include investigations of racism towards other 
race groups in addition to anti-Black racism.  Due to the lack of empirical evidence of Black 
racial attitudes towards other race groups, Black attitude research could provide a fruitful avenue 
for future research.  
 162
References 
Aboud, F. (1988). Children and prejudice. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. 
Aboud, F.E., & Amato, M. (2003). Developmental and socialization influences on intergroup 
bias. In R. Brown & S.Gaertner. (Eds.), Blackwell Handbook of social psychology: 
Intergroup processes  (pp. 65-85). Oxford, UK:  Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
Adorno, T.W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D.J., & Sanford, R.N. (1950). The authoritarian 
personality.  New York:  Harper & Row. 
Ahmed, R. & Pillay, A.L. (2004). Reviewing clinical psychology training in the post-apartheid 
period:  Have we made any progress?  South African Journal of Psychology, 34(4), 630-
656. 
Ajzen, I., & Fishbein, M. (2005). The influence of attitudes on behaviour.  In D. Abarracín, B.T. 
Johnson & M.P. Zanna. (Eds.),  The handbook of attitudes  (pp.173-221). Mahwah, NJ:  
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Albarracín, D., Zanna, M.P., Johnson, B.T., & Kumkale, G.T. (2005). Attitudes: Introduction and 
scope.  In D. Abarracín, B.T. Johnson & M.P. Zanna. (Eds.),  The handbook of attitudes  
(pp. 3–20). Mahwah, NJ:  Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Allen, B.P. (1975). Social distance and admiration reactions of “unprejudiced” Whites. Journal of 
Personality, 43, 709-726. 
Allport, G.W. (1954a). The history of social psychology.  In G. Lindzey (Ed.), Handbook of 
social psychology (pp. 1-80). Cambridge, MA:  Addison-Wesley. 
Allport, G.W. (1954b).  The nature of prejudice.  Reading, MA:  Addison-Wesley. 
 163
Allport, G.W., & Ross, J.M. (1967). Personal religious orientation and prejudice. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 5, 432-443. 
Altemeyer, B. (1981). Right wing authoritarianism.  Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press. 
Altemeyer, B. & Hunsberger, B. (1992). Authoritarianism, religious fundamentalism, quest, and 
prejudice. The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 2, 113-133. 
Althusser, L. (1969). For Marx.  London: Allen Lane. 
Appelgryn, A.E.M., & Bornman, E. (1996). Relative deprivation in contemporary South Africa. 
The Journal of Social Psychology, 381-397. 
Argyle, M., & Beit-Hallahmi, B. (1975).  The social pscyhology of religion.  London:  Routledge 
& Kegan Paul. 
Aronson, E., Wilson, T.D., & Akert, R.M. (2002). Social psychology. New Jersey, NJ:  Prentice 
Hall. 
Ashmore, R.(1970). The problem of intergoup prejudice. In B.E. Collins, (Ed.), Social psychology  
(pp. 245-296).  Reading, MA:  Addison-Wesley. 
Ashmore, R., & DelBoca, F. (1976). Psychological approaches to understanding intergroup 
conflict.  In P. Katz (Ed.), Towards the elimination of racism (pp. 73-123).  New York: 
Pergamon.  
Asia-Europe Foundation (2005). Beyond Black and White:  Confronting modern realities of 
racism and xenophobia in Asia and Europe. Research paper commissioned by the 
Intellectual Exchange Department of the Asia Europe Foundation. 
Atwell, M. (1986). South Africa:  Background to the crisis.  London: Sidgwick & Jackson. 
Augoustinos, M., Ahrens, C., & Innes, J.M. (1994). Stereotypes and prejudice: The Australian 
experience.  British Journal of Social Psychology, 33(1), 125-141. 
Bailey, K.D. (1994). Methods of social research (4th ed.). New York:  Free Press. 
 164
Banton, M. (1967). Race relations.  London: Tavistock. 
Banton, M. (1970). The concept of racism. In S. Zubaida (Ed.), Race and racialism.  London:  
Tavistock. 
Banton, M.P. (1983). Racial and ethnic competition. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Baron, R.A., & Byrne, D. (2003). Social psychology (10th ed.). Boston: Allyn & Bacon. 
Beinhart, W. (1994).  Twentieth-century South Africa. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Berkowitz, L., & Green, J.A. (1962). The stimulus qualities of the scapegoat. Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 64(4), 293-301. 
Billig, M. (1985). Prejudice, categorization and particularization: From a perceptual to a rhetorical 
approach. European Journal of Social Psychology, 15, 79-103. 
Blasovich, J., Mendes, W.B., Hunter, S.B., Lickel, B., & Kowai-Bell, N. (2001). Perceiver threat 
in social interactions with stigmatized others. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 81, 828-841. 
Bobo, L. (1988). Group conflict, prejudice, and the paradox of contemporary racial attitudes.  In 
P.A. Katz & D.A. Taylor (Eds.), Eliminating racism: Profiles in controversy (pp. 85-114). 
New York: Plenum. 
Bobo, L., & Hutchings, V. L. (1996). Perceptions of racial group competition. American 
Sociological Review, 61, 951-972. 
Bobo, L., and Kluegel, J. R. (1993). Opposition to race-targeting: Self-interest, stratification 
ideology, or racial attitudes? American Sociological Review, 58, 443–464. 
Bodenhausen, G.V., Kramer, G.P., & Süsser, K. (1994). Happiness and stereotypic thinking in 
social judgment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66(4), 621-632. 
 165
Bodenhausen, G.V., & Lichtenstein, M. (1987). Social stereotypes and information processing 
strategies: The impact of task complexity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
52, 871-880. 
Bodenhausen, G.V., Sheppard, L.A., & Kramer, G.P. (1994). Negative affect and social 
judgment: The differential impact of anger and sadness. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 24, 45-62. 
Bohner, G. (2001). Attitudes. In M. Hewstone, & W. Stroebe (Eds.), Introduction to social 
psychology (3rd ed.) (pp.239-285). Badstow, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
Boonzaier, E., & Sharp, J. (1988). South African keywords:  The uses and abuses of political 
concepts.  Cape Town, Western Cape: David Philip. 
Breckler, S.J. (1984). Empirical validation of affect, behaviour, and cognition as distinct 
components of attitude. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 47, 1191 – 1205. 
Briňol, P., & Petty, R.E. (2005). Individual differences in attitude change. In D. Abarracín, B.T. 
Johnson and M.P. Zanna. (Eds.),  The handbook of attitudes  (pp. 575-615).  Mahwah, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Brown, J.D. (2006). Social psychology. Boston: McGraw Hill. 
Brown, R.P., Charnsangavej, T., Keough, K.A., Newman, M.L., & Rentfrow, P.J. (2000).  Putting 
the “affirm” into affirmative action:  Preferential selection and academic performance. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79(5), 736-747. 
Burns, N., & Grove, S.K. (1997). The practice of nursing research: conduct, critique and 
utilization. Philadelphia, PA: Saunders. 
Caldwell, S. (2007). Statistics unplugged (2nd ed.). Canada: Thomson Wadsworth. 
Campbell, D.T. (1965). Ethnocentric and other altruistic motives. In D. Levine (Ed.), Nebraska 
symposium on motivation.  Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 
 166
Cooper, H.M. (1979). Statistically combining independent studies: Meta-analysis  of sex 
differences in conformity research. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 
131-146. 
Corenblum, B., Annis, R.C., & Young, S. (1996). Effects of own group success or failure on 
judgments of task performance by children of different ethnicities. European Journal of 
Social Psychology, 86, 32-66. 
Crandall, C.S., & Eshlemann, A. (2003). A justification-suppression model of the expression and 
experience of prejudice.  Psychological Bulletin, 129(3), 414-446. 
Crisp, R.J., Walsh, J., & Hewstone, M. (2006). Crossed categorisation in common ingroup 
contexts. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32(9), 1204-1218. 
Cristonaffanini, P.R. (2004). The representation of ‘the Others’ as strategies of symbolic 
construction. In M. Blasco & J. Gustavsson (Eds.), Intercultural alternatives: Critical 
perspectives on intercultural encounters in theory and practice. Copenhagen, Denmark:  
Copenhagen Business School Press. 
Crocker, J., Luhtanen, R., Blaine, B., & Broadnax, S. (1994). Collective self-esteem and 
psychological well-being among White, Black, and Asian college students. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20, 503-513. 
Cunningham, W.A., Nezlek, J.B., & Banaji, M.R. (2004). Implicit and explicit ethnocentrism:  
Revisiting the ideologies of prejudice. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30(10), 
1332-1346. 
Finschilescu, G., & Dawes, A.  (1998).  Catapulted into democracy:  South African adolescents’ 
socio-political orientations following rapid social change.  Journal of Social Issues, 54(3), 
563-583.   
 167
Dawes, A., & Finchilescu, G. (1994). Adolescents’ perspectives of South African Society. In F. 
Van Zyl Slabbert, C. Malan, H. Marais, J. Olivier, & R. Riordan (Eds.), Youth in the new 
South Africa  (pp. 245 – 250).  Pretoria, Gauteng: HSRC Publishers. 
De la Rey, C. (1991). Intergroup relations: Theories and positions. In D. Foster, & J. Louw-
Potgieter (Eds.),  Social psychology in South Africa (pp. 27-51). Isando, Gauteng: Lexicon 
Publishers. 
De la Rey, C., & Duncan, N. (2003). Racism: A social psychological perspective. In K. Ratele, & 
N. Duncan (Eds.), Social psychology:  Identities and relationships (pp. 45-66). Cape 
Town, Western Cape:  UCT Press. 
Devine, P.G. (1989). Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and controlled components.  
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56, 5-18. 
Devine, P.G. (2005). Breaking the prejudice habit: Allport’s “inner conflict” revised.  In J. 
Dovidio & S. Gaertner (Eds.), Prejudice, discrimination, and racism (pp. 327-342). New 
York: Academic Press. 
Devine, PG., Monteith, M.J., Zuwerink, J.R., & Elliot, A. (1991). Prejudice with and without 
compunction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60(6), 817-830. 
Devine, P.G., Plant, E.A., & Blair, I.V. (2003). Analysis of racial prejudice. In R. Brown & 
S.Gaertner (Eds.), Blackwell handbook of social psychology: Intergroup processes (pp. 
198-217).  Malden: MA: Blackwell Publishers. 
De Vos, A.S. (1998). Research at grass roots: A primer for the caring professions. Pretoria, 
Gauteng: Van Schaik. 
Dovidio, J.F. (1993). The subtlety of racism. Training and Development, 51-57. 
Dovidio, J.F. (2001). On the nature of contemporary prejudice: The third wave.  Journal of Social 
Issues, 57, 829-849. 
 168
Dovidio, J.F., & Gaertner, S.L. (1986). Prejudice, discrimination, and racism: Historical trends 
and contemporary approaches. In J. Dovidio & S. Gaertner (Eds.), Prejudice, 
discrimination, and racism  (pp. 1-34). New York: Academic Press. 
Dovidio, J.F., & Gaertner, SL. (2000). Aversive racism and selection decisions: 1989 and 1999. 
Psychological Science, 11(4), 315-319. 
Dovidio, J.F., & Gaertner, S.L. (2004). Aversive racism. In M.P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in 
experimental social psychology, vol. 36.  (pp. 1-52).  San Diego, CA: Elsevier Academic 
Press. 
Dovidio, J.F., Gaertner, S.L., Niemann, Y.F., & Snider, K. (2001). Racial, ethnic, and cultural 
differences in responding to distinctiveness and discrimination on campus: Stigma and 
common group identity. Journal of Social Issues.  Downloaded on October 2, 2006, from 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0341/is_1_57/ai_75140967. 
Dovidio, J.F., Gaertner, S.L., Validzic, A. (1998). Intergroup bias: Status, differentiation, and a 
common in-group identity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 109-120. 
Dovidio, J.F., Glick, P., & Rudman, L.A. (2005). Introduction: Reflecting on The Nature of 
Prejudice: Fifty years after Allport. In J.F. Dovidio, P.Glick, & L.A. Rudman (Eds.), On 
the Nature of Prejudice: Fifty years after Allport (pp.1-16). Oxford, UK: Blackwell 
Publishing. 
Dovidio, J.F., Kawakami, K., & Beach, K.R. (2003). Implicit and explicit attitudes: Examination 
of the relationship between measures of intergroup bias. In R. Brown & S.Gaertner (Eds.), 
Blackwell Handbook of social psychology: Intergroup processes (pp.175-197). Oxford, 
UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
 169
Dovidio, J., Kawakami, K., Johnson, C., Johnson, B., & Howard, A. (1997). On the nature of 
prejudice: Automatic and controlled processes. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 33, 510-540. 
Duckitt, J. (1991a).  Prejudice and racism.  In D. Foster & J. Louw-Potgieter (Eds.), Social 
psychology in South Africa (pp.171-205). Isando, Gauteng: Lexicon. 
Duckitt, J. (1991b). The development and validation of a subtle racism scale in South Africa.  
South African Journal of Psychology, 21, 233-239. 
Duckitt, J. (1992a). Patterns of prejudice: Group interests and intergroup attitudes. South African 
Journal of Psychology, 22(3), 147-156. 
Duckitt, J. (1992b). Psychology and prejudice: A historical analysis and integrative framework.  
American Psychologist, 47, 1182-1193. 
Duckitt, J. (1993a). Further validation of a subtle racism scale in South Africa. South African 
Journal of Psychology, 23, 116-119. 
Duckitt, J. (1993b). Right-wing authoritarianism among White South African students:  Its 
measurement and correlates. The Journal of Social Psychology, 133, 553-563. 
Duckitt, J. (1994). The social psychology of prejudice. Westport, CT: Preager Publishers. 
Duckitt, J. (2001). A dual-process cognitive motivational theory of ideology and prejudice. In 
M.P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology, Vol. 33.  San Diego, CA:  
Academic Press. 
Duckitt, J., & Farre, B. (1994). Right-wing authoritarianism and political intolerance among 
whites in the future majority-rule South Africa. The Journal of Social Psychology, 134, 
735-741.  
Duckitt, J., & Mphuthing, T. (1998). Group identification and intergroup attitudes: A longitudinal 
analysis in South Africa. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 80-85. 
 170
Duncan, N., Seedat, M., Van Niekerk, A., de la Rey, C., Gobodo-Madikezela, P., Simbayi, L.D., 
et al. (1997). Black scholarship: Doing something active and positive about academic 
racism. South African Journal of Psychology, 27 (4), 1-5. 
Dunn, E.W., & Spellman, B.A. (2003). Forgetting by remembering: Stereotype inhibition through 
rehearsal of alternative aspects of identity. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 39, 
420-433. 
Du Preez, P. (1980). The politics of identity: Ideology and the human image. Oxford:  Blackwell. 
Durheim, K. (2003). White opposition to racial transformation: Is it racism? South African 
Journal of Psychology, 33(4), 241-249. 
Du Toit, A. (1983). No chosen people: The myth of the Calvinist origins of Afrikaner nationalism 
and racial ideology. American Historical Review, 88, 920-952. 
Eades, L.M. (1999). The end of Apartheid in South Africa. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 
Eagly, A.H., & Carli, L.L. (1981). Sex of researchers and sex-typed communications as 
determinants of sex differences in influenceability: A meta-analysis of social influence 
studies. Psychological Bulletin, 85, 86-116. 
Eagly, A.H., & Chaiken, S. (1993). The psychology of attitudes. Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace. 
Eagly, A.H., & Chaiken, S. (2005). Attitude research in the 21st century: The current state of 
knowledge. In D. Abarracín, B.T. Johnson & M.P. Zanna (Eds.), The handbook of 
attitudes (pp.743-767). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Eagly, A.H., & Diekman, A.B. (2005). What is the problem? Prejudice as an attitude-in-context. 
In J.F. Dovidio, P.Glick, & L.A. Rudman (Eds.), On the Nature of Prejudice:  Fifty years 
after Allport (pp.19-25). Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing. 
 171
Eaton, M.C. (2001). Career decision-making self-efficacy of South African high school students 
and a comparison with Australian peers. Unpublished masters treatise, University of Port 
Elizabeth, Port Elizabeth. 
Eidelson, R.J., & Eidelson, J.I. (2003). Dangerous ideas: Five beliefs that propel groups towards 
conflict. American Psychologist, 58(3), 192-192. 
Elliot, G., & Tyson, G. (1983). The effects of modifying color-meaning concepts on the racial 
attitudes of black and white South African preschool children. Journal of Social 
Psychology, 121, 181-190. 
Erase Racism. (2006). What is institutional racism? Retrieved, November 9, 2006, from 
http://www.eraseracismny.org/institutional_racism 
Essed, P. (1991). Understanding everyday racism. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
Fabrigar, L.R., MacDonald, T.K., & Wegener, D.T. (2005). The structure of attitudes. In D. 
Abarracín, B.T. Johnson & M.P. Zanna (Eds.), The handbook of attitudes (pp.79-124).  
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Fanon, F. (1990). The wretched of the earth. London: Penguin Books. 
Farwell, L., & Weiner, B. (2000). Bleeding hearts and the heartless: Popular perceptions of liberal 
and conservative ideologies. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26(7), 845-852. 
Fazio, R.H., & Dunton, B.C. (1997). Categorization by race: The impact of automatic and 
controlled components of racial prejudice. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 33, 
451-470. 
Fazio, R.H., Jackson, J.R, Dunton, B.C., & Williams, C.J. (1995). Variability in automatic 
activations as an unobtrusive measure of racial attitudes: A bona fide pipeline? Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 69(6), 1013-1027. 
 172
Fazio, R.H., Sanbonmatus, D.M., Powell, M.C., & Kardes, F.R. (1986). On the automatic 
activation of attitudes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 229-238. 
Fein, S., & Spencer, S.J. (1997). Prejudice as self-image maintenance: Affirming the self through 
derogating others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 31-44. 
Finchilescu, G. (1988). Interracial contact in South Africa within the nursing context. Journal of 
Applied Social Psychology, 18, 1207-1221. 
Finchilescu, G., & Dawes, A. (2001). Adolescents’ perceptions of the future of South Africa.  In 
C.R. Stones (Ed.), Socio-political and psychological perspectives on South Africa (pp.131-
155). New York: Nova Science Publishers. 
Finnemore, M. (1998). UPE students and staff have their say about unfair discrimination.  Labour 
Relations Unit: University of Port Elizabeth. 
Foster, D. (1991a). A note on attitude measurement.  In D. Foster & J. Louw-Potgieter (Eds.), 
Social psychology in South Africa (pp. 487-505). Isando, Gauteng:  Lexicon Publishers. 
Foster, D. (1991b). ‘Race’ and racism in South African psychology.  South African Journal of 
Psychology, 21(4), 203-210. 
Foster, D. (1991c). Social influence I: Ideology. In D. Foster & J. Louw-Potgieter (Eds.), Social 
psychology in South Africa (pp. 345-391). Isando, Gauteng: Lexicon Publishers. 
Foster, D. (1993). On racism: Virulent mythologies and fragile threads. In L.J. Nicholas (Ed.), 
Psychology and oppression: Critiques and proposals (pp. 55-80). Braamfontein, Gauteng: 
Skotaville. 
Foster, D. (2001). Perpetrators of gross violations of human rights. In C.R. Stones (Ed.), Socio-
political and psychological perspectives on South Africa (pp.53-90). New York: Nova 
Science Publishers. 
 173
Foster, D. (2006). Theoretical and metatheoretical frames in inter-group psychology: Three 
competing perspectives. In K. Ratele (Ed.), Inter-group relations: South African 
perspectives (pp. 23-65). Cape Town, Western Cape: Juta & Co. 
Foster, D., & Finchilescu, G. (1986). Contact in a “non-contact” society. In M. Hewstone & R. 
Brown (Eds.), Contact and conflict in intergroup encounters. Oxford, UK:  Blackwell. 
Foster, D., & Nel, E. (1991). Attitudes and related concepts. In D. Foster & J. Louw-Potgieter 
(Eds.), Social psychology in South Africa (pp. 121-170). Isando, Gauteng: Lexicon 
Publishers. 
Fouché, C.B., & De Vos, A.S. (2002). Quantitative research designs. In A.S. De Vos (Ed.), 
Research at grass roots: For the social sciences and human service professions (2nd ed.)  
(pp.137-149). Pretoria, Gauteng: Van Schaik Publishers. 
Fox, R.  (1992). Prejudice and the unfinished mind: A new look at an old failing.  Psychological 
Inquiry, 3(2), 137-152. 
Franchi, V.E., & Swart, T.M. (2003). Identity dynamics and the policy of self-definition. In K. 
Ratele & N. Duncan. (Eds.), Social psychology: Identities and relationships (pp. 148-176). 
Cape Town, Western Cape: UCT Press. 
Franzoi, S.L. (2003). Social Psychology. (3rd ed.). USA: McGraw Hill. 
Fredrickson, G.M. (2002). Racism: A short history. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Gaertner, S.L., & Dovidio, J.F. (1977). The subtlety of White racism, arousal, and helping 
behaviour. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35, 23-30. 
Gaertner, S.L., & Dovidio, J.F. (1986). The aversive form of racism.  In J.F. Dovidio & S.L. 
Gaertner (Eds.), Prejudice, discrimination, and racism (pp. 61-89). New York:  Academic 
Press. 
 174
Gaertner, S.L., & Dovidio, J.F. (2005). Understanding and addressing contemporary racism: From 
aversive racism to the common ingroup identity model. Journal of Social Issues, 61 (3), 
615-639.   
Gaertner, S.L., Dovidio, J.F., Rust, M.C., Nier, J., Banker, B.S., Ward, C.M., et al. (1999).  
Reducing intergroup bias: Elements of intergroup cooperation. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 76, 388-402. 
Gaertner, S.L., Mann, J.A., Dovidio, J.F., Murrell, A.J., & Pomare, M. (1990). How does co-
operation reduce intergroup bias? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59, 692-
704. 
Garcia-Marques, L., & Mackie, D.M. (1999). The impact of stereotype-incongruent information 
on perceived group variability and stereotype change. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 77(5), 979-990. 
Gibbons, F.X., Gerrard, M., Cleveland, M.J., Wills, T.A., & Brody, G. (2004). Perceived 
discrimination and substance abuse in African American parents and their children: A 
panel study.  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 86, 517-529. 
Gilbert, D.T., & Hixon, J.G. (1991). The trouble of thinking: Activation and application of 
stereotypical beliefs. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60, 509-517. 
Giliomee, H., & Schlemmer, L. (1989). From apartheid to nation building.  Cape Town, Western 
Cape:  Oxford University Press. 
Glover, R.J. (1995). Using moral and epistemological reasoning as predictors of prejudice.  
Journal of Social Psychology, 134(5), 633-640. 
Gough, H.G. (1951). Studies of social intolerance: IV. Related social attitudes. Journal of Social 
Psychology, 3, 263-269. 
 175
Gordijn, E.H., Hindriks, I., & Koomen, W. (2004). Consequences of stereotype suppression and 
internal suppression of motivation: A self-regulation approach. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 30(2), 212-214. 
Gordijn, E.H., Koomen, W., & Stapel, D.A. (2001). Level of prejudice in relation to knowledge of 
cultural stereotypes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 37, 150-157. 
Gonzalez, J. (2001). The effect of social desirability on the self report of prejudice, 
discrimination, tolerance, and empathy. Retrieved August 6, 2006, from 
http://www.psichi.org/awards/winners/abstracts/allbac_02.asp. 
Greenwald, A.G., McGhee, D.E., & Schwartz, J.L.K. (1998). Measuring individual differences in 
implicit cognition: The implicit association test. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 74, 1464-1480. 
Guillaumin, C. (1995). Racism, sexism, power and ideology. London:  Routledge. 
Hafer, C.L., & Olson, J.M. (1993). Beliefs in a just world, discontent, and assertive actions by 
working women. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 19, 30-38. 
Hamilton, D.L., & Trolier, T.K. (1986). Stereotypes and stereotyping: An overview of the 
cognitive approach. In J.F. Dovidio & S.L. Gaerner (Eds.),  Prejudice, discrimination and 
racism (pp.127-159). Orlando, FA:  Academic Press. 
Hampel, R., & Krupp, B. (1977). The cultural and political framework of prejudice in South 
Africa and Great Britain. Journal of Social Psychology, 103, 193-202. 
Harding, J., Proshansky, H., Kutner, B., & Chein, I. (1969). Prejudice and ethic relations. In G. 
Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology, Vol. 5  (pp.1-76).  
Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
 176
Harley, D.A., Jolivette, K., McCormick, K., & Tice, K. (2002). Race, class, and gender: A 
constellation of positionalities with implications for counseling.  Journal of Multicultural 
Counseling and Development, 30, 216-238. 
Harris, M.B. (1998).  Basic statistics for behavioural science research. Boston: Allyn & Bacon. 
Hatting, J.F.J., Harvey, E.W., Saayman, J.N., & Van Jaarsveldt, M. (Eds.) (1987). Disability in 
the Republic of South Africa, Vol. 4. Pretoria: Department of National Health. 
Heine, S.J., Lehman, D.R., Peng, K, & Greenholtz, J.  (2002). What’s wrong with cross-cultural 
comparisons of subjective Likert scales?  The reference-group effect.  Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 82(6), 903-918. 
Heaven, P.L.C., & Groenwald, H.J. (1977). New social distance data of English-speaking South 
Africans. Psychological Reports, 40, 247-249. 
Heaven, P.L.C., & Moerdyk, A. (1977). Prejudice revisited: A pilot study using Ray’s scale.  
Journal of Behavioural Science, 2, 217-220. 
Heaven, P.C.L., Organ, L., Supavadeeprasit, S., & Leeson, P. (2006). War and prejudice: A study 
of social values, right-wing authoritarianism, and social dominance orientation.  
Personality and Individual Differences, 40, 599-608. 
Hewstone, M. (1990). The ‘ultimate attribution error’? A review of the literature on intergroup 
causal attribution. European Journal of Social Psychology, 20, 311-335. 
Himmelfarb, S.  (1993).  The measurement of attitudes.  In A.H. Eagly & S. Chaiken (Eds.), The 
psychology of attitudes (pp.23-87).  Fort Worth, TX:  Harcourt Brace. 
Hinton, P.R. (2004). Statistics explained  (2nd ed.). London: Routledge. 
Hippel, W. V., Hawkins, C, & Schooler, J. W. (2001). Stereotype distinctiveness: How 
counterstereotypic behavior shapes the self-concept. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 81(2), 193-205. 
 177
Hofmeyer, J. (1990). How white political opinions have changed: 1977-1990.  Monitor, 37-42. 
Hofstee, E. (2006). Constructing a good dissertation. Johannesburg, Gauteng: EPE. 
Holtman, Z., Louw, J., Tredoux, C., & Carney, T.  (2005). Prejudice and social contact in South 
Africa: A study of integrated schools ten years after apartheid. South African Journal of 
Psychology, 35 (3), 473-493. 
Hook, D. (2004). Racism as abjection: A psychoanalytic conceptualisation. South African Journal 
of Psychology, 34(4), 672-703. 
Hoxter, A.L., & Lester, D. (1994). Gender differences in prejudice. Perception and Motor Skills, 
79, 1666. 
Hunsberger, B. (1996). Religious fundamentalism, Right-Wing Authoritarianism, and hostility 
toward homosexuals in non-Christian religious groups. International Journal for the 
Psychology of Religion, 6, 39-49. 
Hunsberger, B., Owusu, V., & Duck, R. (1999). Religion and prejudice in Ghana and Canada:  
Religious fundamentalism, Right-Wing Authoritarianism. International Journal for the 
Psychology of Religion, 9(3), 181-194. 
Jackman, M.R. (2005).  Rejection or inclusion of outgroups? In J.F. Dovidio, P. Glick and L.A. 
Rudman (Eds.), On the nature of prejudice: Fifty years after Allport (pp. 89-105).  
Malden, MA:  Blackwell Publishing.  
Jarvis, W.B.G., & Petty, R.E. (1996). The need to evaluate. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 70, 172-194. 
Johnson, R.W. (2004). South Africa: First man, last nation. Johannesburg, Gauteng: Jonathan 
Ball Publishers. 
 178
Johnson, B.T., Maio, G.R., & Smith-McLallen, A. (2005). Communication and attitude change: 
Causes, processes and effects. In D. Abarracín, B.T. Johnson and M.P. Zanna. (Eds.), The 
handbook of attitudes (pp.617-669). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Jones, J.M. (1997). Prejudice and racism. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Jost, J.T., & Banaji, M.R. (1994). The role of stereotyping in system-justification and the 
production of false consciousness. British Journal of Social Psychology, 33, 1-27.  
Jost, J.T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A.W., & Sulloway, F.J. (2003).  Political conservatism as 
motivated social cognition.  Psychological Bulletin, 129, 339-375. 
Kaiser, C.R., & Miller, C.T. (2001). Stop complaining! The cost of making attributions to 
discrimination. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 254-263. 
Kanahara, S. (2006). A review of the definitions of stereotype and a proposal for a progressional 
model. Individual Differences Research, 4(5), 306-321. 
Karlsen, S., & Nazroo, J.Y. (2002). Relations between racial discrimination, social class, and 
health among ethnic minority groups. American Journal of Public Health, 92(4), 624-633. 
Karpinski, A., & Hilton, J.L. (2001). Attitudes and the Implicit Association Test. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 774-788. 
Katz, D., & Braly, K.W. (1933). Racial stereotypes of 100 college students. Journal of Abnormal 
and Social Psychology, 28, 280-290. 
Katz, I., & Hass, R.G. (1988). Racial ambivalence and American value conflict: Correlational and 
priming studies of dual cognitive structures. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 55(6), 893-905. 
Katz, I., Wackenhut, J., & Hass, R. (1986). Racial ambivalence, value duality, and behaviour.  In 
J. Dovidio & S. Gaertner (Eds.), Prejudice, discrimination, and racism (pp. 35-60).  San 
Diego, CA:  Academic Press. 
 179
Kawakami, K., Dovidio, J.F., Moll, J., Hermson, S., & Russin, A. (2000). Just say no (to 
stereotyping): Effects of training in the negation of stereotypic associations on stereotype 
activation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78, 871-888. 
Kenworthy, J.B., Turner, R.N., Hewstone, M., & Voci, A. (2005). Intergroup contact: When does 
it work, and why? In J.F. Dovidio, P.Glick, & L.A. Rudman (Eds.), On the Nature of 
Prejudice:Fifty years after Allport (pp.278-292). Oxford, UK:  Blackwell Publishing. 
Kerlinger, F.N., & Lee, H.B. (2000). Foundations of behavioural research (4th ed.).  USA:  
Wadsworth Thomson Learning. 
Kinder, D.R., & Sears, D.O. (1981). Prejudice and politics: Symbolic racism versus racial threats 
to the good life.  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 40, 414-431. 
Kleinpenning, G., and Hagendoorn, L. (1993). Forms of racism and the cumulative dimension of 
ethnic attitudes. Social Psychology Quarterly,  56, 21–36.  
Korf, L., & Malan, J. (2002). Threat to ethnic identity: The experience of White Afrikaans-
speaking participants in postapartheid South Africa. The Journal of Social Psychology, 
142, 149-169. 
Krosnick, J.A., Judd, C.M., & Wittenbrink, B. (2005). The measurement of attitudes. In D. 
Abarracín, B.T. Johnson and M.P. Zanna (Eds.), The handbook of attitudes (pp. 21-76). 
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Kunda, Z., & Oleson, K.C. (1995). Maintaining stereotypes in the face of disconfirmation:  
Constructing grounds for subtyping deviants. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 68(4), 565-579. 
Laythe, B., Finkel, D., & Kirkpatric, L.A. (2001). Predicting prejudice from religious 
fundamentalism and Right-Wing Authoritarianism: A multiple-regression approach.  
 180
Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 40(1). Retrieved September 29, 2006, from 
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/101111/0021-8294.00033.htm  
Lea, S.J., Bokhorst, F.D., & Colenso, J. (1995). The empirical relationship between the constructs 
of traditional and symbolic racism. South African Journal of Psychology, 25, 224-228. 
Leach, C.W. (2005). Against the notion of a ‘new racism’.  Journal of Community and Applied 
Social Psychology, 15, 432-445. 
Leach, C.W., Spears, R., Branscombe, N.R., & Doosje, B. (2003). Malicious pleasure:  
Schadenfreude at the suffering of another group. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 84, 932-943. 
Leary, M.R. (1991). Introduction to behavioral research methods. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 
Leedy, P. (1993). Practical research, planning and design. Columbus, Ohio: Merril. 
Lemyre, L., & Smith, P.M. (1985). Intergroup discrimination and self-esteem in the minimal 
group paradigm. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49, 660-670. 
Lepore, L., & Brown, R. (1997). Category and stereotype activation: Is prejudice inevitable?  
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 275-287. 
Le Roux, P. (1986). Growing up an Afrikaner. In S. Burman & P. Reynolds (Eds.), Growing up in 
a divided society: The contexts of childhood in South Africa (pp.184-207). Johannesburg, 
Gauteng: Ravan Press. 
Lever, H.  (1969). Are university students more tolerant than the general public? South African 
Journal of Science, 65, 321-324. 
Lever, H. (1972). Changes in ethnic attitudes in South Africa. Sociology and Social Research, 56, 
202-210. 
Lewis, N. (2005). Luster’s lost quarter. Journal of Postcolonial Writing, 41, 166-178. 
Lord, C.G. (1997). Social psychology. Fort Worth, TX: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston. 
 181
Louw-Potgieter, J. (1991).  Language and identity. In D. Foster., & J. Louw-Potgieter. (Eds.), 
Social psychology in South Africa (pp. 317-344). Isando, Gauteng: Lexicon Publishers. 
 
Louw, J., & Foster, D. (1991). Historical perspective: Psychology and group relations in South 
Africa. In D. Foster., & J. Louw-Potgieter. (Eds.), Social psychology in South Africa (pp. 
57-88). Isando, Gauteng: Lexicon. 
Lui, J.H., & Mills, D.  (2006). Modern racism and neo-liberal globalization: The discourses of 
plausible deniability and their multiple functions. Journal of Community and Applied 
Social Psychology, 16, 83-99. 
Luiz, D., & Krige, P. (1981). The effect of social contact between South African White and 
Coloured adolescent girls. The Journal of Social Psychology, 113, 153-158. 
Macrae, C.N.,  Bodenhausen, G.V., Milne, A.B., & Jetten, J. (1994). Out of mind but back in 
sight: Stereotypes on the rebound. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67(5), 
808-817. 
Macleod, C.  (2004). South African psychology and ‘relevance’: Continuing challenges.  South 
African Journal of Psychology, 34, 613-620. 
Major, B., Spencer, S., Schmader, T., Wolfe, C., & Crocker, J. (1998). Coping with negative 
stereotypes about intellectual performance: The role of psychological disengagement.  
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 24, 34-50. 
Makaula, M.N. (2005).  Ten years of democracy, 1994-2004: The experiences and perceptions of 
selected women of New Brighton, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality.  
Unpublished masters treatise: Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University. 
 182
Manstead, A.S.R., & Semin, G.R. (2001). Methodology in Social Psychology (pp. 73-111).  In M. 
Hewstone, & W. Stroebe, (Eds), Introduction to social psychology  (3rd ed.).  UK:  
Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
McCauley, C., & Stitt, C.L. (1978).  An individual and quantitative measure of stereotypes.  
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36(9), 929-940. 
McConahay, J.B. (1986). Modern racism, ambivalence and the Modern Racism Scale. In J.F. 
Dovidio & S.L. Gaerner. (Eds.), Prejudice, discrimination, and racism (pp. 91-124). San 
Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
McConnell, A.R., & Leibold, J.M. (2001). Relations among the Implicit Association Test, 
discriminatory behaviour, and explicit measures of racial attitudes. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 37, 435-442. 
Meertens, R.W., & Pettigrew, T.F. (1997). Is subtle prejudice really prejudice? Public Opinion 
Quarterly, 61, 54-71. 
Melamed, L. (1968). Race awareness in South African children. South African Journal of 
Psychology, 76, 3-8. 
Melamed, L. (1970). Ethnic attitudes of South African children. South African Journal of 
Pscyhology, 1, 13-17. 
Mellor, D. (2003). Contemporary racism in Australia: The experience of aborigines.  Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 474-486. 
Mellor, D., Bynon, G., Maller, J., Cleary, F., Hamilton, A., & Watson, L. (2001). The perception 
of racism in ambiguous scenarios. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 27(3), 473-
488. 
 183
Meyer, I., & Finchilescu, F. (2006). The social dominance theory perspective on discrimination 
and prejudice. In K. Ratele (Ed.) Inter-group relations: South African perspectives (pp. 
66-86). Cape Town, Western Cape: Juta. 
Miles, R. (1989). Racism. London: Routledge. 
Monteith, M.J., Spicer, C.V., & Tooman, G.D. (1998). Consequences of stereotype suppression: 
Stereotypes on and not on the rebound. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 34, 
355-377. 
Morse, S.J., & Peele, S. (1975). A socio-economic and attitudinal comparison of white and 
coloured adults in Cape Town. In S.J. Morse & C. Orpen (Eds.), Contemporary South 
Africa.  Cape Town, Western Cape:  Juta. 
Mouton, J. (1996). Understanding social research. Pretoria, Gauteng: J.L. van Schaik. 
Müller, G.A. (2005). The career decision-making self-efficacy of South African adolescents with 
respect to gender, grade, and culture. Unpublished masters treatise: Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan University. 
Mummendey, A., & Otten, S. (2003). Aversive discrimination. In R. Brown & S.Gaertner. (Eds.), 
Blackwell Handbook of social psychology: Intergroup processes (pp. 112-132). Oxford, 
UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
Myers, D.G. (2005). Social psychology  (8th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.  
Mynhardt, J. (1980). Prejudice among Afrikaans- and English speaking South African students. 
Journal of Social Psychology, 110, 9-17. 
Nelson, T.D.  (2006). The psychology of prejudice  (2nd ed.). Boston: Pearson Education. 
Neuman, W.L. (2006). Social research methods: Qualitative and quantitative approaches (6th 
ed.). Boston: Allyn and Bacon. 
 184
Neumann, R., & Seibt, B. (2001). The structure of prejudice: associative strength as a determinant 
of stereotype endorsement. European Journal of Social Psychology, 31(6), 609-620.   
Nieuwoudt, J.M., & Plug, C.  (1983). South African ethnic attitudes:  1973 – 1978.  Journal of 
Social Psychology, 121, 163-171. 
Nieuwoudt, J.M., Plug, C., & Mynhardt, J. (1977). White ethnic attitudes after Soweto: A field 
experiment. South African Journal of Sociology, 16, 1-12. 
Nosek, B.A., Banji, M.R., & Greenwald, A.G. (2002). Math = male, me = female, therefore math 
not = me. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 44-59. 
O’Donnell, J.P. (1993). Predicting tolerance of new religious movements: A multivariate analysis. 
Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 4, 356-366. 
Olson, M.A., & Fazio, R.H. (2004). Reducing the influence of extrapersonal associations on the 
Implicit Association Test: Personalizing the IAT. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 86, 653-667. 
Orne, M.T. (1962). On the social psychology of the psychological experiment: With particular 
reference to demand characteristics and their implications. American Psychologist, 17, 
776-783. 
Pedersen, A., & Walker, I. (1997). Prejudice against Australian Aborigines: Old-fashioned and 
modern forms. European Journal of Social Psychology, 27, 561-587. 
Perdue, C.W., Dovidio, J.F., Gurtman, M.B., & Tyler, R.B. (1990). “Us” and “them”: Social 
categorization and the process of intergroup bias. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 59, 475-486. 
Pettigrew, T.F. (1958). Personality and socio-cultural factors in intergroup attitudes: A cross-
national comparison. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2, 29-42. 
 185
Pettigrew, T.F. (1979). Racial change and social policy. Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, 441, 114-131. 
Pettigrew, T.F. (1997). Generalized intergroup contact effects on prejudice. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 23(2), 173-185. 
Pettigrew, T., & Meertens, R. (1995). Subtle and blatant prejudice in Western Europe.  European 
Journal of Social Psychology, 25, 57-75. 
Pettigrew, T.F., & Tropp, L.R. (2005). Allport’s intergroup contact hypothesis: Its history and 
influence. In J.F. Dovidio, P.Glick, & L.A. Rudman (Eds.), On the Nature of Prejudice:  
Fifty years after Allport (pp. 262-277). Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing. 
Pillay, N.S., & Collings,. S.J. (2004). Racism on a South African Campus: A survey of students’ 
experiences and attitudes. Society of Personality Research.  Retrieved April 19, 2006, 
from http://www.findarticles.com.   
Plug, C. & Nieuwoudt, J.M.  (1983). South African ethnic attitudes 1973-1978. Reports from the 
Psychology Department, No. 8.  Pretoria, Gauteng: University of South Africa. 
Pratt, P.B. (1995). The end of apartheid in South Africa. San Diego:  Lucent Books. 
Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., Stallworth, L.M. & Malle, B.F. (1994). Social dominance orientation:  A 
personality variable predicting social and political attitudes. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 67, 741-763. 
Ramsy, F.L., & Schafer, R. (2002). The statistical sleuth: A course in methods of data analysis 
(2nd ed.). Pacific Grove, CA: Wadsworth. 
Rankin, R.E., & Campbell, D.T. (1955).  Galvanic skin response to Negro and White 
experimenters.  Journal of Abnormal & Social Psychology, 51, 30-33. 
 186
Ratele, K.  (2006). Introduction: Intergroup psychologies, after apartheid. In K. Ratele (Ed.), 
Inter-group relations: South African perspectives (pp. 1-22). Cape Town, Western Cape:  
Juta & Co. 
Ray, J.J. (1976). Do authoritarians hold authoritarian attitudes? Human Relations, 29, 307-325. 
Reber, A.S., & Reber, E. (2001). The penguin dictionary of psychology (3rd ed.). London:  
Penguin Books. 
Rogers, W.S. (2003). Social psychology: Experimental and critical approaches  Glasgow, UK: 
Open University Press. 
Rothbart, M., & Lewis, S. (1988). Inferring category attributes from exemplar attributes:  
Geometric shapes and social categories. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55, 
861-872. 
Rowatt, W.C. & Franklin, L.M. (2002). Christian orthodoxy, religious fundamentalism, and 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism as predictors of implicit racial prejudice. International 
Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 14(2), 125-138. 
Rudman, L.A., Ashmore, R.D., & Gary, M.L. (2001). Unlearned automatic biases: The 
malleability of implicit prejudice and stereotypes. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 81(5), 856-868. 
Ruggiero, K., & Taylor, D.  (1995). Coping with discrimination: How disadvantaged group 
members perceive the discrimination that confronts them. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 68, 826-838. 
Ruggiero, K., & Taylor, C. (1997).  Why minority group members perceive or do not perceive the 
discrimination that confronts them.  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 
373-389. 
 187
Russo, R. (2003). Statistics for the behavioural sciences: An introduction. New York:  Psychology 
Press. 
Sampson, E.E. (1999). Dealing with differences: An introduction to the social psychology of 
prejudice. Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt College Publishers. 
Schaller, M., Conway, L. G., & Tanchuk, T. L. (2002). Selective pressures on the once and future 
contents of ethnic stereotypes: Effects of the communicability of traits. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 82(6), 861-876. 
Schmader, T., & Johns, M.  (2003). Converging evidence that stereotype threat reduces working 
memory capacity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 440-451. 
Schneider, M.E., Major, B., Luhtanen, R., & Crocker, J. (1996). Social stigma and the potential 
costs of assumptive help. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22(2), 201-209. 
Sears, D.O. (1988).  Symbolic racism. In P.A. Katz & D.A. Taylor (Eds.), Eliminating racism:  
Profiles in controversy. Perspectives in social psychology (pp. 53-84). New York: Plenum. 
Sears, D.O. (2005). Inner conflict in the political psychology of racism. In J. Dovidio & S. 
Gaertner (Eds.), Prejudice, discrimination, and racism (pp. 343-358). New York:  
Academic Press. 
Sears, D.O., & Henry, P.J. (2003). The origins of symbolic racism.  Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 85(2), 259-275. 
Seibt, B., & Forster, J.  (2004). Stereotype threat and performance: How self-stereotypes influence 
processing by inducing regulatory foci. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 
38-56. 
Seltzer, R., Frazier, M., and Ricks, I. (1995). Multiculturalism, race, and education. Journal of 
Black Education, 64, 124–140. 
 188
Sidanius, J. (1993). The interface between racism and sexism. Journal of Psychology, 127, 314-
318. 
Sidanius, J., Devereux, E., & Pratto, F. (1992). A comparison of symbolic racism theory and 
social dominance theory as explanations for racial policy attitudes. The Journal of Social 
Psychology, 132(3), 377-395. 
Sidanus, J., Pratto, F., & Bobo, L. (1996). Racism, conservatism, affirmative action, and 
intellectual sophistication. A matter of principled conservatism or group dominance?  
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 476-490. 
Sigall, H., & Page, R. (1971). Current stereotypes: A little fading, a little faking. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 18, 247-255. 
Sinha, A.K., & Upadhyaya, O.P. (1960). Change and persistence in the stereotypes of university 
students towards different ethnic groups during the Sino-Indian border dispute.  Journal of 
Social Psychology, 52, 31-39.   
Shavelson, R.J. (1988). Statistical reasoning for the behavioural sciences (2nd ed.). Needham 
Hights, MA: Allyn & Bacon. 
Smedley, A. & Smedley, B.D. (2005). Race as biology is fiction, racism as a social problem is 
real:  Anthropological and historical perspectives on the social construction of race.  
American Psychologist, 60, 16-26. 
Smith T.B., & Boero, J.V. (2001). Racial attitudes and the contact hypothesis: A systematic 
integrative review. In C.R. Stones (Ed.), Socio-political and psychological perspectives on 
South Africa (pp.113-129). New York: Nova Science Publishers. 
Smith, T.B, & Stones, C. R. (1999). Identities and racial attitudes of South African and American 
adolescents: A cross-cultural examination. South African Journal of Psychology, 29, 23-
29. 
 189
Smith, T.B., & Stones, C.R. (2001). Perceptions of social change and cross-cultural differences 
among South African adolescents. In C.R. Stones (Ed.), Socio-political and psychological 
perspectives on South Africa (pp.158-172). New York: Nova Science Publishers. 
Smith, T., Stones, C. R., & Naidoo, A. (2003). Racial attitudes among South African young 
adults: A four-year follow-up study. South African Journal of Psychology, 33, 39-43. 
Smith, T.B., Stratton, J., Stones, C.R., & Naidoo, A. (2003). Ethnic identity and racial attitudes in 
a minority group of mixed racial origin. Psychological Reports, 92, 284-290. 
Solomos, J., & Back, L. (1996).  Racism and society. Malaysia: MacMillan Press. 
Spangenberg, J., & Nel, E.M. (1983). The effect of equal-status contact on ethnic attitudes.  
Journal of Social Psychology, 121, 173-180. 
Sparks, A. (2003). The Mind of South Africa. Cape Town, Western Cape: Jonathan Ball. 
Stangor, C., Swim, J.K., Van Allen, K.L., & Sechrist, G.B. (2002). Reporting discrimination in 
public and private contexts. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1, 69-74. 
Statsoft.  (1995). STATISTICA for Windows (2nd ed., Vol.3) [Computer Software]. Tulsa, OK:  
Author. 
Statistics South Africa (2002).  Stats in brief. Pretoria, Gauteng: Author. 
Steele, C.M., & Aronson, J. (1995). Stereotype threat and the intellectual test performance of 
African Americans. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 797-811. 
Stevens, G., & Lockhat, R. (2003). Black adolescent identity during and after apartheid. In K. 
Ratele, & N. Duncan. (Eds.), Social psychology: Identities and relationships (pp. 130-
147). Cape Town, Western Cape: UCT Press. 
Stones, C.R., Heaven, P.C.L., & Bester, C. (1997). Political change and social attitudes in South 
Africa. Social Behaviour and Personality, 25(2), 105-114. 
 190
 Struwig, F.W., & Stead, G.B. (2001). Planning, designing, and reporting research. Cape Town, 
Western Cape: Pearson Education Press. 
Strydom, H. (2002). Ethical aspects of research in the social sciences and human service 
professions. In A.S. De Vos (Ed.), Research at grass roots:For the social sciences and 
human service professions (2nd ed.) (pp.137-149). Pretoria, Gauteng: Van Schaik. 
Strydom, H. & Venter, L. (2002).  Sampling and sampling methods. In A.S. De Vos (Ed.), 
Research at grass roots: For the social sciences and human service professions (2nd ed.) 
(pp.137-149). Pretoria, Gauteng: Van Schaik. 
Sue, D.W. (2005).  Racism and the conspiracy of silence. The Counseling Psychologist, 33(1), 
100-114. 
Suffla, S., & Seedat, M. (2004). How has psychology fared over ten years of democracy?  
Achievements, challenges and questions. South African Journal of Psychology, 34(4), 
513-519. 
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J.C. (1986).  The social identity theory of intergroup behaviour.  In 
S.Worchel & W.G. Austin (Eds.), The psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 7-24). 
Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall. 
Taylor, D.M., & Dube, L. (1986). Two faces of identity: The ”I” and the ”we”.  Journal of Social 
Issues, 42, 81-98. 
Taylor, S.E., Peplau, L.A., & Sears, D.O. (2006).  Social psychology  (12th ed.). New Jersey, NJ: 
Pearson Prentice Hall. 
Thiele, G.  (1991). Verandering en stabiliteit in die evaluatiewe stereotipes van blankes en 
kleurlinge in Suid-Afrika 1973-1980/4.  South African Journal of Psychology, 21, 211-
218.    
Thompson, L.M. The political mythology of apartheid. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
 191
Trochim, W.M.K. (2002). Non-probability sampling. Retrieved April 13, 2006, from 
http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/desintro.htm. 
Trochim, W.M.K. (2006).  Dummy variables. Retrieved December 12, 2006, from 
http://www.socialresearchmethods.net. 
Twenge, J.M., & Campbell, W.K. (2002). Self-esteem and socioeconomic status: A meta-
analytical review. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 6(1), 59-71. 
Tyson, G.A., Schlachter, A., & Cooper, S. (1988). Game playing strategy as an indicator of racial 
prejudice among South African students. Journal of Social Psychology, 17, 143-156. 
Van den Berghe, P.L. (1962). Race attitudes in Durban, South Africa. Journal of Social 
Psychology, 57, 55-72. 
Van den Berghe, P.L. (1967). Race and racism: A comparative perspective. New York:  Wiley. 
Van Lill, J.B., & Grieve, K.S. (1994). Descriptive statistics for students in the human sciences. 
Pretoria, Gauteng: Sigma Press. 
Voci, A. (2006). The link between identification and in-group favouritism: Effects of threat to 
social identity and trust-related emotions. British Journal of Social Psychology, 45, 265-
284. 
Voster, J., & Proctor, L. (1976). Black attitudes to “White” languages in South Africa: A pilot 
study. Journal of Psychology, 92, 103-108. 
Wade, R., & Lewis, F. (2004). Christian orthodoxy, religious fundamentalism, and Right-Wing 
Authoritarianism as predictors of implicit racial prejudice. International Journal for the 
Psychology of Religion, 14 (2), 125-139. 
Weary, G., Jacobson, J. A., Edwards, J. A., & Tobin, S. J. (2001). Chronic and temporarily 
activated casual uncertainty beliefs and stereotype usage. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 81(2), 206-219. 
 192
Weber, R., & Crocker, J. (1983). Cognitive processes in the revision of stereotypic beliefs.  
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45(5), 961-977. 
Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged (2nd ed.).  
(1965). New York: The Publishers Guild. 
Wicker, A.W. (1969). Attitudes versus actions: The relationship of verbal and overt behavioural 
responses to attitude objects. Journal of Social Issues, 25, 41-78. 
Wigboldus, D.H.J., Dijksterhuis, A., & Van Knippenberg, A. (2003). When stereotypes get in the 
way: Stereotypes obstruct stereotype-inconsistent train inferences. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 84(3), 470-484. 
Wilson, D.C. (2006). Blacks’ racial attitudes:  Perceived racial context, racial threat and self-
reported prejudice.  Dissertation abstracts International Section A: Humanities and Social 
Sciences, 66 (9-A), 3449. 
Wittenbrink, B., Judd, C. M, & Park, B. (2001). Spontaneous prejudice in context: Variability in 
automatically activated attitudes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 815-
827.  
Zuckerman, M. (1990). Some dubious premises in research and theory of racial differences.  
American Psychologist, 45, 1297-1303. 
  
